





RECOMMENDATIONS.

From REV. DR. NOTT, *President of Union College, Schenectady, New York.*

Though I have not had it in my power to examine the whole of the *Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*, and though not entirely subscribing to every proposition laid down, in the portion of the work which I have examined, it gives me pleasure to say, that it is, considering its limits, very comprehensive—that it evinces an extensive examination of authors, both ancient and modern—and contains an abstract of whatever is pertinent and valuable in the same. No book of the kind that has fallen under my notice, is better calculated for youth in Schools and Academies, and its production, therefore, may be regarded as a fresh and valuable contribution to the helps already so liberally afforded to the rising generation for becoming acquainted with whatever in that department is desirable to be known. I therefore cheerfully recommend its use to those pursuing an education in all elementary Institutions of learning.

Yours, &c.,

ELIPHALET NOTT.

From REV. E. P. BARROWS, *Professor of Sacred Literature in Western Reserve College, Hudson, O.*

MESSRS. DEWEY & ELKINS: In the “*Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*,” Mr Hall has, with great diligence and extensive research, prepared and arranged in regular order, a summary of what is taught by the most eminent English and Scotch metaphysicians respecting the human mind, (availing himself also, to some extent, of the writings of other authors who have treated on the subject) and has simplified the subject as far, perhaps, as it admits of simplification, and thus adapted it to the use of Schools and Academies. It is my opinion, that to those who study it, it will furnish a good outline of Mental Philosophy, according to the system of the authors above referred to, and, as such, I would cheerfully recommend its use to those pursuing an education in elementary Institutions of learning.

At the same time, I do not wish to be understood as assenting to every proposition contained in the book. This could hardly be expected in the case of a Science respecting which such a diversity of opinion exists.

E. P. BARROWS.

From REV. EDWARD E. ATWATER, *Pastor of the First Congregational Church, Ravenna, O.*

MR. DEWEY — *Dear Sir* : Having had an opportunity of perusing the *Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*, prepared by Mr. Hall, of this village, to be used as a manual of instruction in Schools, I take pleasure in saying, that I think the book worthy of success in the sphere for which it is designed. While we have many other treatises on mental science which would be preferred by those of mature minds, this book supplies a want which must have been felt by every teacher of youth. It can be understood by those for whom it was written, and will furnish their minds with an "Outline," which may be filled up with subsequent study and reflection.

Yours, truly,

EDWARD E. ATWATER.

From MR. W. D. BEATTIE, *Principal of the Classical and English School, Cleveland, O.*

I have cursorily examined the *Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*, by L. W. Hall, and am highly pleased with the design and execution of the work. The author has not detracted from the dignity of his science, by omitting or mincing difficult and important points, and at the same time, he has treated his subject with so much clearness and precision, that the attentive pupil cannot fail to be interested, as well as benefitted by the study. It can hardly be doubted, that, when the merits of the work are known, it will come into extensive use in our High Schools and Academies.

W. D. BEATTIE.

From the HON. ELISHA N. SILL, *Cuyahoga Falls, O., one of the Trustees of Western Reserve College.*

MR. DEWEY: I have been able to make but a very hasty and most superficial examination of Mr. Hall's *Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*, but I am much pleased with the design of the work, and doubt not that it will prove highly beneficial to the cause of education. It supplies a very great deficiency in our School literature; and I presume that intelligent teachers will hasten to avail themselves of the opportunity furnished them by Mr. Hall's text book, of introducing this misunderstood and neglected, but important science, into their Schools.

Should this *Elementary* text book of Mental Philosophy accom-

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plish no more than to awaken a proper interest in this science, as a suitable branch of School education, Mr. Hall will have earned the gratitude of the friends of education. I trust, however, that he will receive a more substantial reward for his meritorious labors.

Very truly yours, &c.,

E. N. SILL.

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From Mr. T. PARNELL BEACH, *Principal of the Classical and English School, Akron, O.*

MR. DEWEY: I have thoroughly examined the *Outlines of Mental Philosophy*, by Mr. Hall, of Ravenna. I have no hesitation in saying that its manly independence, and great perspicuity, particularly in the mode of questioning, will render it a valuable aid to the faithful teacher, in imparting to the young an elementary knowledge of the science on which it treats; and I sincerely desire that it may prove an introduction to this branch of education into every District School in the country.

Yours, &c..

T. PARNELL BEACH.

From Gen. JOHN CROWELL, *of Warren, O., formerly principal of an Academy, and now a member of the Bar.*

DEAR SIR: I have read the sheets of Mr. Hall's *Elementary Outlines of Mental Philosophy*, for which I am indebted to your politeness, and think it supplies a desideratum in our series of School Books.

Mr. Hall has been known for some time as a successful teacher, and this unassuming little volume, upon an important branch of science, cannot fail, in my opinion, to extend his well earned reputation as an instructor of youth. Moral culture has been too much neglected in our schools; it should be a prominent object of education to improve the heart as well as to inform the mind, and to instruct the moral as well as the intellectual faculties.

Mental Philosophy, from the character of the subjects which it embraces, and its intimate connection with ethical science, is better fitted than almost any other branch of learning, to accomplish this object. It should, therefore, it seems to me, be introduced into our schools, and receive that attention in the instruction of youth which it justly merits.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

JOHN CROWELL.

From WILLIAM S. C. OTIS, Esq., *Prosecuting Attorney of Summit County, Ohio.*

MESSRS. DEWEY & ELKINS:—I have examined the *Elementary Outlines of Mental Philosophy*, prepared by Mr. Hall, and as a whole, I deem it a judicious and valuable compilation, and happily adapted to that class of persons for whose use it is designed. Whoever has been engaged in the instruction of youth in Academies, and Schools of that grade, must have felt the want of some familiar work on the elementary principles of mental science, as the treatises hitherto published on this subject are fit only for text books in Colleges, and are too minute and abstruse for the immature mind, not yet accustomed to take cognizance of its own operations. Though the means of education are widely diffused throughout our country, comparatively few enjoy the advantages of what is termed a liberal education, and hence, to the many, mental philosophy has been in a measure a sealed science, and too much regarded as a dry, uninteresting, and unprofitable study. Should this Outline meet with the patronage it deserves, it will take its place in Academies and Schools, along with other valuable elementary treatises on Chemistry, Astronomy, Philosophy, &c., and will become an important auxiliary to the cause of education. Yours, &c. WILLIAM S. C. OTIS.

From W. A. STONE, A. B., *Principal of Middlebury High School, Summit County, Ohio.*

MESSRS. DEWEY & ELKINS:—I received the work you recently sent me, upon *Mental Philosophy*, from the pen of Mr. Hall. So far as I have been able to examine it, I am decidedly of the opinion that it possesses many intrinsic excellencies. The author is especially happy in the order and arrangement of the subjects upon which he treats. The work is small, being, as the title indicates, only an elementary outline of the science; but it is plain and comprehensive, embracing all the principles necessary for the scholar who wishes to lay a good foundation for a thorough and extensive knowledge upon this important subject. It is free from many of the technical terms usually found in more extensive treatises upon this branch of science. In my opinion, it needs only to be examined by a discerning public to secure its immediate adoption as a text book in all our schools. W. A. STONE.

From Mr. H. N. ROSS, *Assistant Teacher, Middlebury High School.*

MESSRS. DEWEY & ELKINS:—From a cursory examination of Mr. Hall's *Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*, I consider it, as an elementary work, one of decided merit.

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The author's division of his subject, and classification of the different mental phenomena, are at once natural, concise, and explicit; and his definitions brief and comprehensive. Unlike many other works on the science of mind, it will not dishearten the student by compelling him to grope his toilsome way through a labyrinth of fine-spun theories, speculative abstractions, and a profundity of mysticism, in which the author himself well nigh loses his own identity; but the happy manner in which the subject is treated, will render it interesting and comprehensible, even to juvenile minds. It is a work well adapted for and should be introduced as a text book, in our *Common*, as well as higher Schools.

Respectfully yours, &c.,

H. NORTHE ROSS.

From N. W. GOODHUE, Teacher of Common Schools, Middlebury, Ohio.

MESSRS. DEWEY & ELKINS:—I have carefully examined Mr. Hall's "*Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*," and consider it a work well calculated to occupy a prominent position, as a class book, in both our common and select schools. I think the author has been peculiarly fortunate in his classification and treatment of the various mental phenomena—drawing deductions so plainly in accordance with common sense—using language at once so simple, chaste and forcible, and employing comparisons so pleasing and familiar, that as far as this excellent book is concerned, the study of the "*Science of Mind*" is rendered a pleasing duty, rather than an irksome task. I hope the time will soon arrive when the work will receive the favor its merit deserves, by a general introduction into our Schools and Seminaries.

Yours, respectfully,

NATHANIEL W. GOODHUE.

From Mr. H. J. CLARK, President of Meadville College, Pa.

Having examined briefly, *Hall's Mental Philosophy*, designed for the use of Schools and Academies, I cheerfully express my approbation of the work. The design of the Author is highly laudable; and his work appears well adapted to promote the design. It can not be doubted, that the *elements* of Mental Science might be introduced, with advantage, into Common Schools; and an Academic course of instruction which should exclude them, might justly be considered defective. It should be recollected that the great mass of our youth are wholly dependent, for intellectual training, on these minor institutions. And multitudes of both sexes, who resort to these schools, would be able, I doubt not, with the aid of the more enlightened class of teachers which conduct them, to obtain a com-

petent knowledge of this judicious compendium of Mental Science, thereby adding to their stores of knowledge a valuable acquisition, improving their faculties, and forming intellectual habits, important to their happiness, respectability and success in life.

With great confidence, therefore, I would recommend the above book to the patronage of the public, as being well adapted to the class of young persons for whom it is chiefly designed, and embracing a subject, of which they ought not to remain wholly ignorant.

H. J. CLARK.

From Mr. G. W. CLARKE, Professor of Meadville College, Pa.

Having read, with considerable care, Mr. Hall's "*Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*," though not prepared to adopt all the positions of the author without some qualification, I consider it, as an elementary work, one of more than ordinary merit.

The classification and arrangement of the work are natural and simple, while the author has certainly excelled in adapting his style and mode of illustration to the juvenile mind. It is cheerfully commended to those who have charge of Common and Primary Schools, as a valuable auxiliary in their important work.

G. W. CLARKE.

From Mr. JAMES COWLES, Principal of Painesville Academy.

Messrs. DEWEY & ELKINS:—I have perused Mr. Hall's "*Outline of Mental Philosophy*," with some care, and am prepared to say that I am highly delighted with the book, both in respect to style and doctrine. I am gratified to see common sense elevated as the great umpire of mooted questions; pronouncing those views false which do not accord with it, and those true which do accord with it. I am anxious to see this common sense Philosophy prevail; for popular errors have for their basis, unsound dogmas of Mental Science.

Yours, &c.

JAMES COWLES.

From JOHN R. DONNALLY, Principal of the High School in Meadville, Pa.

Messrs. DEWEY & ELKINS:—From a rapid examination of Mr. Hall's "*Elementary Outline of Mental Philosophy*," placed in my hands by you, I am happy to state, that I deem it a compilation admirably calculated to benefit that class of youths for whom it was prepared. For a long time I have felt the necessity of such a work, and would take pleasure in recommending it to the public, as a volume of decided merit.

Respectfully, &c.

JOHN R. DONNALLY

ELEMENTARY OUTLINE
OF
MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS.

BY LYMAN W. HALL.

COLUMBUS : ISAAC N. WHITING.
CINCINNATI : H. W. DERBY & CO. ; NEW-YORK : A. S. BARNES & CO.

1850.

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Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1845, by
LYMAN W. HALL, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the
District of Ohio.

PREFACE.

THIS work is a compilation of opinions, views, and facts, in Mental Philosophy, deemed of importance, by the writer, to be embodied in an elementary treatise, designed for use in Schools and Academies. In the preparation of the work, use has been made of Locke, Stewart, Brown, Beattie, Abercrombie; and a number of other works have been more or less consulted, viz: Edwards, Tappan, Day, Upham, Hedge, Jamieson, &c., &c., from which many valuable hints and suggestions have been derived.

The writer has sought to employ language capable of being understood by youth of average intellectual endowments, and has, therefore, studied perspicuity more than the graces of a finished style—adopting, in some instances, the statements of the authors consulted, with such variations as seemed requisite to adapt them to the work in hand.

This work has its origin in what is believed to be a necessity for such a treatise. “The proper study of mankind is man”—a truth, the importance of which does not seem to be impressed upon a majority of minds. There appears to be something quite forbidding, to many, if not to most people, in the term *Metaphysics*, and it is apparently regarded as a profound mysticism, which it is the province of the learned few alone to fathom. Hence *Intellectual Science* is almost wholly

excluded from the minor grade of Schools, and too much so even from High Schools and Academies.

What has greatly contributed to this aversion to the science, and served to exclude its study from Schools and Academies, is, as is believed, a deficiency in books on the subject, adapted to the wants and capacities of most of the pupils ordinarily convened in such Schools. This deficiency, it is the attempt of this performance, partially, at least, to supply.

The writer is well aware, also, that the idea is quite prevalent, that the mature mind alone is capable of grappling with Intellectual Science. That this is true, to a great extent, having in view only the several learned and profound treatises on the subject, may readily be admitted. But that, with proper aids, it is true to the extent supposed, may well be doubted.

A more simple, brief, and elementary view of the subject, may serve to furnish, even to young minds, some just notions of the leading outlines of the science, and some distinct apprehension of the living, active principle within them, and thus they may grow up to maturity *thinking, reflecting, reasoning* beings, knowing something of themselves, and desiring to know more, and thus be prepared to push their intellectual investigations and studies into the higher and more abstruse points of metaphysical enquiry.

On the other hand, to grow up to maturity in profound ignorance of this science, is to remain to a great extent, in self ignorance, and to run the hazard of acquiring unfortunate mental habits, creating a disrelish, and even an incompetency for patient, thoughtful, and profitable attention to that science, the acquisition of

which is most important to us as intellectual and moral beings.

With all the aids that may be furnished, with all the simplified and elementary treatises that may be multiplied, no "royal high-road" to the attainment of mental science can be opened, which will dispense with patient study and thought. Indeed, it is this latter prerequisite (thought) which renders the study of the mind of such vast importance and utility. If this work shall answer the design for which it was intended, and cause the study to be any more easy, accessible, and alluring to the youthful student, and thus supply the deficiency, which is believed to exist, the writer will feel much compensated for his humble, though toilsome labors in the compilation of it. His effort, such as it is, to prepare a *School Book of Mental Science*, which shall serve to render the study more attractive, and more general in Schools, is submitted to the candid consideration of the public.

RAVENNA, August 16, 1845.



NOTE.

TO TEACHERS.--With the questions, arranged to accompany the work, special pains have been taken, that not only the whole meaning of the text may be developed, but that the whole text itself may be brought under the notice and study of the pupil. Some we know, object to the system of questioning entirely, in school books, believing that the use of questions in conning the lessons, does not bring into exercise that patient thought and investigation which is requisite to the highest development of the mental powers. Others again, believe that only a few questions are desirable, and those merely as suggestions to leading thoughts and topics--while yet another class believe, that a full accompaniment of questions are of most essential, if not of indispensable importance.

Each of the three modes of instruction,—namely, without questions, with few questions, and with full questions—has its advantages, while it must be admitted, we think, that by far the larger proportion of pupils (probably it will not exceed the truth to say nine-tenths) can be more benefited, and will make greater progress, and more valuable attainments with the aid of many, rather than with few or no questions. To many, without questions, the task of mastering a lesson is almost, or quite insurmountably forbidding—while a few leading or general questions would serve to fix attention upon only a portion of the text—for it is a fact, which it is believed the experience of all teachers will go to establish, that the large majority of pupils confine themselves to a study of the answers called for by the questions, and in this way a large proportion of the text not only remains unstudied, but actually unread. It has been the aim in preparing the questions to this work, to embrace in them the whole text, so that a study of the work, with the use of the questions, will leave no essential or important point untouched, but all will be brought to the observation and study of the pupil. Teachers, however, need not be bound by the course here marked out, unless they should prefer it. If this little work should arrive at the honor of being adopted into schools for use, teachers can pursue that course in giving instruction from it, which their own experience satisfies them is best. If the more experienced teacher should prefer to regard it simply in the light of a text book, taking it as the basis upon which to simplify by oral illustrations; even in that case, the questions may be of great service to the pupil in aiding him so to master the text,

as to be better prepared to profit by the instructions of his teacher—and the more so, as the questions themselves embrace many answers, explanations, and illustrations, calculated to aid in arriving at a more distinct understanding of the principles of the science, embodied in the work. In a system of questions so particular and specific, some repetition, and even in some instances the appearance of juvenility is unavoidable.

This unpretending little treatise on a branch of science of the highest importance, is submitted, not without a degree of diffidence, to the consideration of teachers, by a co-worker in the great field of instruction, as an earnest attempt, however imperfect may have been its accomplishment, to subserve the general purposes and interests of education.

It is due to say that the writer, owing to the pressure of unremitting cares, found it necessary to employ another hand to aid in the formation of the questions—and for this purpose has availed himself of the assistance of an individual having the experience of many years as a teacher.

NOTE.—Owing to the distance of the author's residence from the place of publication, he has been prevented from bestowing that careful attention upon the revised sheets, which is at all times desirable, and hence, some errors may possibly have escaped detection—but there are none, it is believed, of material consequence, or which the intelligent reader cannot easily for himself correct. The only typographical errors of consequence yet discovered are the following, viz: on page 110, second line from the top of the page, for "monitors," read "monitions"—on page 93, eighth line from the top of the page, for "arises," read "arise."

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ELEMENTARY OUTLINE

OF

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

IMPORTANCE OF MENTAL SCIENCE.

1. THE science of mind receives, generally, too little attention. Its value is not sufficiently appreciated. "Know thyself," enters too slightly into the purposes of men. Erroneous and mistaken views of the ends, objects and aims of the science prevail. Prejudices founded in misconception, exist against it. The term metaphysics, is regarded as a hard, if not a cabalistic word. Metaphysical speculations are viewed with aversion. The belief is entertained that they are employed on subjects beyond the reach of the human faculties. The opinion is also cherished, that such investigations can have no practical relation to the affairs of life. We live in a day whose leading, characteristic spirit is evidently utilitarian. Hence arises a great dislike for the exact and abstract sciences.

QUESTIONS.—1. What is said of the science of mind? How is it appreciated? What enters too slightly into the purposes of men? What erroneous views prevail? What prejudices exist against it? How is the term metaphysics regarded? Define cabalistic? *Ans.* Containing an occult, or hidden meaning. How are metaphysical speculations viewed? What belief is entertained? And what opinion cherished? What spirit is prevalent? What is the result?

2. The learned nonsense of the schools has contributed not a little to the unpopularity of mental science. The absurdities of the *Scholastic Philosophy* it is true, have passed away. The influence of warm and voluminous discussions, on many frivolous points, involving childish weakness, may still remain, to excite prejudice against metaphysical enquiries. Hence may arise the notion of their inutility. During the period, designated as that of the School Philosophy, lengthened discussions were had on such points as the following:

3. Can the Deity exist in imaginary as well as in real space? Does the Deity love an angel which does not, but which may possibly exist, better than an insect in real existence? Is the essence of mind distinct from its existence? Or, in other words, can its essence exist, when it has no actual existence? Can angels see objects in the dark? Can they pass from point to point in space, and not pass through the space between?

4. Such was the frivolous character of the speculations of the schools—as useless, as trifling—evolving no principle, eliciting no truth—and foreign to the scope of true philosophical enquiry. At a later period, the science was encumbered with other vagaries, as

2. What has rendered mental science so unpopular? What is meant by Schools, as used here? *Ans.* The seminaries for teaching logic, metaphysics and theology, (school divinity) which were established in the middle ages, and which were characterized by academical disputations and subtleties of reasoning; or the learned men who were engaged in discussing mere points in metaphysics or theology. What has now passed away? What may still remain? What do they excite? What is the effect?

3. What questions did they discuss during the period of School Philosophy? Are they important? Did they elicit truth? To what were they foreign?

4. At a later period with what was the science encumbered?

for example, the mind cannot act where it is not present, and consequently it cannot perceive external objects themselves, but only their images, which were said to be conveyed through the medium of the senses, and represented to the mind in a manner similar to the representations of images in a camera obscura. Bishop Berkley and others of his school of philosophers, by a very natural application of this theory, contended that if the mind perceives only its own impressions or images, we can derive from our senses no evidence of the existence of the external world; and Hume, pushing the doctrine still farther, contended that we could have as little evidence of the existence of mind itself, and that nothing exists except impressions and ideas.

5. These absurd views, and fanciful and fallacious theories, have been combatted and fully exposed; and whatever prejudice they may have been the means of exciting against the science of mind, to indulge such prejudices now, would be manifestly unjust, since the investigations of intellectual philosophy are now conducted on entirely different and rational principles, which cannot lead to such monstrous and absurd conclusions.

6. The investigations of true science are now properly limited to those enquiries coming within the scope of human capability. It is at once admitted that there are many things beyond our ken, impossible to be comprehended by finite faculties, and the vain attempt to account for every thing, is given up, as an effort worse than fruitless.

Give an example of these vagaries? Meaning of vagary? *Ans.* A whim. What application did Berkley make of this theory? For what did Hume contend?

5. Have these fanciful theories been combatted? Should they create any prejudice against the science of mind now? Why?

6. To what are the investigations of this science now limited? What is admitted? What attempt is considered fruitless?

7. Mr. Locke's great work, the *Essay on the Human Understanding* owed its origin to the felt necessity of an examination of our own abilities, in order to see what objects our understandings are, or are not fitted to deal with, as we learn from that eminent author himself. This distinction is of chief importance in the investigations of mental science, as it disencumbers it of the unsound and unphilosophical theories of the scholastic and subsequent philosophers, and places it upon the true basis of rational enquiry—enquiries capable of being grasped and comprehended by the human faculties.

8. The importance of this science deserves to be more generally appreciated, for several reasons, and among them the following:

(1.) It relates to ourselves. A man who despises metaphysical enquiries, must regard his own nature as unworthy of investigation or examination; while he may perhaps regard the round of the other sciences of the highest importance, and be well instructed therein. What would be thought of a man who should exhibit the strange inconsistency of being well versed in Geography, for example, except that of his own country? Superficial at best must be that education, which has never turned the thoughts inward, to scan the leading characteristics and wonderful operations, of that immortal principle which presides with such supreme control, in its prison-house of clay.

7. To what did Mr. Locke's work owe its origin? Of what does this distinction disencumber mental science? Upon what basis does it place it? What is said of these enquiries?

8. Why should this science be more generally appreciated? What is the first reason? How does a man who despises metaphysical enquiries regard his own nature? Still what may he regard? What would such a man be like? What is said of such a superficial education?

9. To live under the influence of mere animal propensities, yielding obedience to the grosser corporeal appetites; never taking cognizance of what passes in our minds, is to live in profound ignorance of the nobler part of our nature, of those high and ennobling intellectual properties, perceptions and faculties bestowed upon us by Him whose creative power called us into, and continues us in being. He who fashioned our bodies, and mysteriously connected therewith that intangible, spiritual essence which we call mind, alone knows the nature of the connection between mind and matter. Vain is the attempt of man to pry into these hidden mysteries. By the term *matter*, we designate that arrangement of properties which we call bodies, possessing solidity, figure, extension, divisibility, &c., and material substances are known to us only by these properties. We feel within us a power which thinks, and wills and reasons, and this power, or, as it may be expressed, this arrangement of functions we call mind, and by these functions only is it capable of being known. Matter is the object of our senses, mind is the object of our consciousness. In a strict sense, we are as ignorant of the essential, hidden properties of matter, as of mind. To pry into these deep mysteries, especially by futile theorizing, is foreign to the purposes of true philosophical science, whose legitimate object is the investigation of facts, in relation to both matter and mind.

9. How do we live if we yield obedience to our grosser appetites and mere animal propensities? Who only knows the connection between matter and mind? What is said of the attempt to pry into the hidden mysteries? What is meant by the term *matter*? How are material substances known to us? What power do we feel within us? What is this arrangement of functions called? How known? What is the object of our senses and our consciousness? Of what are we ignorant? What is foreign to the purposes of true philosophical science? What is its legitimate object?

10. In this point of view—the investigation of facts, as far as human faculties are capable of eliciting them—the study of mental science is of great moment. By such investigations, while we are led to know more of our mental constitution, we are thereby enabled to detect, and, to an extent at least, correct any defects therein. Man, in his fallen state, is, at the best, but an imperfect creature; and as bodily malformations constantly salute the eyes, it should by no means be matter of surprise, that mental distortions also exist—and as the skill of the anatomist may, to a degree, remedy the deformities of the one, so scientific enquiry may aid in correcting the faults of the other. A knowledge of mental science, then, is of vast importance, as affording valuable hints, and extraordinary aid to parents and teachers, in the training and education of children and youth. Parents and teachers hold in their hands, under God, the destinies of the world, through the influence which they exert upon the rising generation. How important, then, that they have some insight into the philosophy of mind, that they may be the better qualified, and more capable to detect and uproot the prurient propensities of youth, and stimulate and invigorate those, in too many cases, weaker powers, that are overmastered by raging passions, but upon the ascendancy of which alone can characters of virtue and excellence be established.

10. In what point of view does mental science appear of great moment? What will such investigations lead us to do? What is man in his present state of being? What constantly salute the eyes? What then should not surprise us? What will remedy the one and correct the other? Of what importance is a knowledge of mental science? What do parents and teachers hold in their hands? In what manner? What knowledge should they possess? Why? Upon what alone can characters of virtue and excellence be established?

11. Mental science receives a great degree of importance from the fact, that it has an intimate relationship to moral science, and the investigations of each, almost insensibly blend, and run into each other. This is an idea advanced by Stewart. He remarks that the connection between metaphysics and ethics is peculiarly close, the theory of morals having furnished, ever since the time of Cudworth, several of the most abstruse questions, which have been agitated concerning the general principles, both intellectual and active, of the human frame. Such being the fact, a process of investigation in mental science, must develop, almost insensibly perhaps to the student, feelings of reverential awe, towards that great and infinitely wise Being, the Creator of so wonderful a structure as that of the human mind. We may look out upon the face of nature and find much to excite our wonder and admiration—we may lift our eyes to the stupendous vault of heaven, filled with wheeling worlds and circling systems, and be led still more to wonder, and adore that great and incomprehensible power, which spoke them from nothing, into existence, and holds them exactly balanced in boundless space.

12. But when we look within, and take cogni-

11. From what fact does mental science receive a great degree of importance? What is Mr. Stewart's remark? What has the theory of morals furnished since the time of Cudworth? Who was Cudworth? *Ans.* A learned English divine and philosopher, who published, in 1672, his grand work entitled, "The true Intellectual System of the Universe," in which he confuted all the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism, and demonstrated its Impossibility. What feelings will an investigation of mental science naturally develop? What state of mind is naturally produced by contemplating the beauties of nature, and the splendor of the vaulted heavens?

12. What are the emotions when we turn our eyes within and take cognizance of the wonderful structure of the human mind?

zance of the wonderful mechanism, if it may so be called, of the human mind, regard its powers of taking into view, as it were, at a glance, all the glories of the visible creation; of looking out of its clayey tenement, and glancing from earth to heaven, and from heaven to earth again, (for, in the language of poetical inspiration,

"How fleet is a glance of the mind!
Compared with the speed of its flight,
The tempest itself lags behind,
And the swift winged arrows of light.")

when we thus, we repeat, take cognizance of this wonderful structure, we feel impressed with the truth, that the incomprehensible power and wisdom of creative energy is more fully unfolded in the creation of the human mind, than in all the material universe together, having fully in view, in making this declaration, the wonders brought to view by the researches of natural science, and all the glories of creation, unfolded by astronomical discoveries. How impressive then must be the lessons taught us, in investigating the science of mind; with what reverence, with what adoration shall we be forced to contemplate its adorable Author, the great First Cause of all things.

13. The importance of mental science is vastly magnified, when we come to consider the value of the mind, the human soul, this indestructible fabric, as immortal as he who formed it. This consideration is worthy of more than a passing remark, for,

14. (2.) A soul is more important than the whole

What do we have in view when we make this declaration? What lessons are taught us by investigating the science of mind, and what feelings are excited towards the Great First Cause of all things?

13. How does the importance of this science become magnified?

14. Why worthy of more than a passing remark? Who knows

material universe. He, from whose creative energies sprang this undying, living principle, must be supposed to understand its worth, and he has negatively, but solemnly affirmed its value, in the momentous enquiry: What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul—an enquiry, the full purport of which, eternity alone can unfold to us. Indeed, nothing short of infinite intelligence, can comprehend, in all its extent, the value of that immortal treasure, whose destiny, under him, is committed to our charge; or how essential to our happiness here and hereafter, is the culture of our intellectual powers. God created man for high and noble purposes, and endowed him with a living soul of various faculties.

“ Man he made of angel form erect,
To hold communion with the heavens above,
And on his soul impressed his image fair,
His own similitude of holiness,
Of virtue, truth and love; with reason high
To balance right and wrong, and conscience quick,
To choose or to reject; with knowledge great,
Prudence and wisdom, vigilance and strength,
To guard all force or guile; and last of all,
The highest gift of God's abundant grace,
With perfect, free, unbiassed WILL.”

15. When we consider that the human mind, like its great Author, is immortal, we are at once conducted to the discovery of a resemblance between it and that mind in whose image it was originally created—a view which greatly enhances its importance, and which should animate us with a desire to become acquainted,

its value? What has he affirmed respecting it? Who alone can comprehend the value of the soul in all its extent? What is essential to our happiness here and hereafter? For what was man created, and with what endowed?

15. What consideration leads to a discovery of a resemblance between the human and divine mind? With what desire should

at least, with its leading phenomena. It is mind that gives all of worth, and dignity to man that he possesses. Wonderful as is his physical conformation, much more wonderful is the structure of mind. The body is valueless in the comparison. Abstract from it, its intelligent, undying inhabitant, and the body at once falls into ruins, an inert and worthless mass, returning to its kindred dust. Intrinsically considered, then, the body is of no value. It derives its consequence solely from its association and connection with mind. It is but the engine, if we may so speak, to which the motive power of the soul is applied, in carrying on its various operations, while stationed in a world of probation.

16. That which is immortal must incalculably surpass in value and importance that which is mortal, and perishable. But the body dies, and returns to earth. The soul survives. This asserts its superiority. Yea, more, the earth shall decay, and the elements melt with fervent heat. The soul lives on. What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? The world itself, then, dwindles to naught in the comparison of value. Still more: in the progress of the designs of the Almighty, the period will arrive, when the whole material Universe shall have passed away. But the soul will survive, increasing, and ever enlarging in capacity, and through the ever revolving, endless cycles of an incomprehensible eternity, it shall live on, parallel, in point of duration, with the existence of its Maker. The whole physical

a view of this discovery animate us? What alone gives dignity to man? What is said of his physical and mental structure? What does the body become when the mind leaves it? From what does it receive its consequence? What is the body called?

16. What asserts the superiority of the soul? How long will it

creation itself, then, shrinks into insignificance, in the comparison of value with a single soul. The proposition, therefore, is established, that the soul—one soul, is more important than the whole material universe.

17. How, in this point of view, swells the importance of faithfully cultivating a knowledge of mental science. True, indeed, we may know much of the human mind, without going through with the formal process of studying it. By a law of its constitution, it necessarily gives to itself some knowledge of its powers, and a knowledge of its acts. But by turning our thoughts inward, and investigating their powers and their operations, in short, by a voluntary, patient, continuous, even laborious attention to the subjects of our own consciousness, we may familiarize this general knowledge which we possess, and render it far more available, in developing ourselves to ourselves, and in enabling us to ascertain our relations and duties, to ourselves, to our fellow-kind, and to God.

18. Another consideration, going vastly to magnify the importance of the study of mental science, is derived from the fact, that, as President Edwards has very justly remarked, we can know nothing respecting God, except what we learn from our own minds. When told that God thinks, that he feels, that he chooses, we know nothing respecting his actions, unless we take the acts of our own minds as a criterion, and judge respecting the acts of the Divine mind, by

survive? Parallel with what shall its existence be prolonged? What proposition is established?

17. In this point of view, what seems of great importance? Can we know any thing of the mind without a formal study of it? By what law does it give itself some knowledge of its own powers and acts? How may we familiarize the general knowledge we possess and render it available? In what respects available?

18. What other consideration vastly magnifies the importance

our own. We judge, also, what the powers and faculties of the Divine mind are by our own.

19. If God possesses any mental faculty different in kind from ours, we are not only ignorant of it, but, from the very nature of the case, we can but be ignorant. We cannot be informed what it is, for language is incompetent to give us any ideas which are not already in the mind. Our ideas of external objects are derived from experience, and cannot be described in words so as to be understood by those who have never perceived them. For example, the idea of sound cannot be conveyed to a man born deaf, for, cut off from any experience on the subject, the mind has no conception of it. So in the case of a man blind from his birth; he can have no conception of light or color, and as the idea of color, by experience, has not been implanted in his mind, no form of language which can be employed, can possibly convey such idea to him. This was illustrated in the case of the philosopher, who attempted in the most pains-taking and laborious manner to convey to a blind man a notion of *scarlet*, by the employment of every form of language which he could conceive as at all adequate to such a purpose. After thus laboring, he asked him whether he thought he had some idea of it. Yes, replied the blind man, scarlet must, from your account, be the nearest thing in the world to the sound of a trumpet!

of mental science? How do we know any thing respecting the actions of God? How do we judge what the powers and faculties of the Divine mind are?

19. If God possess any mental faculty different from ours, are we ignorant of it? Why must we remain so? How do we derive our knowledge of external things? Can these ideas be understood by one who has not this experience? What is said of those who are born deaf and blind? How is it illustrated in the case of the philosopher? How did the blind man reply?

20. Language, therefore, can convey to the mind no ideas which are not there already, as the product of our experience, or our consciousness. If, then, there is any faculty in the Divine mind of which we have no idea, we have no words to express it, and consequently the idea cannot be conveyed to us by language. All our ideas of God, then, are founded upon our knowledge of a human mind. We remove limits from the latter, and then we have the only conception which we can form of Him in whose image we are made.

21. Another consideration, going to enforce the importance of mental science as a study, is derived from the fact, that the only knowledge which we have of our fellow-men, is also derived from our self-knowledge. Reasoning on the principle that human minds are alike—that they are endowed with the same powers—that they perform the same acts, we conclude that what we find in ourselves, is also to be found in our fellow-men. It is thus that we interpret their language. When one of them says, “I choose thus”—we judge respecting his act, by what we know of our own choices. If we did not know by consciousness what choice is, his words would convey to us no more idea than the words “green” or “red” to one who had been blind from his birth.

22. As a concluding consideration, enforcing the

20. When can language convey no ideas to the mind? If there is any faculty in the Divine mind of which we have no idea, can we obtain any knowledge of it? Why? Upon what are our ideas of God founded? If we remove limits from the mind, of what will it give us a conception?

21. What consideration is still urged to show the importance of mental science? How do we reason to come to the conclusion that what we find in ourselves is also to be found in our fellow-men? When one says “I choose thus,” how are we able to understand him?

22. What is the concluding consideration enforcing the impor-

importance of this science, we would urge, that we must also know ourselves, before we can understand the relations which we sustain to God and our fellow-creatures. The more we know of our own constitution, the better shall we understand what duties we owe to other beings—the better can we appreciate the true dignity of man as a morally accountable, and intelligent being—the better can we understand the character and the attributes of God—the better shall we be enabled to apprehend our moral as well as our mental wants—the better shall we be enabled to repress our grosser corporeal propensities, and the more to relish what pertains to pure mind—in fine, we shall be better parents, teachers, brothers, sisters, citizens, and members of community; better christians, more devout worshippers of Him who formed us in his own similitude, whose we are, and whom to serve is life eternal.

tance of this science? What shall we better understand, if we have a thorough self acquaintance? What can we better appreciate? What understand? What apprehend? What repress? And to relish what? In fine, what shall we become? In what will the service of God result?

PART I.

OF THE MIND IN GENERAL.

1. MAN is a complex being, part body and part mind, which parts are connected together, in intimate relationship, but how they are connected, and how they mutually act and operate upon, and influence each other, being beyond the reach of human faculties to discern, is not the proper subject matter of our enquiry, or of any philosophical enquiry. The investigation of facts known to exist, and not vain and useless theories and speculations, as to how they exist, is the true object and end of philosophical science.

2. Matter and mind are considered by philosophical writers as merely relative terms. If asked to explain what we mean by matter, we can answer only by describing its sensible properties, regarding it as a something which possesses solidity, extension, figure, color, &c. Of matter then, we are not sensible, except by a reference to those properties. It is, likewise, so in regard to mind. We are not conscious of its distinct and abstract existence. We are conscious of certain internal states, for example, thought, feeling, willing; and hence we infallibly know, that there must be something within us, which thinks, feels, and wills, and this we call mind.

3. We are impressed, also, with the most unhesitating conviction, that these thoughts, feelings, and sen-

1. What is man? What is not the subject matter of our enquiry? Why? What is the true object of philosophical science?

2. How are mind and matter considered by philosophers? What is meant by matter? What is said of mind? Of what are we and of what are we not conscious? Then what do we know?

3. Of what are we also impressed?

sations belong to one and the same being; and that being we call *ourselves*—a being, which, from the constitution of our nature, we are compelled to regard as distinct from the body, and as capable of surviving the mutilations and decay of bodily organs.

4. The evidence, then, which we have of the existence of mind, is not only the same as that which we have of the existence of matter, but, in truth, is of a more conclusive character; for the evidence of the existence of the former, is produced by the subjects of our consciousness, while that of the latter rests upon the objects of our perceptions.

5. In the further progress of this branch of our enquiry, we shall endeavor to show, first, *How we gain any knowledge of the mind*: enquire, *What is the mind*: and attend to a *Classification of Mental powers*.

CHAPTER I.

HOW DO WE GAIN ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE MIND?

1. Our knowledge of mind is derived from its own action. In a state of entire inactivity, or suspension, there could be no consciousness of its existence, and of course no knowledge of mind would subsist. On the other hand, action necessarily superinduces consciousness, and it is entirely impossible for the mind to exist

4. What evidence have we of the existence of mind? Upon what does the evidence of the existence of matter rest? Upon what does that of mind?

5. What attempt will be made in the further progress of this branch of our enquiry?

CHAP. I.—1. From what is a knowledge of mind derived? What is said of a state of entire inactivity? What does action superin-

in a state of activity, and not possess a knowledge of itself, of its states and operations. These states and operations become objects of knowledge, concerning which, as a matter of course, ideas and notions are formed. As, then, the knowledge of the mind itself, and all our ideas or notions of mental facts, originate in consciousness, this subject should receive a distinct consideration.

CONSCIOUSNESS.

1. *Primary.*
2. *Secondary or Reflection.*

2. Consciousness, in its simple sense may be defined to be that by which we perceive and attend to what passes in our own minds. In a more extended sense, it implies that operation, distinguished from simple consciousness, which involves the power of remembering past mental states, of giving attention to, and reflecting upon the phenomena of the mind, in order to ascertain the laws by which it is governed. It is important here to make and define a clear distinction between the simple and more extended sense of the term consciousness, which we shall do by the use of the terms *Primary* and *Secondary* Consciousness; intending thereby to distinguish primarily, the *knowledge of Consciousness*, from secondarily, the *knowledge of reflection*.

3. The mental state, in many instances, may be distinguished from its object. For example, I see an

duce? What does the mind possess in this state? What do these states and operations become? What are formed? What originate in consciousness?

2. How is consciousness defined? In a more extended sense what does it imply? How is consciousness divided? What do these two states distinguish?

3. In many instances how may the mental state be distinguish-

object, namely, a ship. Here the mental state and the object may be distinguished, the one from the other. During the continuance of the particular mental state the object principally engages the mind, though not entirely. We must needs give some heed to the mental state itself, as well as to its object, otherwise we certainly could not know of the existence of the particular mental state. For illustration, take the passion of Anger. When, by it, the mind is excited, we must be conscious of the particular mental state, and of course yield some attention to it, else how shall we know that we are angry; while at the same time the object of our anger, and not the attention to the mental state itself, mainly engrosses the mind.

4. Consciousness is knowledge, co-existing with the thing known—that is, the knowledge, and the thing which is the object of the knowledge, exist at the same instant of time. For example, in the case of Anger, just alluded to, the particular state of mind involved, and the object involved in it, have a simultaneous existence, and there seems to be, necessarily, a sufficient degree of attention given, to awaken a consciousness of the particular mental state, and of the object of it, as both co-existent. The degree of attention to the mental state, however, is slight, and the co-existence of the mental state and the object, preclude the possibility of any process of memory or reflection—for the memory of past anger, is not itself anger. In other words, the remembrance of a past mental state, does not revive the existence of that state itself, but only

ed? Give the example? What principally engages the attention? What must we give some heed to? Or what would be the result? How is it illustrated by the passion of anger?

4. Consciousness is knowledge co-existing with what? What then exist at the same time? How is it illustrated? What does attention to both awaken? What do they preclude? What does

the remembrance of a past consciousness. In the latter case the mental state is that of memory, in the former case the mental state was that of actual, present, existing cognition—or simple primary consciousness.

5. Such then is the nature of mind in its more ordinary states, that we seem to be led to give our attention, mainly, to the object of these states, rather than to co-existing states themselves.

6. From what has already been said, it will at once be inferred, that it is not in this *Primary Consciousness*, that we form distinct views of mental facts—that we take cognizance of mental processes—analyze complex states of mind—or investigate, combine and classify the various mental phenomena. This consciousness, though, as we have seen, a slight degree of attention is involved in it, is *not voluntary*, but arises from the very nature and constitution of the mind, as necessarily attending to, and knowing its own states and operations. In transient states of mind, this consciousness is transient, and so on the other hand, in more permanent states, it has also a co-existing permanency.

7. Consciousness, therefore, considered apart from any acts of attention, or any greater degree of attention than that to which we have just alluded, is an involuntary state of mind. We may voluntarily, by efforts adapted to that end, induce certain processes, and effect changes in states of mind, but the knowledge

a remembrance of a past mental state revive? What is the mental state in the latter case? In the former what?

5. Such being the nature of mind, what are we led to do?

6. What will at once be inferred? What is involved in primary consciousness? Is it voluntary? From what does it arise? What is said of it in transient and permanent states of mind?

7. What is said of consciousness apart from any acts of attention? What may we by efforts adapted to that end induce? Does

thereby derived, of the objects presented, do not depend on any act of the will. It is in this case as in perception: we may put forth activity in bringing external objects to view—may place them in various order, for the purpose of minute and exact examination, and yet the knowledge obtained is not dependent on an act of will. We are obliged to see certain objects when brought before the eye, and to hear certain sounds; and when certain substances, suited to excite those sensations, come in contact with the body, we necessarily and involuntarily taste, feel, and smell. Precisely the same is it in operations and states of the mind. We learn by consciousness what meaning is conveyed by certain words, for example, *reason*, *compare*, *joy*, *sorrow*, *doubt*, *assent*; just as by perception we gain a knowledge of *sweet*, *green*, *soft*, *cold*. It is impossible for us to compare, reason, abstract, or to feel pleasure, pain, disgust, and the mind not, from the very constitution of it, entertain necessarily, and involuntarily, a consciousness of those states.

8. Primary consciousness, then, is not a voluntary state, nor is there any thing involved in it, which may properly be called reflection

9. SECONDARY CONSCIOUSNESS very nearly resembles the former, and is easily confounded with it. But it differs in this, namely, it is a voluntary state, and it involves reflection. In the former, the degree of attention to the mental state was slight, being mainly fixed upon its object; in this, the attention is greater, and has reference more particularly to the mental state, than to its object.

the knowledge derived depend upon the will? How is this state compared with perception? What do we learn by consciousness? How compared with perception? What is impossible?

8. What is said of primary consciousness?

9. What of secondary? How do they differ?

10. Reflection, which is involved in our secondary division of consciousness, is an extensive operation. It seems to be connected with a remembrance of past sensations, and mental states, and the power of comparing them with present, existing states, and perceiving the relations which they bear to each other, as pertaining to *ourself*, as one and the same percipient and sentient being. It is also connected with the power of examining and investigating the laws by which mental processes themselves are governed.

11. This (involving reflection) is a complex state of mind, and includes various mental phenomena, or processes, particularly, consciousness, memory and comparison or judgment.

12. Consciousness, in a strict sense, refers only to present time, and present feelings, and does not take cognizance of past states, as existing realities. For example: we were conscious of certain feelings, or mental states yesterday, or one hour ago, or even a moment past—but we can not truly be said, to be conscious of those feelings *now*, but only conscious of the recollection of them. But of any mental facts or states pertaining to the existing moment, we may be conscious.

13. "There is," remarks Dr. Brown, "one sense, in which we talk of a consciousness of a feeling, and a sense, in which it must be allowed, that the consciousness is not precisely the same as the feeling itself. This is, when we speak of a feeling, not actually existing, at present, but past—as when we say that we are conscious of having seen, or heard, or done some-

10. What is said of reflection? With what is it connected?

11. What phenomena does this state of mind include?

12. In a strict sense to what does consciousness refer? Give the example?

13. What is Dr Brown's remark? When is such a use of the

thing. Such a use of the term, however, is pardonable only in the privileged looseness and inaccuracy of familiar conversation; the consciousness in this case, being precisely synonymous with the remembrance or memory, and not a power different from the remembrance. The remembrance of the feeling, and the vivid feeling itself, indeed, are different. But the remembrance, and the consciousness of the remembrance, are the same; as the consciousness of a sensation, and the sensation are the same; and to be conscious that we have seen and spoken to any one, is only to remember that we have seen and spoken to him.

14. When we think of feelings long past, it is impossible for us not to be aware that our mind is, then, truly retrospective, and memory seems to us sufficient to account for the whole. But when the retrospect is of very recent feelings—of feelings, perhaps, that existed as distinct states of the mind, the very moment our retrospect began, the short interval is forgotten, and we think that the primary feeling, and our consideration of the feeling, are strictly simultaneous. We have a sensation—we look instantly back on that sensation—such is consciousness, as distinguished from the feeling that is said to be its object. When it is any thing more than the sensation, thought or emotion, of which we are said to be conscious, it is a brief and rapid retrospect. Its object is not a present feeling, but a past feeling, as truly as when we look back, not on the moment immediately preceding, but on some distant event or emotion of our boyhood.

term pardonable? With what is it synonymous? What are different and what the same? How is it compared with sensation?

14. Of what are we aware when we think of feelings long past? Why do we think that a feeling and a consideration of it are simultaneous? How is consciousness distinguished from it? When is it a brief and rapid retrospect? What is its object said to be?

15. Consciousness, concludes Dr. Brown, in its simplest acceptation, when it is understood as regarding the present only, is no distinct power, or name of a distinct class of feelings, but is only a general term for all our feelings, of whatever species these may be, sensations, thoughts, desires—in short, all those states or affections of mind, in which the phenomena of mind consist; and when it expresses more than this, it is only the remembrance of some former state of the mind, and a feeling of the relation of the past and present, as states of one sentient substance.”

16. By the exercise of consciousness, the mind becomes impressed with certain instinctive convictions, or intuitive principles of belief. For example: “I exist.” “Every effect must have a cause,” are propositions which the mind instinctively rests upon as true, by an attention to its own consciousness, and no process of reasoning or induction can either strengthen its conviction or weaken its belief, in their absolute verity. To attempt to prove them by any other process, than an appeal to consciousness, serves but to darken counsel; to doubt their truth, brings into suspicion the soundness of our own intellects.

17. As we have already seen, it is the peculiar office-work of consciousness to inform us of the present existence of our various passions, affections and mental operations. Upon the evidence of it, rests the whole superstructure of mental science. No evidence is entitled to higher authority, when accurately and

15. When consciousness regards the present only for what is it a general term? When it expresses more than this what is it?

16. By the exercise of consciousness with what does the mind become impressed? Give the example? How does the mind consider these propositions? How? What is said of an attempt to prove them? Of doubting their truth what?

precisely developed; and, therefore, no knowledge can rest upon a firmer basis, than that which is founded upon it.

18. It is not always easy to trace with precision the subjects of our consciousness, and those who are unaccustomed to mental investigations, and analysis, and who do not habitually give some heed to their internal states, are liable to mistakes, and to make a wrong application of the evidence derived from it. Hence the importance of a thorough and patient attention to the subjects of our own consciousness.

19. I think, I believe, I doubt, I reason, I compare; I feel sorrow, anger, disgust, joy; I remember my past personal history, or any event which has transpired. These are *facts* which rest upon the testimony of consciousness. I cannot doubt, no sophisms, however ingeniously contrived, no combination of circumstances, nay, the whole world, cannot cause me to doubt their reality, while my mind performs its healthful functions.

20. Persons of all classes, of different ages, and different measures of intellectual maturity, have in exercise this power, or principle of consciousness, in a greater or less degree, and the subjects about which it is exercised, must, from the constitution and nature of the mind, necessarily, be the internal, mental states and phenomena of that being, that *sentient I*, which each one calls, and thus knows to be, HIMSELF.

17. What is the peculiar office of consciousness? What rests upon its evidence? What is said of this evidence?

18. What is not easy to do? Who are liable to mistakes? What then is important?

19. What cannot one doubt while the mind performs its healthful functions?

20. Who exercise this power of consciousness? What must the subject be, about which it is exercised?

CHAPTER II.

WHAT IS THE MIND ?

1. THE mind is a self-active, spiritual substance, endowed with the powers of thought, feeling and choice.

2. This definition will lead us to refer this branch of our enquiry to the three following heads, viz :

- I. SUBSTANTIVITY.
- II. SPIRITUALITY.
- III. SELF-ACTIVITY.

3. I. SUBSTANTIVITY. By substance is meant something which exists, independently of any thing in which it inheres. There are some things which cannot exist independently. For example, solidity is a property of matter, and is found wherever matter is, but does not, and cannot exist independently of matter. So thought, feeling and choice are properties of mind, and exist only as the substance exists to which they belong.

4. There are other things which are not thus dependent for their existence. These we call substances. They have an existence, independently of any thing else, and are the things to which properties belong. Thus matter is a substance. Solidity, extension, divisibility, are properties which belong to it.

- CHAP. II.—1. What is the mind, and with what is it endowed ?
2. This branch of our enquiry is referred to how many heads ?
3. How is substantivity defined ? Can every thing exist independently ? Give the example ? What is said of thought, feeling, and choice ?
4. What do we call substances ? Name a substance ? What belongs to it ?

5. The mind is also a substance. There is *something* which thinks, feels, and chooses. Every man whose mind has not been perverted, will say, if asked, that there is not only thought, and feeling, and choice, but that there is something which thinks, feels, and chooses. The language of mankind shows that this is the view which they take. Such language as "I think," "I remember," "I hope," "I feel," implies that there are not only these mental acts, but that there is an agent who puts them forth.

6. If it is the competent, unperverted decision of the human mind that the soul is an agent, a something which originates mental action, then the speculations of those who deny it, are of no weight. A decision of common sense outweighs all the dogmas of philosophy. Where the two are opposed the latter must yield.

7. We are not conscious of the existence of the external world. We are conscious, however, of perceptions in our minds of external objects, and we know there are external objects which excite these perceptions. When we see design, we know that there is a designer, as really as we know that there is design. When we see a tree, or a house, we know that there is a tree or a house, as really as we know that we perceive such an object.

8. So when we are conscious of our mental acts, we know that there is something which puts them forth. The mind gives us the knowledge of itself, as truly as it gives us the knowledge of its mental acts.

5. What else is called a substance? What will every unperverted mind assent to? What does the language of mankind show? What does such language as "I think," &c., imply?

6. What is said of the decision of the human mind, that the soul is an agent? What is said of a decision of common sense?

7. Of what are we not, and of what are we conscious? What do we know?

8. What is said of our mental acts?

9. We, therefore, conceive of mind as a substance or entity, which so subsists by itself, as not necessarily to be dependent on any other being or thing whatever. Thought, feeling, choice, are dependent upon mind. They are, therefore, the inherent properties of an independent substance, and that substance we call mind.

10. II. SPIRITUALITY. The mind is a *Spiritual Substance*. That which thinks, chooses, remembers, and reasons, is a spiritual, not a material thing. Matter does not, cannot think. Nor can any organization or modification of matter produce thought. We know on what particular organ the mind is dependent for its knowledge of sound and color, taste and smell, but with what part of the body, memory, for example, or reason, or imagination, is connected, we do not know ; nor can we explain the exercise of these faculties, by any experiments upon matter, but only by attending to what passes in our minds. We are in the habit of saying that the impressions are carried to the brain, but even in this we probably advance a step beyond what is warranted. But it may, nevertheless, be true that the brain is the instrument of thought: still it does not originate thought, any more than the eye originates sight, or the limbs motion. The brain, the eyes, and the limbs, can be nothing more than the instruments of thought, sight, and motion.

11. By means of the corporeal senses, the mind receives impressions from the material world, derives its

9. What do we conceive of mind? What are dependent upon it? What is said of them?

10. In reference to spirituality what is the mind? What is said of it? What cannot matter do? What do we, and what do we not know? Can we explain the exercise of these faculties? How? What are we in the habit of saying? What may this be doing? Yet what is probably true? What is said of the brain?

11. What is said of the corporeal senses? What cannot be ex-

knowledge of, and holds intercourse with it. How spiritual and material substances are connected, and how they act upon each other, cannot be explained. The fact that they are connected, and mutually influence each other, is all that can be made the subject of knowledge. To endeavor to go beyond this, is to launch out into profitless speculations. True philosophical enquiry, therefore, points simply to an investigation of facts, in relation to mental phenomena, and the operations of mind in its intercourse with the material world. There are various operations of the mind, in the performance of which it is not dependent on any bodily organs. We are made aware of these operations or states, simply by attending to them. They are the subjects of our consciousness. This thing, so mysteriously connected and co-operating with matter, this living, thinking, active principle within its material structure, we call mind; and mind we have defined above, to be a *spiritual substance*.

12. It is not a substance, in the ordinary definition of that word. In regard to all sensible objects around us, we connect with substance the idea of materiality. But spirituality, excludes the idea of materiality—and a spiritual substance can as really exist as a material substance. It will appear strange to those who have not reflected upon the subject, to hear it alleged that we know no more of matter, which we daily see and handle, than we do of mental or spiritual life, which our material senses will neither admit of our approach-

plained? What only is the subject of knowledge? What is said of it? How are we made aware of the operations of mind? What is said of the mind?

12. Is the mind a substance? What idea do we connect with substance? What does spirituality exclude? Can a spiritual substance exist? Do we know more of matter than we do of spiritual life? What is said of this fact?

ing nor examining. And yet, this is a fact which is now universally received.

13. We have already dwelt, with sufficient particularity, upon the fact, that we know nothing of matter, but by its properties, and nothing of spiritual existences but by *their* properties—and that hence our knowledge of both is derived in the same manner, namely, from their properties. Of course, our knowledge of both is the same in kind; though possibly our knowledge of the properties of matter may be more extensive, than our knowledge of the properties of mind. But beyond certain limitations, namely, those properties themselves, we cannot carry our knowledge in either case.

14. Certain properties attach to matter—namely, color, solidity, extension, figure, &c. These properties perceived by the mind, through the intervention of the bodily organs, give us the idea of matter, or substance.

15. Observing within ourselves certain mental phenomena, namely, thinking, remembering, willing, doubting, assenting, we at once are unavoidably led to the conclusion, that there is *something* to which these principles attach, or of which they are properties, and we call this something, this intangible substance, mind, spirit, or immaterial existence.

16. If any, notwithstanding these considerations, still believe that they have a better understanding of matter than of mind, let them explain to us what that principle is, in matter, which is termed *gravity*. That all bodies tend with unerring certainty to a common

13. What has been sufficiently dwelt upon? How far can we carry this knowledge?

14. Mention some of the properties of matter. What is said of them?

15. Mention some mental phenomena. What is said of them?

16. What should those explain who think they have a better understanding of matter than mind? What do we know of grav-

centre, that centre being the earth, and with a force proportioned to the quantity of matter, is a fact known, and we know nothing more about it. So in regard to the phenomenon of motion. How a moving body, by coming in contact with one at rest, communicates motion to the latter, we cannot tell. We call it impulsive motion; but how the impulse passes from one body to the other, is beyond our power of comprehension or explanation. Hence it will be observed, that in regard to both matter and mind, are many things, not only equally difficult of solution, but impossible to be made the subject of knowledge. But certain properties which attach to the substances of each, exhibit facts coming within the scope of our faculties to investigate.

17. III. SELF-ACTIVITY. The mind is self-active. By this is meant that it has power to originate action without any external, propelling influence. Some have supposed that there is no efficiency in the mind, but that it acts when acted upon. This cannot be true, as we shall attempt to show.

18. It is true that the mind acts in a particular manner according as it is acted upon by this or that influence, but the efficient cause of action is the mind itself. The objects presented to it, are the occasion of its action. It acts in this or that manner according as different objects present themselves, but it has a motive power of its own. The mind is not a thing which is capable of thought, and feeling, and choice, produced in it by something else; but itself thinks, and feels, and chooses.

ity and motion? What may be observed respecting matter and mind?

17. Define self-activity? What have some supposed? Is it correct?

18. What is true? What is the occasion of the mind's action? Explain its action? What is said of the mind?

19. This we know by consciousness. Our minds, in giving us the knowledge of their own acts, exhibit them to us as operations *of* our own minds, and not as operations *upon* our minds by something external. We are conscious of action, not of being acted upon. When we choose between two kinds of fruit, we are not conscious of a state of choice produced in us by the fruit as an efficient cause, but we are conscious of making the choice. We know that, in view of the two objects, we have put ourselves in a state of preference.

20. We infer also that man is self-active from his resemblance to the Deity. God has said, "Let us make man in our own image—after our own likeness." Whatever else this may mean, there is a resemblance between the Divine and human mind, *as minds*. If we suppose that God is self-active, we cannot believe that man is made so unlike him as to be incapable of originating action. No two things could be more unlike, than a mind capable of acting, and a mind capable only of being acted upon.

21. This thought may be followed out, by observing the several things in regard to which the mind is active. In regard to all its acts, and all its states it is self-active. It is so in regard to thought. Thoughts are not self-active things which come and make their impressions upon the mind. Nor are they stamped upon us by some other being. Our minds produce them. Whether thought arises in the form of perception, or conception, or imagination, or memory, or judgment,

19. How do we know this? In giving us knowledge, what do our minds exhibit? Of what are we conscious? How is it illustrated by two kinds of fruit?

20. What inference is adduced to prove self-activity? What has God said? What does this declaration mean? What can we not believe? What two things are dissimilar?

21. When is the mind self-active? What is said of the thought?

it is, if the expression may be allowed, a domestic manufacture.

22. If the mind is self-active in regard to thought, it is no less so in regard to feeling. It is true that there are some feelings which necessarily follow certain thoughts. If our judgment pronounce our conduct morally wrong, a feeling of disapprobation necessarily follows. Nevertheless, the mind is the originator of its own feelings. There is no other cause sufficient to produce them. Though certain preceding thoughts are the occasional cause of them, the mind itself is the efficient cause.

23. The mind is also active in regard to choice. It is not a balance, in the opposite scales of which motives are thrown, which necessitate one scale or the other to preponderate; but a self-active substance, which, in view of the motives on this side and on that, has power to take either.

24. We are, therefore, warranted in the conclusion, that the mind is a self-active, spiritual substance—endowed with thought, feeling, and choice.

25. These last-named particulars, *Thought*, *Feeling*, and *Choice*, will be considered, under a general classification of the mind, in the following chapter.

22. In regard to what besides thought is the mind self-active? What is true? What is said of the judgment? Of what is the mind the originator? What is the occasional, and what is the efficient cause of our thoughts?

23. How else is the mind self-active? How is it illustrated by a balance?

24. In what conclusion are we warranted?

25. What will be considered in the next chapter?

CHAPTER III.

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL POWERS.

1. DIFFERENT classifications of mental phenomena have been adopted by different writers, eminent in their day. Several of these classifications are now deemed defective. For example, one classification is into the Understanding and the Will. This, though very ancient, and sanctioned by the authority of eminent names, is not now generally followed.

2. Dr. Brown pronounces it illogical—since the will in this division is nominally opposed to the intellect. This is not the fact. Even those who assert its diversity, allot to it a power, in the intellectual department, almost equal to that exercised in the department assigned to itself. There are many emotions, also, which cannot be, with any propriety, classed under either of these divisions. For example, under which division should we classify grief, joy, admiration, astonishment, &c. This division seems to be as defective as would be the classification of animals into those which have wings, and those which have legs, since some animals have both legs and wings, and whole tribes exist, having neither the one nor the other.

3. Another classification, similar to the former, and

CHAP. III.—1. What is said of different classifications of mental phenomena? Are they all approved? Give an example? What is said of it?

2. What is Dr. Brown's opinion of it? Why? Is the will opposed to the intellect? What do those who assert its diversity allot to it? Can all the emotions be classed under either these divisions? Name some that could not be thus classed? To what defective classification is it likened?

of equal antiquity, since it corresponds with the very ancient division of philosophy into the contemplative and the active, is into the Intellectual and Active Powers. This is believed to be equally as defective as the former. Indeed, it represents substantially the same thing, under a change of names. Of course it claims no farther notice at our hands.

4. It is proper to contemplate the mind in its different states, and to examine the conceptions which are formed in those states. These conceptions are manifestly different, as the states themselves are different. Thus, as mental states, *thought* differs from *feeling*, and feeling from *choice*, and each state differs from the other, as is quite obvious.

5. This leads us to the general classification which we prefer to adopt, viz:

- I. THE INTELLECT.
- II. THE SUSCEPTIBILITY.
- III. THE WILL.

6. We thus view the mind in its relations. (1) In its relations to *Thought*, which we call *Intellect*. (2) In its relation to *Feeling*, which we call *Susceptibility*. (3) In its relation to *Choice*, which we call *Will*.

7. The conception of the relations of mind to each of these, gives all the idea we can have of Intellect, Susceptibility and Will. For example, Intellect is the

3. What is another classification? Is this defective? Does it differ from the former?

4. What is proper to do? What is said of these conceptions of the mind? What is quite obvious?

5. What classification is preferred?

6. What view does this qualification give us?

7. What does the conception of the relations of mind to each of these give us? Give the example?

object of that conception which we have of the mind as related to *Thought*. Susceptibility of that, as related to *Feeling*, and the Will of that, as related to *Choice*.

8. We also conceive of the mind in a great variety of specific states, which are modifications of these general states.

9. For example, under the Intellect we embrace, Perception, Conception, Imagination, Memory, Reason, Judgment, Consciousness. Under Susceptibility, we may form various conceptions of its relation to Pleasure and Pain, Happiness and Misery, Desire, Inclination, Passion, Emotion. The Will is here used to signify the general relation of Mind to Choice, or to those acts which involve preference.

10. I. THE INTELLECT. By whatever means communicated, be it by perception or otherwise, it is the Intellect which takes cognizance of ideas and comprehends them. By its exercise, therefore, we derive our knowledge. The states of mind involved in this department of our mental classification should be carefully noted as characterized by intellective, as distinguished from affective, and volative activity.

11. II. THE SUSCEPTIBILITY. This has relation to the capacity of feeling or perceiving the impressions of external objects, the relation which the susceptibility bears to sensation being through the bodily organs—the five senses—seeing, hearing, feeling, touching, tasting. The product of its action is found in certain

8. What do we also conceive of the mind ?

9. Give the example ?

10. What is the office of the intellect ? How do we derive our knowledge ? How should the states of mind in this department of mental classification be noted ? From what distinguished ?

11. To what does the susceptibility have a relation ? In what manner ? What are these states of mind denominated ? What are

states of mind which are denominated emotions and desires, and in the combination of those elementary feelings, which constitute what are generally denominated the Benevolent and Malevolent Affections, but which Dr. Abercrombie prefers to designate as the Uniting and Defensive Affections.

12. We are susceptible to pleasure and pain in various ways, namely, from the body—from the mind—from knowledge—from elevation of character—power—beauty—fitness to good ends—happiness of others—uneasiness.

13. Susceptibility bears a relation to Desire or Inclination in this, namely, to the desire of happiness (as including the removal of evil)—to the desire of Self-Love, which is the desire so often spoken of as a part of our sentient nature, and when so spoken of, always means a constitutional property of the mind. Sometimes, however, the term *self-love* is applied to the desire of happiness, as a mental state arising out of the constitutional susceptibility.

14. This general relation of Susceptibility to desire may be regarded more particularly, as susceptibility to the desire of food, drink, &c., and more specifically to the desire of *this* or *that* food or drink, almost *ad infinitum*.

15. These various susceptibilities of the mind are objects of the highest interest. All may be classified, but we must always, and most carefully distinguish

they generally called? What does Dr. Abercrombie prefer to call them?

12. How are we susceptible to pleasure and pain?

13. In what way does the susceptibility bear a relation to desire or inclination?

14. How may this general susceptibility to desire be regarded?

15. What is said of these various susceptibilities of the mind? What should we carefully distinguish?

between desires, as involuntary constitutional susceptibilities, and desires as voluntary *mental states*. This distinction will be enlarged upon, in a subsequent chapter, when we come to speak more specifically of the Desires.

16. III. THE WILL. This is that faculty of the mind which is brought into activity, when we desire either to do, or forbear a certain action, or when we exercise choice in relation to two or more objects, giving a preference to one over the rest.

17. The will holds the highest position, in this three-fold departmental structure of the mind. Its functions are of a directory, decisive character.

18. These several mental departments, to an extent, at least, rest upon, and are involved in each other. Nevertheless, that the mind is susceptible of these leading, generic distinctions, marking the inception, progress and completion of its operations, a suitable attention to the subject must convince us.

19. This inception, progress and completion, we designate generically by the classification of Intellect, Susceptibility and Will, above adopted. The action commences with the Intellect, giving the knowledge of the object; proceeds to the awakening of the Susceptibilities, as the product of that knowledge, and terminates in the executive department, the mandatory office of the Will being brought into requisition, to bring the mind in reference to the whole, into a state of decision.

16. What is the will?

17. Which of the three above named faculties holds the highest position?

18. What is said of these several mental departments? Of what will a suitable attention to the subject convince us?

19. State how the action of the mind commences and how it is brought to a decision.

20. That this is a natural, and regular order of sequence, in mental states, a little reflection must serve to convince us.

21. For example—there must be, in the action of the Susceptibility some object of desire; and that object of desire must, from the necessity of the case, have been made, in priority of time, the subject of knowledge, by the action of the Intellect, in the exercise of its perceptivity, or cognitive functions. For where no subject of knowledge exists, no object of desire can be brought to the cognition of the mind, no emotive action can be produced, and the susceptibilities, of course, remain quiescent, and the action of the Will is not aroused, as no object of preference or aversion, to choose or refuse, is brought within its cognizance.

20. Of what shall we be convinced if we reflect upon this subject?

21. Give the example? Define perceptivity? *Ans.* The power of perception. Define cognitive? *Ans.* Apprehending by the understanding.

PART II.

OF THE INTELLECT.

THE mind, as we have already seen, is departmental, and susceptible of certain generic distinctions. We have referred to it, therefore, generically, under the three leading heads of *Intellect*, *Susceptibility* and *Will*. Under each of these general divisions more specific distinctions will demand our attention. Under the first department allotted to the mind in this general classification, that of the Intellect, we shall refer specifically, to each of the following sub-divisions, devoting a chapter to each, namely, Sensation and Perception, Memory, Conception, Abstraction, Judgment, (including Intuition and Reasoning,) and Imagination.

CHAPTER I.

SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

1. SENSATION and Perception though susceptible of being philosophically distinguished, yet are so much involved in each other, as to be, to a great extent, practically at least, the same.

2. Sensation exists in the mind. It is a mental

PART II.—What have we already seen of mind, and of what is it susceptible? To what three heads has it been referred? Do any other distinctions demand our attention? What subdivisions belong to the intellect?

CHAPTER I.—1. Are sensation and perception susceptible of being distinguished? Are they the same?

state, which follows impressions made upon the mind through the medium of some of the corporeal senses, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or touching. For example—temperature produces sensation in the mind. We are accustomed to speak of the sensations of heat and cold. But we do not use the same term, when we speak of some mental emotion, as love, joy, sorrow and the like; for, though these involve acts or states of mind, their source is different.

3. It is by many erroneously supposed, that sensation is in the corporeal structure itself, and resides in the particular sense affected. For example, that touch is in the hand, sight in the eye, smell in the olfactory nerve, taste in the tongue, hearing in the ear. But all these organs are only modifications of one and the same thing, namely, matter. Matter is not susceptible of feeling. All that we shall be warranted in saying, then, is, that the instrumentality of the senses is requisite to produce sensation, but that sensation or feeling produced, is entirely in the mind.

4. We may employ an illustration of Dr. Reid on this subject. He says for example, a man cannot see the satellites of Jupiter but by a telescope. Does he conclude from this, that it is the telescope that sees those stars? Such a conclusion would be absurd. It is no less absurd to conclude that it is the eye that sees, or the ear that hears. The telescope is an artificial

2. How is sensation produced? Give the example? How are we accustomed to speak? When do we not use the same term? Why?

3. What is by many erroneously supposed? Give the example? What is said of these organs? What are we then warranted in saying?

4. Give the illustration of Dr. Reid? What is said of the telescope and the eye?

organ of sight, but it sees not. The eye is a natural organ of sight, by which we see, but the natural *organ* sees as little as the artificial.

5. That there is an intimate connection between the sensorial organs and the mind must be readily perceived and unhesitatingly admitted. The nature of that connection cannot be explained. How the excitation of one of the corporeal senses affects the mind, producing a new mental state, involves in its enquiry, a product of intellectual action, which sets analysis at defiance. The fact we know, and all we can say about it is, that so the great and wise Being, who formed us, constituted us.

6. Perception, as we have already remarked, is nearly allied to sensation, yet it embraces more, and may be distinguished from it, as a whole is from a part. It should be borne in mind that we now speak of external and not internal perception.

7. The mental state designated by the term perception, is complex. A sensorial organ is affected, following which is a particular state of mind, which we at once, insensibly, and without any process of reasoning, refer to some external object as the cause. Sensation, on the other hand, is a simple feeling, and is wholly within. That is, the feeling and the thing felt are one and the same thing. For example, when I am pained, I cannot say the pain I feel is one thing, and that my feeling is another thing. The two cannot be dissevered, even in imagination. Pain, when

5. What is admitted? What cannot be explained? What do we know and what can we say about it?

6. What is said of Perception? What should be borne in mind?

7. How is perception and sensation distinguished? What are the same? Give the example? What would be our condition if we were possessed only of sensation?

it is not felt, has no existence. What we have said of pain, will be equally applicable to every other sensation. If we possessed only sensation, there would still be figure, odor, sound, &c.—but they would seem to exist within, without reference to external causes.

8. But Perception seems to carry us out of ourselves, and connects us with the exterior world, referring the sensations produced by the sensorial functions to external causes. Thus the substantial realities of the outward, material world are fully developed unto us. Sensation tends to Perception, and the latter results, as a product, from the former.

9. The corporeal senses, then, are subservient to the faculty of perception, as well as of sensation. But, perhaps, it is not entirely fanciful to suppose, that these bodily organs are not essential to the operation of this intellectual faculty, but rather cramp and repress it. Nor is it unreasonable to indulge the belief, that beings of a superior order, untrammelled by bodily organizations, such as ours, enjoy, in a much more perfect manner than we do, the exercises of this faculty of perception. A person confined to a room with a single window all his life, might, indeed, suppose that window absolutely essential to his sight, rather than as the cause of his very limited view.

10. The perceptions of sense being the first elements of our knowledge, we cannot too sedulously cultivate the habit of attending carefully to the things which we see, feel, and the like. For by attention only, can the

8. How does perception affect us? To what does sensation tend? What results from it?

9. Of what use are the senses? What is it not fanciful to suppose? What belief is it proper to indulge? How is it illustrated?

10. What are the first elements of our knowledge? What then should be cultivated? Why? What is said of attention? How

notions which we thus form be made clear and distinct, and so of value and service to us. Attention is to the perceptive faculty what the microscope is to the eye. An object seen indistinctly with the naked eye, on account of its minuteness, may be seen distinctly with a microscope. It is from habitual inattention to our sensations, rather than to any natural dullness in our organs of sense, that so few of the objects which strike our senses leave any, unless very indistinct impressions upon the mind.

11. It is a remark of Mr. Stewart, that the *sensations* which are excited in the mind by external objects, and the *perceptions* of material qualities, which follow these sensations, are to be distinguished from each other only by long habits of patient reflection.

12. From what has been said, it appears that certain impressions made on our sensorial organs, by external objects, are followed by corresponding sensations, and that these sensations, by the constitution of our nature, are rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions of the existence and qualities of the material bodies by which the impressions are made, and that the whole process is to us an impenetrable and inscrutable mystery.

13. The facts, however, are sufficiently ascertained, and are to be received and referred to that class for which we cannot satisfactorily account. Hence, the evidence which we derive from our senses, of the existence and properties of things pertaining to the ma-

is it illustrated? Why are indistinct impressions made upon the mind?

11. What does Mr. Stewart remark?

12. What appears from the foregoing remarks?

13. What is ascertained? With what is the evidence which we derive from our senses classed?

terial world, is to be classed with those fundamental, intuitive principles of belief, which are susceptible of no other proof than the universal conviction of mankind.

CHAPTER II.

MEMORY.

1. THIS is the faculty by which we have a knowledge of what we have felt, thought, or perceived, in past time. From it we acquire our knowledge and experience. Without it we should forever remain in ignorance. At the close of a long life we should not be in advance of our immediate childhood. When memory presents us with past thoughts, feelings, or perceptions, it is accompanied with the firm persuasion that they were formerly real and present. What we distinctly remember we as firmly believe as anything which is now present to us.

2. The belief which is founded on distinct Memory, is accounted actual knowledge, and is no less certainly relied upon, than if it rested on demonstration. A man in a sound state of mind will not call it in question.

3. To the exercise of memory we are indebted for our knowledge of time or duration. When a fact is

CHAP. II.—1. What is memory? What do we acquire from it? What would be our condition without it? With what is it accompanied when it presents us with past feelings or perceptions? Do we believe what we remember?

2. What is considered actual knowledge? Is it relied upon? Who does not call it in question?

3. For what knowledge are we indebted to memory? What must we necessarily believe?

remembered, we must necessarily believe that an interval of time has elapsed between the period in which it happened and the present moment.

4. It is hardly necessary to say that things remembered must be things which were formerly perceived or known. For example, I remember the comet of 1843. ~ I must, therefore, have perceived it at the time it appeared, or I could not have remembered it.

5. Two things are implied in memory. One is a power of retaining, the other is the power of recalling knowledge to our minds when we have need of its use. The former is called a retentive, the latter a ready memory. When we remember with little or no effort, it is called *remembrance* simply. But when we recall past events by a direct effort of will, it is called *recollection*. The former is sometimes distinguished as passive, the latter as active memory.

6. There are great varieties, and different degrees of strength of memory in different individuals. The power of memory is not only different in different individuals, but is also different in the same persons at different times. There are many instances of extraordinary memory on record. Themistocles made himself master of the Persian language in one year, and could call by their names all the citizens of Athens, amounting to twenty thousand. Cyrus knew the name of every soldier in his army. Julius Cæsar could dictate to three secretaries at once, on as many different subjects; and I have somewhere seen it recorded of

4. What seems not necessary to say? Give the example?

5. What two things are implied in memory? What are they called? What is called remembrance simply? What is called recollection? How are they distinguished?

6. Do all possess this faculty alike? What is said of Themis-

Napoleon Bonaparte, that he could dictate to five, in the same manner. Seneca relates of a person, who, upon hearing a poet read a new poem, could accurately repeat the whole of it. A similar anecdote is related of an Englishman, who visited the king of Prussia. When Voltaire read a new poem which he had written, to the king, the latter, for amusement, accused the former of plagiarism, and, as proof, produced the Englishman, who had been concealed behind a screen during the reading. The Englishman repeated the poem verbatim, to the amazement of Voltaire, who, in a fit of passion, tore his poem into fragments. Upon explanation being made, Voltaire was glad to recover his poem by writing it down from the lips of the wonderful but obliging Englishman, who repeated it to him for that purpose.

7. There are on record, also, many singular instances of defective memory—defective in some particulars, and yet wonderfully retentive in others. Dr. Watson, Bishop of Landaff, relates concerning his father, who had been afflicted with palsy several years before his death, that he would ask twenty times in a day “the name of the lad at college,” meaning his youngest son, and at the same time was able to repeat hundreds of lines, without a blunder, out of classic authors. Montaigne, a French writer of genius, affords a striking instance of defective memory, in all that related to the common affairs of life. He says of himself, “I can do nothing without my memorandum book; and so great is my difficulty in remembering proper

toes? Of Julius Cæsar? Of Napoleon? What does Seneca relate? What similar one is stated?

7. What instance of defective memory is given by Dr. Watson? What does a French writer relate of himself?

names, that I am forced to call my domestic servant by their offices. I am ignorant of the greater part of our coins in use; of the difference of one grain from another, both in the earth and in the granary; what use leaven is in making bread, and why wine must stand some time in the vat before it ferments. When I have an oration to speak of any considerable length, I am reduced to the miserable necessity of getting it word for word by heart."

8. Mr. Stewart remarks, that this ignorance of Montaigne did not proceed from any original defect of memory, but from the singular and whimsical direction which his curiosity had taken at an early period of life.

9. It has been thought that a great memory is incompatible with quick parts, or bright genius. But this prejudice seems to be without foundation. In refutation of this notion, we need only repeat the names of the individuals just referred to, namely, Themistocles, Cyrus, Cæsar, and Bonaparte, as men of the greatest abilities, as well as of great memory.

10. Memory certainly seems to be bestowed in very unequal degrees upon different individuals, and yet the difference is not so great as, at first view, we might perhaps be led to suppose. A very considerable degree of the difference which does exist, may properly be ascribed to the different degrees of *Attention* bestowed by individuals upon objects which pass in review before them.

11. Memory may be said to depend mainly upon

8. What does Mr. Stewart remark respecting him?

9. What has been thought of a great memory? Is this prejudice correct? How is it refuted?

10. To what, mostly may be ascribed the difference of memory in different individuals?

two particulars, namely, *Association* and *Attention*. In order to improve the memory, therefore, the intellectual energy should be carefully directed to the formation of correct habits of association and attention.

12. The principle of Association is founded upon the tendency which exists in thoughts formerly considered to recall each other in the same order of succession in which they were at first contemplated. This requires no mental effort, and is therefore properly referred to what is called passive memory, or simple *Remembrance*. A single thought or circumstance will frequently introduce a whole train of thoughts. A view of our early home, after a long absence, will frequently recall many of the incidents of childhood, and one, introducing another, may quickly run over a series of years. This is called association of ideas. And were it not for this tendency of one idea to introduce another, we could never recall a thought which has once passed from the mind. Association, therefore, is involved in every act of Remembrance or effort of Recollection.

13. Attention is absolutely essential to memory, for without some degree of attention, no thought once passed, could ever be recalled. The distinctness of our recollection, will be in proportion to the energy infused into the attention bestowed upon the object, and the clearness of our perception of it. When the attention is not given to a particular circumstance, the

11. Upon what mainly does memory depend? How can memory be improved?

12. Upon what is the principle of association founded? To what is it referred? What is said of a single thought or circumstance? What is this called? What is said of this tendency? In what is association involved?

13. What is said of attention? In proportion to what will be distinctness of recollection? When is recollection wanting? Give the example?

perception will be indistinct, and recollection feeble or wanting. For example, we may be intently engaged in conversation or other employment in a room when the clock strikes, and the moment after be unable to recall the fact. We are apt to conclude, therefore, that we did not perceive it. This idea is not well founded. The fact was perceived, though the perception was not clear and distinct, owing to a lack of attention, and hence we are not able to recollect it.

14. Perhaps this can be better illustrated by instancing a person asleep in church. Let such an individual be suddenly awakened, and he cannot perhaps recall the last words of the speaker, or even tell whether he was speaking at all. And yet, that sleep does not entirely suspend perception is proved from the fact, that if the speaker suddenly pause in his discourse, every person asleep in the house will instantly awake. We may, then, be conscious of a perception, though, from its indistinctness, owing to the absence of a suitable degree of attention, we cannot afterwards recollect it.

15. When a person complains of a defective memory, he mistakes, often, a deficiency of attention for a defect of memory.

16. It is of the utmost importance, in order to secure what is ordinarily called a good memory, to cultivate the habit of giving fixed, exclusive, and intense attention to whatever object is before the mind, whether it be matter of observation or of reading and study.

17. Writing is a great aid to fixedness of attention, clearness of perception, and, consequently, to distinctness of subsequent recollection. Transcribing volu-

14. How is it further illustrated? What is said of our being conscious of a perception?

15. What mistake is often made?

16. What is of the utmost importance to secure a good memory?

minously, perhaps, would not subserve the purpose in view. But to write systematically, slowly, and carefully, transcribing short passages, making abstracts of chapters or books read, or writing down in our own language the leading thoughts of the authors whose works we read, would form such habits of attention, as must be of the highest value and most serviceable character.

18. Professor Porson, once highly distinguished as a scholar among the learned men of England, was noted for his singularly excellent and remarkable memory. He could at pleasure recite any passage from the Greek poets. He says he never remembered any thing which he did not transcribe three times, or read over six times at least. A like persevering and laborious course would serve to cultivate the faculties of Association and Attention, and secure to every one, with hardly an exception, a good memory.

19. What better, more advantageous, and grateful return for labor bestowed, could be enjoyed, than this high cultivation and vigorous and healthful exercise of memory—one of the noblest of our faculties, without which we could derive no benefit from experience; hopeless ignorance would be our portion, and the past would be to us as obscure as the future is inscrutable.

17. What is said of writing? How should it be done? What habits will it form?

18. What is related of Professor Porson? What is said of his perseverance?

19. Should we be repaid by making such efforts?

CHAPTER III.

CONCEPTION.

1. CONCEPTION has been defined to mean that power or faculty of the mind which enables us to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation which it has formerly felt.

2. To illustrate this, take the case of a painter who wishes to paint a picture of an absent friend. He is said, in so doing, to paint from memory. This expression is allowable in ordinary conversation. But in an analysis of the mind a distinction should be made.

3. The painter conceives, for the instant, his friend to be present before him. He makes the features of his friend an object of thought, so as to copy their resemblance. This the power of conception enables him to do. It is then the office of memory to recognize these features, as a former object of perception. Here, then, is shown the inaccuracy of saying that he paints from memory. The distinction to be made between conception and memory is this: Memory has relation to past time. Conception implies no idea of time whatever. Shakespeare calls this power "the mind's eye."

Hamlet. My father ! methinks I see my father.

Horatio. Where, my lord ?

Hamlet. In my mind's eye, Horatio.

HAMLET, Act I. Scene 4.

CHAPTER III.—1. How is conception defined ?

2. How is it illustrated ?

3. What does the painter conceive ? What does the power of conception enable him to do ? What is the office of memory ?—What is shown ? What distinction is made between conception and memory ? What does Shakspeare call conception ?

4. Conception, as we here use the word, is designed to be limited in its application to our sensations, and the objects of our perceptions.

5. The term *conception*, has been employed by some writers in a sense as extensive as the term *simple apprehension* used by the school philosophers, who used that term as expressive of what we mean by the term conception as here defined, and including in it also, our apprehension of general propositions. In ordinary language we apply the word *conception*, to the knowledge which we have by our senses of external objects, and also, to our knowledge of speculative truth. Yet there is, in strictness as much difference between the conception of a truth, and the conception of an absent object of sense, as between the *perception* of a tree and the perception of a mathematical theorem. Conception then may be regarded as the faculty whose province it is to enable us to form a notion of our past sensations, or of the objects of sense, that we have formerly perceived.

6. We can conceive the objects of some of our senses, much more easily than those of others. We can conceive of an absent visible object, as, for example, a landscape with which we are familiar, much more easily than we can of a particular sound, taste, or pain formerly felt.

7. This peculiarity seems referable to the fact, that when we think of a sound, taste, &c., the object of our

4. How is it limited in its applications ?

5. How has it been employed ? How do we employ the term conception in ordinary language ? What difference is shown ?— How may conception be regarded ?

6. Are all the objects of our senses conceived alike ? How is it explained ?

7. To what does this peculiarity seem referable ? What can we

conception is a single, isolated sensation ; but, on the other hand, every visible object is complex, and our conception of it is aided by the association of ideas. We do not attend to every part of a visible object at the same instant of time ; nor do we form our conception of it as a whole, at the same instant of time. Our conception of it as a whole, is the result of many conceptions. The association of ideas, seems to connect the whole together in the formation of these several conceptions.

8. A talent for lively description, at least so far as sensible objects are concerned, depends upon the degree in which the describer is enabled to exercise the power of conception. One man in describing an object seems to place it before him, and to describe from actual perception, while another, not at all deficient in a ready flow of words, seems embarrassed in the midst of a number of particulars, indistinctly apprehended, which crowd into his mind without order or connection.

9. It is probable that the faculty of Conception follows nearly the same law as memory, and depends upon the degree of attention bestowed upon the objects of it, for the different degrees of vigor and clearness in its exercise.

10. There are also certain situations, which contribute essentially to the more intense activity of the conceptive faculty. Seclusion and the absence of all

not do at the same instant of time ? What is said of our conception of the landscape as a whole ? What is said of association of ideas ?

8. Upon what does a talent for lively description depend ? How will one man describe an object ? How will another ?

9. What law does conception follow ?

10. What is said of some situations being more favorable to its intensity than others ? And what to its most healthy exercise ?

external impressions, are especially favorable to its highest and most healthy exercise. This is beautifully illustrated in the case of the celebrated Danish traveler, Neibuhr.

11. In his old age, when entirely prostrated in physical strength, and totally blind, he used both to delight and astonish his friends, by his exact, circumstantial, and most vivid and animated descriptions of scenes witnessed by him in former days, during his extensive travels. When they expressed to him their surprise, at this his wonderful power of description, he replied, that as he lay in bed, all visible objects shut out, the pictures of what he had seen in the East continually floated before his mind's eye, so that it was no wonder he could speak of them as if he had seen them yesterday. With like vividness the deep intense sky of Asia, with brilliant and twinkling hosts of stars, which he had so often gazed at by night, or its lofty vault of blue by day, was reflected in the hours of stillness and darkness, on his inmost soul.

12. Dr. Abercrombie, in his treatise on the intellectual powers, relates an anecdote never before on record, illustrative of the power and application of this conceptive faculty. In the church of St. Peter, at Cologne, the altar piece is a large and valuable picture by Reubens, representing the martyrdom of the Apostle. This picture having been carried away by the French in 1805, to the great regret of the inhabitants, a painter of that city undertook to make a copy of it from recollection; and succeeded in doing so in such a manner, that the most delicate tints of the original are preserved with the most minute accuracy.

11. How is it illustrated?

12. Relate the anecdote given by Abercrombie?

The original painting has now been restored, but the copy is preserved along with it, and even when they are rigidly compared, it is scarcely possible to distinguish the one from the other.

CHAPTER IV.

ABSTRACTION.

1. By abstraction, we are not to understand an independent original source of knowledge. But it enables us to take the knowledge which we have, and separate it from other knowledge, and thus view it in a new, or isolated position; as when we contemplate some particular part or property of a complex object, as separate from the rest. The exercise of this power is equally applicable to external and internal objects.

2. For example, the Statuary, by external perception, derives his knowledge of the block of marble upon which he bestows the labor of his curious art, but it is the power of abstraction which enables him to examine it as a complex object, and separate it into its several parts, or properties of length, breadth, thickness, &c; and thus intellectually separated and abstracted, of making each a distinct object of contemplation and examination, apart from the rest.

3. But this is strictly an intellectual operation. A complex object is perceived by the mind. For example, a tree. It has height, figure, thickness, color, &c.

CHAPTER IV.—1. Is abstraction an independent original source of knowledge? What does it enable us to do? To What is it applicable?

2. Relate the example?

Physically these properties are incapable of separation. But each property, by the mental process of abstraction, may be taken separately, and held isolated before the mind, for its contemplation.

4. Abstraction involves two mental processes. By the one, a variety of objects are examined. Properties or qualities in which several of these objects, agree, are ascertained, and thus they are arranged into classes, genera and species.

5. By the other, we take a comprehensive view of an extensive collection of facts, and select one, common to the whole. This we call generalizing, or deducing a general fact, or general principle.

6. Did we not possess this power of abstraction, our knowledge would have been confined exclusively to an acquaintance with individual beings, and individual facts. The very foundation of science is laid in generalizing and reducing to a few classes and general principles, the multitude of individual things which every branch of human knowledge embraces. Science, then, without abstraction could not have existed.

7. Reason has its highest exercise, in the discovery of general principles. To its exertions abstraction is subservient. Especially is it so, in those exertions of reason, by which man has arrived at the distinction of being called a rational being.

8. If this be true, abstraction may properly be re-

3. What is abstraction strictly speaking? Give the example?

4. What does this power involve? What is done by the one?

5. What by the other? What do we call this?

6. What would have been the condition of our minds if we did not possess this power? In what is laid the foundation of science? What is said of science without abstraction?

7. To what is abstraction subservient? In what cases is it so especially?

garded as one of the leading attributes of human nature, for man could not be what he is without it. The want of it, therefore, to any great extent, or its disordered or imperfect action, is a great misfortune. For a mind deficient in this respect, will be incapable of distinguishing the properties or qualities of things, by which they are distinguished from each other; and hence things appear to him in a crude, shapeless, unformed mass. Such a mind must be inefficient to the highest degree.

9. On the other hand the very intensity of the exercise of the abstractive principle, often destroys the proper balance of the mind. Individuals, under this high degree of its influence, are not unfrequently lost to themselves, and to a perception of all external objects. The other powers of the mind seem to have left their appropriate offices, and yielded up their strength to this one concentrated faculty. The power of the mind, in this particular direction, and under the influence of this condensed effort, must be immense. The mind seizes upon its object, holds it in its fixed unwavering grasp, in a state of complete insulation, abstracts from it a peculiar quality or property, and holds it in intense, continuous contemplation. Such men pass for profound men, and profound men they unquestionably are. But their profundity is often acquired at the expense of what the world calls common sense, as far

2. How may abstraction be regarded? Why? What is said of the want of it and a disordered or imperfect action of it? How will things appear to a mind in this respect deficient? Why?

9. What is said of the intensity of this power? What is the state of individuals of this class? How are the other powers of the mind affected? Describe the active energy of the mind in this condition? How are such persons considered? What is said of them?

as it regards all the ordinary affairs and transactions of life.

10. An example or two, of the excessive action of the abstractive principle, will serve to illustrate, in a clear manner, its power, and the utility which it may be made to subserve, in reducing complexity to distinct and lucid classification, and in deducing general principles.

11. The abstractive power was exercised to an extraordinary and absorbing degree by Sir Isaac Newton. We are informed by his biographer, that he would sometimes sit for hours on his bed-side, without dressing, wrapped in his own abstractions, wholly lost to all external objects, his thoughts seeming to retain no connection with the ordinary affairs of life.

12. A still more amusing account, of the singular intensity of this power, is given of Dr. Robert Hamilton. He was a celebrated author, and a clear-headed philosopher. His writings were characterized by logical arrangement and beauty of expression. But in him the abstractive power exhibited itself to a degree of intensity, that was painfully amusing, if such an expression may be allowed. It seemed to leave him, in the individuality of his own thoughts, isolated from the world and its objects. From the seclusion of his closet, he could make the power of his profound and cultivated mind felt in the world, but he, himself, was, when in public, a mere shadow. He would pull off his hat to his own wife in the streets, and apologize for not having the pleasure of her acquaintance. He went to his classes in the college on the dark mornings, with one of her white stockings on one foot, and one of his own

10. Why is an example or two given?

11. Relate what is stated of Sir Isaac Newton?

12. Relate the account given of Dr. Hamilton?

black ones on the other, and often spent the whole time of the meeting in moving from the table the hats of the students, which they as constantly returned. Sometimes he invited the students to call on him, and then fined them for coming to insult him. He would run against a cow in the road, turn round and beg her pardon, "Madam," and hope she was not hurt. At other times he would run against posts, and chide them for not getting out of his way, and yet his conversation, at the same time, if any one happened to be with him, was perfect logic, and perfect music.

13. Numerous instances of a like character might be given, but this will suffice. This undue absorption of the other powers, by this excessive mental operation, does not imply imbecility of mind, or disordered intellect, approaching to insanity; but a profoundness and intensity of the abstractive power, which firmly grasps every subject of contemplation which is brought before the mind, and holds it, in vigorous and isolated inspection, separate from every other object, and often to the entire forgetfulness of self, and of the proprieties and conventionalities of life. In the language of Dr. Good, all the external senses remain in a state of torpor, so that the eyes do not see, nor the ears hear, nor the flesh feel; and the individual, thus under the influence of the abstractive power, may be spoken to, or conversation may take place around him, or he may even be struck upon the shoulders, without any knowledge of what is occurring.

14. It may be inferred, perhaps, that such an individual must have his thoughts chiefly employed on subjects of the most abstruse and profound character.

13. What is said of this undue absorption of the mental powers? What does Dr. Good say of it?

14. What may be inferred? Is such an inference just? What

This, however, is not at all the case. To such an individual it is of no consequence what the nature or importance of the subject may be. Whether it is of the most trifling character, or of the greatest magnitude, its contemplation by him, involves equally an absorption, and, for the time being, seemingly a suspension of all his other powers. The intensity of the abstractive power is the same, whether he contemplates the structure of a heel-tap or of a world, the figure of a hobnail, or the expanse of the universe.

CHAPTER V.

JUDGMENT OR REASON.

1. JUDGMENT is that faculty of the mind which enables it to decide in regard to the truth or falsehood of whatever is brought to its cognizance. In an act of judgment the determination of the mind is influenced, by comparing the relations of ideas, or by comparison of facts and arguments. Our notions of the relations of things are derived from the exercise of this power of the mind, and without it we should have no notions of relations. These relations the judgment may enable us to perceive, instantly, without reference to anything else, or its determinations may depend upon a mental process involving the exercise of Reason.

is said of the importance of the subject which employs the thoughts of such an individual?

CHAPTER V.—1. What is the judgment? How is the mind influenced in an act of judgment? What do we derive from its exercise? What would be our deficiency without it? What may the judgment enable us to perceive instantly? Or upon what may its determinations depend?

2. The truth or falsehood of a thing asserted may be instantly perceived, without examination, or the discovery of the truth or falsity of a given proposition may be more remote, and require examination. In both cases the perceptive faculty is Judgment. In the first, it may be called intuitive judgment; in the latter, is involved a process of reason, called *reasoning*. Reasoning is a process by which we pass in regular sequence from one judgment to another. Judgment, then, may be distinguished as *Intuitive*, depending upon no previous judgment, and also, as *Discursive* or deductive, being deduced from some preceding judgment, by a chain of reasoning.

3. We shall, therefore, in the further prosecution of our subject, regard Judgment as a generic term, including under it,

I. INTUITION.

II. REASONING.

4. I. INTUITION. There are certain fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of our knowledge, the truth of which is instantly perceived, the moment they are enunciated, and, indeed, seemingly forced upon us by our very constitution. What we mean by Intuition, therefore, is that act of the mind, by which it perceives certain truths the moment they are presented. These are called Intuitive, or First, or Primary Truths;

2. What may be instantly perceived? Or what may be requisite? What is the perceptive faculty in both cases? What is it called in the first? What in the latter? What is reasoning?—How then is the judgment distinguished?

3. What term is the judgment and what does it include?

4. What is said of certain fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of our knowledge? What is meant by intuition? What are these principles called and why?

and are properly so called, "because they are the ultimate propositions into which all reasoning resolves itself."

5. These truths force themselves upon the conviction of all classes of men, by whom their force is felt, perhaps, in an equal degree. Every one, with unhesitating confidence, acts upon them, in all the constantly occurring transactions of life. They are not susceptible of proof by any process of reasoning, and hence, any arguments put forth to establish or sustain them, must be fallacious, and can be easily overthrown. In former times, philosophical writers did attempt to establish them by a process of reasoning. Their reasoning, from the nature of the case, was necessarily unsound. It was, therefore, successfully assailed by sceptical writers. Triumphant over the defective arguments of their opponents, the latter claimed that they had overthrown the truths themselves.

6. But these truths were and are impregnable. They stood equally unaffected by the impotent arguments of the one side to sustain, and the desperate scepticism of the other, which sought to overthrow them.

7. As illustrative of the fallacious character of the arguments used to establish an intuitive truth, we may appropriately refer to that of Des Cartes, in which he attempted to prove his own existence. He formed the determination not to believe in his own existence till

5. Upon whom do these truths force themselves? Who acts upon them? Are they susceptible of proof by any process of reasoning? What is said of arguments to sustain them? What did philosophers formerly attempt to do? What is said of their reasoning? Who assailed it? What did infidels claim?

6. What are these truths? Did they stand or were they overthrown?

7. Give an example of an attempt to prove a first truth? What

he could prove it. He adopted, therefore, the following process: *Cogito, ergo sum*, I THINK, THEREFORE, I EXIST. This succinct argument was regarded by him as entirely conclusive and impregnable. Nevertheless, it involves what the logicians call a *petitio principii*, or begging of the question. There can be no thought where there is no existence; the argument, therefore, assumes that to be true, which it attempts to prove. It really amounts to this, when literally rendered, namely, *Cogito, I am a thinking being, Ergo sum, I am in being*. His very premises, it will be observed, assume his existence, and then the premises themselves are adduced to prove his existence.

8. The argument itself then is unsound, of course unsuccessful. But the overthrow of the argument affects not the truth itself. To contend that the overthrow of the argument overthrows the truth also, and that, therefore, we have no evidence of our own existence, would be nothing short of arrant nonsense. The fact of our existence as thinking beings, is the subject of our consciousness. It is one of those leading, primary truths, which, as no argument is needed, or can be formed to sustain, so none can be employed, competent to overthrow it. This is characteristic of all the first principles of belief. Des Cartes succeeded as well as any one ever did or ever will, in his attempt to prove, by process of reasoning, an Intuitive article of belief.

9. The chief kinds or sources of intuitive truth are

does such an argument involve? How is it explained? What is said of the premises?

8. What of the argument? What would be arrant nonsense? What is the subject of our consciousness? Does it need any argument to establish it? Why? Is it characteristic of all of them? What is said of Des Cartes?

the evidence of the SENSES, of CONSCIOUSNESS, of MEMORY, and of AXIOMS.

10. The external senses, hearing, seeing, smelling, touching, and tasting, afford us all the evidence we have of the material world around us; and we can no more doubt the existence of objects, the evidence of which is conveyed to us through these sources, than we can our own existence. For example, to doubt our own existence would be no more absurd than to doubt the existence of a body which we see and handle.

11. Consciousness is another source of intuitive belief. By it we are made acquainted with our mental states and operations. We exercise thought, feeling, choice—we experience sorrow, pain, pleasure, disgust. These are mental states. They are facts of which we are conscious. We cannot disbelieve them. We cannot doubt their reality. Such is the testimony of consciousness. Such the intuitive conviction of an existing fact which it fastens upon the mind. It is a species of evidence, than which there is none higher, when fully ascertained and made apparent.

12. The evidence of *Memory* is another source of certain knowledge, or intuitive belief. We remember past facts, whether pertaining to mind or matter. Thus memory gives us our knowledge of the past. This is a species of evidence upon which men rely with as great a feeling of certainty, as upon any evi-

9. What are the chief kinds of intuitive truth?

10. What affords us all the evidence we have of existence of material things? Do we doubt the existence of objects?

11. With what does consciousness make us acquainted? What are mental states? Can we disbelieve them? Is there a higher species of evidence than consciousness?

12. What is another source of knowledge? What do we remember? What is said of this species of evidence? What are deter-

dence furnished by the senses. Upon such testimony, the most weighty causes, affecting life, liberty, and property, are determined in our courts. It is also true that that may be relied upon, as certain present knowledge, which gained our belief and assent upon an investigation long past, although we may have forgotten the particular process of investigation, and the individual steps by which we arrived at the conclusion. To reject the evidence of memory, as a source of certain knowledge, is to sweep away the basis of demonstrative reasoning.

13. Mathematical axioms afford another species of intuitive belief. These are abstract truths which force conviction upon the mind, the moment the terms are understood by which they are expressed. They cannot be proved, for no propositions of greater certainty can be employed from which to deduce their truth.

14. The following may be referred to, as chiefly embracing what are called intuitive truths:

(1.) *A belief in our personal existence.* This truth must rest upon the conviction of every one, who takes any cognizance of his mental states. When any body comes in contact with the senses, an impression is produced, and a perception of the object awakened, and at the same time there must arise a conviction of a percipient being. For example, when sight, hearing, touch, &c., are excited, there is unavoidably an accom-

panied upon such testimony in our courts? What may be relied upon as certain present knowledge? What would be the rejection of the evidence of memory as a source of certain knowledge?

13. What is another species of intuitive belief? How are these truths forced upon the mind? Can they be proved? Why?

14. What is the first intuitive truth? What must this truth rest upon? When is there an impression produced and a perception awakened? What must arise at the same time? Give the

panying belief in the existence of a being, who sees, hears, and feels. This belief springs from the very constitution of our nature, and hence is neither susceptible of proof, nor does it require argument to sustain it. For the same reason it is fearless of any argument attempting its overthrow.

15. (2.) *A belief in our personal identity.* This truth is derived from the combined operation of consciousness and memory. Whatever may have been the mental states of an individual, however great may have been the change which has taken place in his character at different periods of time, whether he has reference to the past, the present, or the future, he has, and retains the unhesitating and unalterable conviction, that the thinking, sentient being whom he calls himself, remains uniformly the same. Upon this intuitive conviction, all men act in all the transactions of life.

16. (3.) *The material world exists.* This involves the evidence of our senses, and a conviction that material bodies have an existence independently of our sensations. This is an intuitive truth, admitting no other proof than the universal conviction of mankind.

17. (4.) *Memory may be trusted.* It is not meant that there is no liability to mistake from this source. All that is meant is, that when we feel certain that memory retains a correct impression of past perceptions, we act with the same feeling of certainty and

example? From what does this belief spring? What is said of it? For the same reason of what is it fearless?

15. What is the second intuitive truth? From what is this truth derived? What is said of it? Who act upon it in all the transactions of life?

16. What is the third intuitive truth? What does it involve? Of what proof does it admit?

17. What is said of memory? What is not meant? What is

confidence, as we should do if the remembrances were the perceptions of the present moment. Without such trust in memory, we could hardly maintain our existence. Certain it is, we could derive no benefit from the experience of the past.

18. (5.) *Every effect must have a cause.* The cause too, it is equally evident, must be adequate to the effect. When we see contrivance, our minds are inevitably led to the conclusion that there is an efficient cause for the contrivance—a contriver. For example, we see a watch. Its curious mechanism unfolds contrivance. The conclusion of the mind irresistibly follows, that there is an intelligent cause of the contrivance. So, also, when we look abroad over the material creation, we see all around us evidences of design. Our minds are at once, and intuitively, conducted to the belief in the existence of a designer; an intelligent cause adequate to produce the effects which we witness. We are thus led, “through nature, up to nature’s God.” The immense conclusion is fastened upon the mind, that there is a God—“a perceiving, intelligent, designing Being, at the head of creation, and from whose will it proceeded. The attributes must be adequate to the magnitude, extent, and multiplicity of his operations, which are not only vast beyond comparison with those performed by any other power, but, so far as respects our conceptions of them, infinite, because they are unlimited on all sides.”

meant? What would be our condition without such trust? What is certain?

18. What is said of every effect? What of the cause? How are our minds affected when we see contrivance? Give the example of the watch? When we look at the material world what do we see? What are our minds led to believe? How are we led?—What is the conclusion? What is said of his attributes?

19. (6.) *The uniformity of nature may be trusted.* This involves the belief that the same substances will always present the same characters, and that the same causes, under similar circumstances, will always produce the same effects. This truth intuitively receives the assent of the mind, and is confidently acted upon in all the transactions of life. Founded upon it are all our arrangements and calculations for future life, involving protection, comfort, and even our very existence. It can readily be appreciated, that without this confidence in the uniformity of nature, instead of order and system, wild confusion would characterize all human affairs.

20. These truths which we have been considering, being fundamental, are of the most essential importance, as they lie at the foundation of our knowledge, and involve the ultimate propositions in our processes of reasoning. Unsusceptible of proof by any deductions of reasoning, and at the same time invulnerable to the assaults of sophists and sceptics, they afford a true, overwhelming, and only answer to many of the sophisms of the scholastic philosophy, and to many sceptical arguments of more modern times.

21. An appeal to the consciousness of every individual, must afford complete evidence of their truth, and compel belief.

22. Dr. Brown says, "We believe them because it is impossible not to believe them."

19. What is said of the uniformity of nature? What belief does this truth involve? What is further said of it? What is founded upon it? What effect would follow without this confidence in the uniformity of nature?

20. Are these truths important? Why? What answer do they afford?

21. What is said of an appeal to the consciousness of every individual?

22. What is Dr. Brown's remark?

23. Mr. Stewart remarks, "In all these cases, the only account that can be given of our belief is, that it forms a necessary part of our constitution, against which metaphysicians may argue, so as to perplex the judgment, but of which it is impossible to divest ourselves for a moment, when we are called to employ our reason, either in the business of life or in the pursuits of science."

24. As intuitive or primary truths lie at the foundation of every act of reasoning, it follows, that when one asserts that any given opinion is contrary to reason, he is bound to show that it is contradictory to some one of those intuitive or primary truths.

25. II. REASONING. Dr. Hedge, in his elements of Logic, remarks, that "Judgment is an act of the mind, uniting or separating two objects of thought, according as they are perceived to agree or disagree. The relation between these objects is sometimes discovered by barely contemplating them, without any reference to anything else, and sometimes by comparing them with other objects, to which they have a known relation. The former is simple comparison, the latter is an act of reasoning. The determination of the mind, in both cases, is denominated judgment. Every act of judgment is grounded on some sort of evidence. That which determines the mind in simple comparison, is called *intuitive evidence*; and that which is employed in reasoning, *deductive*."

23. What is Mr. Stewart's?

24. As intuitive truths lie at the foundation of every act of reasoning what is one bound to do, who asserts that a given opinion is contrary to reason?

25. How does Dr. Hedge define judgment? How is the relation between objects discovered? What is the former called? What is the latter called? What is the determination of the mind in both cases called? On what is every act of judgment grounded? What is called intuitive evidence? What deductive?

26. The decisions of the mind, when founded upon intuitive evidence, we have called *Intuition*—the process of the mind when employed with deductive evidence, we call *Reasoning*.

27. Reasoning is but a prolonged exercise of *reason*. It may consist of many steps, the first conclusion being a premise to the second, the second to the third, and so on till we come to the last conclusion. Thus unknown propositions are deduced from previous ones which are known, or are evident, or which are admitted or supposed for the sake of argument.

28. All the objects of the human understanding may be reduced to two classes, namely, abstract ideas, and things really existing. Of abstract ideas, and their relations, all our knowledge is certain, being founded on mathematical evidence, which includes intuitive evidence, and the evidence of strict demonstration.

29. All knowledge is either Intuitive, Demonstrative, Moral or Probable. Intuitive knowledge is extremely circumscribed, and *reasoning*, therefore, begins where intuition ends.

30. The most general division of Reasoning then, is into *Moral or probable*, and *Demonstrative*.

31. Demonstration is employed about abstract and independent truths, or those relations which are con-

26. What have we called intuition? What have we called reasoning?

27. Of what is reasoning a prolonged exercise? Of what may it consist? What is said of the first, second and third conclusions? Thus, what is deduced?

28. To how many classes are all objects of the human understanding reduced? What is said of abstract ideas? What does mathematical evidence include?

29. What is said of all knowledge? Which is circumscribed? Where does reasoning begin?

30. What is the most general division of reasoning?

sidered necessary, and whose subjects may be exactly measured and defined. The properties of number and quantity are of this sort. They have no respect to time or place, depend on no cause, and are subject to no change.

32. The subjects of moral reasoning are matters of fact, which are in their nature contingent, and the variable connections, which subsist among things in actual existence. Thus, that mercury may be congealed by cold, that lead is fusible, that Hannibal led an army over the Alps, and that Lisbon was destroyed by an Earthquake, and the like, are truths within the province of moral reasoning.

33. *Induction*, is a species of moral reasoning.—This is reasoning from particulars to generals—the deduction of general truths from particular facts. This mode of reasoning is founded on the belief that the laws of nature are uniform, and that what we have witnessed of their operation in the past, will occur again under like circumstances in the future.

34. *Analogy* is another species of moral reasoning. It is founded, also, upon a confidence in the uniformity of nature's laws. In reasoning from analogy, we argue *from* a fact or thing experienced, *to* something similar not experienced. The opinion formed, in this mode of reasoning, will be more or less confidently entertained, in proportion as there is greater or less sim-

31. About what is demonstration employed? What sort is mentioned? What is said of them?

32. What are the subjects of moral reasoning? What are the examples given to illustrate the province of moral reasoning?

33. What is said of induction? In what is it founded?

34. What is another species of moral reasoning? In what is it founded? In reasoning from analogy how do we argue? In proportion to what is opinion formed in this mode of reasoning? How

ilarity between the circumstance from which, and the one to which, we argue. Inductive and analogical reasoning are so similar, that it is difficult to point out their specific difference. Every inductive process commences with analogy. Analogy is not regarded as an entirely safe mode of reasoning, and its conclusions, for that reason, ought never to be received with implicit and unhesitating reliance.

35. Another mode of reasoning has for its field contingent truth, not what must necessarily be at all times, but what is, or was, or shall be. This of course involves the investigation of those important and interesting truths which are comprised under the general name of *facts*. Such truths go to make up by far the greater and more important part of our knowledge, and for the essential reason that they enter into the business of life. It is by moral evidence alone, that we are enabled to reason on historical facts, and the transient and ever varying transactions which are taking place in the world. For these are facts so dissimilar in their nature and causes, that no general principles of reasoning can be stated, from which they can be deduced. Our conclusions are also influenced, on the highly important and interesting subjects, of government and religion, by the same kind of evidence.

36. The field of demonstrative reasoning, as has already been hinted at, is necessary or abstract truth. Contingent truth is incapable of strict demonstration.

does every inductive process commence? How is analogy regarded and what is said of its conclusions?

35. What is said of another mode of reasoning? What does it involve? What is said of such truths? What is said of moral evidence alone? What is said of these facts being so dissimilar in their nature and causes? What conclusions are mentioned as being influenced by the same kind of evidence?

36. What is necessary or abstract truth? Of what is contingent truth incapable?

37. It is a remark, however, of Professor Scott, that every branch of science may occasionally assume the demonstrative form. The existence of a Deity, the immateriality of the human soul, and other moral and metaphysical truths, have perhaps been as fairly demonstrated as the Pythagorean proposition, or the parabolic motion of projectiles.

38. But some sciences are far more susceptible of such kind of proof than others; physics admitting much more of demonstration, than metaphysics or morals. Of all the sciences, mathematics is that which admits the most largely of demonstration. Its first principles are so certain, so definite and clear, and its manner of proof so accurate and legitimate, that it may fairly be called a completely demonstrative science, and the only one which is justly entitled to that name. So much for the views of Professor Scott.

39. Mr. Locke advanced the opinion that moral subjects are as susceptible of demonstration as mathematical.

40. Dr. Hedge remarks, that whenever the subjects of our reasoning are independent of the existence of things, and are of a nature to afford exact definitions, and general propositions of undoubted certainty, there,

37. What does Professor Scott remark? What is the Pythagorean proposition? *Ans.* The forty-seventh proposition of Euclid, which was first solved by Pythagoras. What is meant by the parabolic motion of projectiles? *Ans.* Every body projected or thrown, forms a line in space, which, setting aside the resistance of the air is called a parabola; and the parabola of conic sections enables us to calculate, mathematically, the path of a projectile in free space, from the proportionate magnitude of the two forces.

38. What is said of some sciences admitting proof? Which science admits the most largely of demonstration? What may it be called?

39. What opinion does Mr. Locke advance?

this (the demonstrative) method of reasoning may be employed. And it appears unnecessary to concede, that these elements of demonstration are nowhere to be found, except in the science of mathematics.

CHAPTER VI.

IMAGINATION.

1. THE exercise of the Imagination involves a complex mental process. It denotes, first, the power of conceiving ideas, without any view to their reality, and, secondly, of combining these conceptions into new assemblages. By the exercise of the imagination, therefore, we form new creations or combinations which have no existence in nature.

2. Imagination is distinguished from Abstraction in which we endeavor to generalize. Imagination invents objects, with all their qualities, real or fictitious. It exerts itself in matters which we know to be real, as well as in matters which we invent or believe to be fictitious.

3. Conception is frequently used as synonymous with imagination—the latter, however, should be distinguished from the former as a part from a whole. The business of conception is to present us with an

40. When, does Dr. Hedge say, that the demonstrative mode of reasoning may be employed?

CHAPTER VI.—1. What does the exercise of the imagination involve? What does it first denote? And secondly what?—Therefore what do we form?

2. How is the imagination distinguished from abstraction?—What does it invent? Exerts itself how?

3. How is conception frequently used? How should it be dis-

exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. It is the power of imagination which enables us to modify our conceptions, by combining them, or part of them, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. The complex mental process spoken of above, can here be clearly seen. In the operation of re-arranging these several conceptions, or parts thereof, so as to form a new whole, abstraction is necessary, to separate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction, and also judgment and taste to direct us in forming the combinations. A facility for forming these combinations so as to produce an intended result, is what is called *inventive genius*.

4. The due government and regulation of the imagination is of the highest importance to all men, as our happiness is peculiarly affected by whatever affects imagination—and as our actions are much influenced, and their character greatly modified by it.

5. When a deed of guilt, crime, or atrocity, is perpetrated, the perpetrator has generally dwelt, before the commission of the crime, in his imagination, much upon the scene, the circumstances, and the consequences of the act. The deliberate murderer never perpetrates his deed of blood without first, and it may be many times, viewing, in imagination, the circumstantial details of his horrid act. He views, it may be, his future victim, defenseless in unconscious sleep.

tinguished? With what does conception present us? What does the power of imagination enable us to do? What can be clearly seen? Why is abstraction necessary in the exercise of imagination? What besides is necessary? Why? What is called an *inventive genius*?

4. Why is it important to control the imagination?

5. What is said of the imagination of a person who deliberately commits an atrocious crime?

He views himself, with uplifted arm, standing over the helpless sleeper. The arm descends—imagination continues her power, and, with terrible distinctness, he sees the dagger strike to the heart—the gushing blood he almost feels, warm from the fountain of life, upon his murderous hand—he sees the frantic start, and seems to hear the fearful, heart-rending exclamation of his horror-struck, dying, bleeding victim. To end the struggle, he plies again and again the dagger—the conflict ceases—a convulsive quivering of the frame—a groan—a sigh—and all is still. He stands alone in the chamber of death—his work accomplished, his victim before him. Now imagination pictures to him the ingenious devices by which he will elude pursuit and detection.

6. Having thus contemplated an act of crime yet future, he goes forth to give reality to the scenes so fearfully depicted by a guilty imagination.

7. The deleterious influence of a prurient, unrestrained, unchastened imagination, is incalculable. No faculty is naturally more irregular and rambling in its motions, or demands more loudly the control of a governing power.

8. It stands in most need of restraint, when it runs into either of the opposite extremes of levity or melancholy. The first is incident to youth; the second to manhood and old age. The latter is more fatal to happiness than the former, but both are attended with much evil. Those minds which are in most danger

6. Having thus contemplated the scene, what does he go forth to do?

7. What is said of the deleterious influence of a prurient, unrestrained, unchastened imagination? What does this faculty demand? Why?

8. When does it need most restraint? To whom is the first in-

from levity of imagination, are of a joyous or sanguine temperament, with a great share of vanity, and apt on all occasions to amuse themselves with the hope of success, and of higher felicity, than men have reason to look for in this world.

9. They are the dupes of the flatterer, and misinterpret common civilities, for compliments paid to their superior merit. They form a thousand schemes of conduct, few of which can be reduced to practice, and look down with contempt on all those plodding mortals, who, having only good sense to guide them, and disclaiming all extravagant hopes, aim at nothing beyond the common pursuits of life.

10. Another dangerous levity of imagination is the habit of turning every thing into joke and ridicule. It is so allied to the other as to derive its origin from vanity, for no man will persist in it, who has not a high opinion of his own talents. To correct such an unfortunate propensity, a love of nature and of truth must be instilled into the mind.

11. Flatterers and romances must be banished for ever. Honesty, industry, and sobriety, should be cherished, and the wretchedness ever attendant on the efforts of fantastic ambition should be carefully considered. Extravagant expectations, of course, cannot be realized, and, sooner or later, disappointment and an-

eident? The second? Which is the most fatal to happiness, levity or melancholy? With what are both attended? What is the state of those minds which are in most danger from levity of imagination?

9. Of what are they the dupes? They misinterpret what? What is said of their schemes of conduct?

10. What is another dangerous levity of imagination? What is said of it? How can it be corrected?

11. What must be forever banished? What should be cherished? What should be considered? What is said of extravagant

guish will come. Adversity, indeed, is a severe monitor, but no other is so effectual in promoting that knowledge of one's self which is the parent of humility; or in begetting that fellow-feeling for the infirmities of other men, which melts the heart into forbearance and good will, and restrains the sallies of intemperate passion, and the flights of unruly fancy.

12. A gloomy imagination, when it grows ungovernable, is a dreadful calamity, indeed. In this forlorn condition, a man not only feels the extremes of anxiety and fear, but is apt to fancy that his conscience, and every power of heaven and earth, are combined against him. Folly is a weakness of understanding, but this kind of phrensy which mistakes its own ideas for realities, has often been the lamentable portion of those, who, in the common affairs of life, and indeed on every topic, except that which discomposed them, could think and speak with propriety.

13. Let those who wish to preserve their imaginations in a cheerful and healthy state, cultivate piety, and guard against superstition, by forming right notions of God's adorable being and providence, and cherishing the corresponding affections of love, veneration, and gratitude.

expectations? What of adversity? What does it beget? Restrains what?

12. What is a great calamity indeed? How does a person feel, and what does he fancy in this state of mind? What is his mistake? Is he competent to attend to the common affairs of life?

13. How can the imagination be kept in a cheerful and healthy state? Against what must they guard? How?

PART III.

OF THE SUSCEPTIBILITY.

THE mind is formed with an aptitude to feeling. Feeling is consequent upon knowledge, or intellection. Upon this order of sequence is based this great division of the mind, distinguished as *Susceptibility*. This, also, like the intellect is capable of certain subordinate divisions. In the prosecution of our enquiries, our reference of the subject will be principally to two heads, namely, the *Desires* and the *Affections*.

CHAPTER I.

THE DESIRES.

1. DESIRE is an act of the mind towards some object, which we wish to obtain. As this broad definition includes any and all objects, towards which desire may be exercised, it, as a matter of course follows, that the objects of desire are co-extensive with the whole field of human effort for the attainment of ends, and the acquisition of things, regarded as worthy of pursuit. It is hardly necessary to remark that various estimates, are placed by different individuals, upon distinct objects of pursuit. Some regarding that, as useless, and not

PART III.—How is the mind formed? Upon what is feeling consequent? What is based upon this order of sequence? Is susceptibility capable of divisions? To how many heads is it referable?

CHAP. I.—1. What is desire? What does this definition include?

worth a wish or thought, the attainment of which absorbs almost the whole being of others.

2. The desire of happiness is called by the best writers, Self-love. This, by some, is regarded as the genus, including all desires. Hence, the desire of pleasure, happiness from the senses, from knowledge, power, elevation of character, the happiness of others; &c., are only species under this genus. They are the objective good, my happiness the subjective good. I desire them all for the sake of my own happiness—because they promote my own happiness.

3. Self-love is sometimes used as synonymous with selfishness. This is a great mistake. An important distinction is here to be made. Self-love is merely the constitutional desire of happiness. This is an involuntary state. An involuntary, constitutional state, is not a moral state. When kept within its proper sphere, its indulgence is not wrong, but is made to subserve the most important ends. Thus circumscribed, it constitutes prudence, and a just regard to our own protection, safety and welfare. The inordinate exercise of self-love, in which the happiness of an individual is sought, at the expense of the rights, feelings and happiness of other individuals, degenerates into selfishness. This is a voluntary state, involves morality and

What then follows as a matter of course? What seems hardly necessary to remark? What do some regard?

2. What do the best writers call the desire of happiness? How is this regarded? What are species included under this genus? Which are the objective and which the subjective good? In what sense is objective here used? *Ans.* Every object not belonging to one's self. How is subjective to be understood? *Ans.* Pertaining to one's self. Why do I desire them all?

3. How is self love sometimes used? What is self love? What state is it? Is it moral? What is said of it? Circumscribed thus what does it constitute? When does self love degenerate

is wrong. This distinction should be clearly noted, and we will repeat, namely, Self-love, in a strict sense, is an involuntary, constitutional state, and therefore its exercise is right and wholesome. Selfishness, is Self-love degenerated, is a voluntary, not a constitutional state, and therefore wrong.

4. Great confusion and misapprehension not unfrequently arises, because a clear distinction is not defined between an involuntary, constitutional, and a voluntary state. For example, Emulation is by many regarded wrong. But so far from this is it, that the involuntary, constitutional desire of excellence is a noble and elevating part of our nature. It is not impregnated with moral characteristics. But a desire and purpose to destroy others, in order to promote our own elevation, is voluntary, and wicked. No state is moral which is not voluntary—and no state has any practical merit, but a state of volition.

5. Susceptibility to happiness from the happiness of others, or a desire for the happiness of others, is denied by some. But it may be proved by consciousness. Every one is conscious, that his own happiness is promoted, by promoting the happiness of others. If this susceptibility does not exist in the mind, what possible motive can there be prompting us to please others. None. And if none, the desire in question exists.

6. When a person gives another pain, this constitutional desire is overcome by a stronger desire.

into selfishness? What is said of it? Why is it repeated? Repeat the distinction?

4. Why does there arise not unfrequently confusion and misapprehension? Give an example? What desire is wicked? What state is moral?

5. What is denied by some? How is it proved? Of what is every one conscious? Why do we wish to please others? What then exists?

6. When is this constitutional desire overcome?

7. The word desire is somewhat ambiguous. It is sometimes used in the sense of choice or voluntary state, and, sometimes, in the sense of propensity, inclination, in which last sense it is not as ambiguous. Emotion is a more generic term. Passion differs from emotion only in degree. Appetite is sometimes used to signify the desire, sometimes with and sometimes without a sense of uneasiness.

8. Every desire is not followed by volition. We may desire an object, and yet put forth no volition towards its attainment. We may feel the impulse of anger, a desire of revenge may spring up within, and yet we may act with entire forbearance.

9. "The mental condition which we call Desire, appears to lie in a great measure at the foundation of character, and for a sound moral condition, it is required that the desires be directed to worthy objects, and that the degree and strength of the desire be accommodated to the true and relative value of each of these objects. If the desires are thus directed worthy conduct will be likely to follow in a steady and uniform manner. If they are allowed to break from these restraints of reason and the moral principle, the man is left at the mercy of unhallowed passion, and is liable to those irregularities which naturally result, from such a derangement of the moral feelings.

10. If, indeed, we would see the evils produced by

7. What is said of the word desire? How is it used? What is a more generic term? Define generic? *Ans.* Pertaining to a genus or kind. How does passion differ from emotion? How is appetite sometimes used?

8. What is said of volition in relation to desire?

9. What is said of desire in relation to character? Why should the desires be directed to worthy objects? When will the conduct be steady and uniform? What will be the result if one throws off the restraints of reason and the moral principle?

desire, when not thus controlled, we have only to look at the whole history of humankind. What accumulated miseries arise from the want of due regulation of the animal desires or propensities, in the various forms in which they degrade the character of rational beings.

11. What evils spring from the love of money, and the desire of power, from the contests of rivals, and the tumults of party.—What envy, hatred, malignity, and revenge. What complicated wretchedness follows the train of ambition, contempt of human suffering, countries depopulated, and fields deluged with blood. Such are the results of desire, when not directed to objects worthy of a moral being, and not kept under the rigid control of conscience, and the immutable laws of moral rectitude.

12. When in any of these forms, a selfish, or sensual propensity is allowed to pass the due boundary, which is fixed for it by reason and the moral principle, the mental harmony is destroyed, and even the judgment itself comes to be impaired and distorted in that highest of all inquiries, the search after moral truth.

13. The desires, indeed, may exist in an ill-regulated state, while the conduct is yet restrained by various principles, such as submission to human laws, a regard to character, or even a certain feeling of what is morally right, contending with the vitiated principle within. But this cannot be considered as the healthy condition of a moral being. It is only when the desire itself is sound that we can say that the man is in moral health.

10. Where shall we look to see these results?

11. Mention some of the results of misguided desire?

12. When is the mental harmony destroyed? How does it affect the judgment? In what sense is it impaired?

13. Can the desires be wrong and the conduct right? What may be the motives which restrain them in this case? What is said of this condition? When do we say one is in moral health?

This, accordingly, is the great principle so often and so strikingly enforced in the sacred writings, namely, "Keep thy heart with all diligence because out of it are the issues of life." "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God"

14. Thus there are desires which are folly, and there are desires which are vice, even though they should not be followed by indulgence; and there are desires which tend to purify and elevate the moral nature, though their objects should be beyond the reach of our full attainment in the present state of being.

15. Perfect moral purity is not the lot of man in this transient state, and is not to be attained by his own unaided efforts. But, subservient to it is that warfare within, that earnest and habitual desire after the perfection of a moral being, which is felt to be the great object of life, when this life is viewed in relation to a hereafter.

16. For this attainment, however, man must feel his total inadequacy, the utmost efforts of human reason having failed in unfolding the requisite aid. We are thus forcibly taught that a higher influence is necessary, and this influence is fully disclosed in the light of revealed truth. We are there taught to look for a power from on high, capable of effecting what human effort cannot accomplish—the purification of the heart, and the consequent regulation and due subordination of the desires.

What principle is enforced in the sacred writings, and how is it expressed?

14. What kind of desires are spoken of?

15. What is said of perfect moral purity? How shall it be attained? What is subservient to it?

16. How must man feel in order to make this attainment? What has failed in affording adequate aid? What then is necessary? What does Revelation teach that, that power can accomplish?

CHAPTER II.

THE AFFECTIONS.

1. A DISTINCTION is sometimes made between desire and affection. The Desires involve those emotions whose exercise is calculated to produce gratification to ourselves, the Affections involve those emotions whose exercise leads to a discharge of the relative duties of life. Desire, then, in its exercise, may be said to be subjective, and Affection may be said to be objective.

2. In the prosecution of the present inquiry, we shall include, under the term Affections, those emotions commonly denominated Passions, for the only difference between Affections and Passions is in degree. Nor is it to be supposed that any affection or passion has been implanted in the human soul by the great Author of our existence, which, properly regulated and restrained, will not subserve a useful, rather than a hurtful purpose. It is the vitiated exercise of the affections or passions which produces so much mischief.

3. The Affections are original principles of our nature, by which we mean constitutional susceptibilities. In their due constitutional exercise, morality is not predicable of them. The same distinction is to be made here, that we made when treating of the Desires, namely, into constitutional or involuntary, and volun-

CHAPTER II.—1. What distinction is sometimes made? What emotions do the desires involve? What the affections? What is said of desire in its exercise? What of affection?

2. What emotions are included under the term affections? What is the difference between affections and passions? What is not to be supposed? What has produced so much mischief?

3. What is meant by the affections? When is mortality no

untary states. The former operation is not a moral state, the latter is. The constitutional exercise of an affection involves no sense of duty, nor any calculation of propriety or utility.

4. This may be illustrated by reference to a mother, who, in total disregard of self, of ease, comfort, and health, through wearisome days and watchful nights, devotes herself to the wants of a sick child. She is impelled to this, not by a sense of duty, or a motive of utility, but by that constitutional, inwrought affection of her nature, which leads her, by its own intuitive and irresistible force to the exertion of the painful and protracted efforts which she puts forth.

5. It appears, then, that an affection may be an original, inherent principle of our constitutional susceptibility, and as such its operations may be carried on by its own intrinsic strength. The exercise, therefore, involves an involuntary constitutional, rather than a voluntary moral state.

6. The Affections have been divided into the Benevolent and Malevolent Affections. This, however, especially in view of the foregoing considerations, is thought at least, in reference to what are called malevolent, to be a defective classification. For it will be seen that the due constitutional exercise of the emotions referred to in this last class, cannot involve malevolence. Their implantation in our nature was made to subserve the wisest purposes, and to operate for protec-

predicable of them? What distinction is made? What is said of these states?

4. How is it illustrated? Why does she do this?

5. What then appears?

6. How have the affections been divided? Why is this division considered defective? Why were the passions implanted in our nature?

tion and defense, against the conduct and encroachments of other men.

7. When they go beyond this simple constitutional exercise, and become impregnated with malevolence, and evolve revengeful actions, then the exercise is a degenerated, morbid one, of the emotions in question. The mental state is changed from constitutional to voluntary, and of this morality is predicable—it is wicked.

8. A different classification of the affections is preferred by Dr. Abercrombie, namely, the Uniting and Defensive Affections, including under the former, Justice, Benevolence, Veracity, Friendship, Love, Gratitude, Patriotism, and the Domestic Affections; under the latter, Jealousy, Disapprobation, and Anger.

9. Another, and a more ancient division, is into *Calm* and *Violent*—including under the former what were regarded as more properly the Affections, as Benevolence, Pity, Gratitude, and in general all the virtuous and innocent emotions; and under the latter, what were more generally regarded as Passions, namely, Anger, Hatred, Avarice, Ambition, Revenge, excessive Joy or Sorrow, and in general all criminal and all immoderate emotions.

10. These several classifications, it will be observed, amount to nearly or quite the same thing, under a change of name; neither of them admitting, without violating strict propriety, under the significant terms employed, a classification of every specific emotion, affection, susceptibility, or passion of the soul.

7. When does the exercise of passion become wicked? What is Dr. Abercrombie's classification of the affections? What does the former include? What the latter?

9. What is another classification mentioned? What does the former include? What the latter?

10. What is said of these several classifications?

11. For the reason, then, that all our susceptibilities are implanted in us for wise purposes, and, unperverted, are designed to subserve useful ends, and from the further consideration that affections, emotions, and passions, differ only in degree, and are either innocent or hurtful, virtuous or vicious, according to the manner and degree of their exercise, we shall prefer, in this brief treatise, to resort to no specific classification, and shall, therefore, treat of the Affections generally, meaning to include, under that significant term, those more intense emotions, commonly denominated passions.

12. Of the many susceptibilities which may appropriately enough be ranked as affections, we shall notice the following, namely:

13. *Anger* is a sudden emotion of the mind, produced by injuries, either real or supposed, received from others. It does not differ, essentially, from *Hatred*. This difference, however, is to be noticed, namely, Anger is a sudden impulse. Hatred is anger prolonged, and when indulged for a length of time, generally results in feelings of *Revenge*.

14. *Admiration* is excited by great and uncommon qualities in an object.

15. *Pride* arises in a feeling of superiority, as existing in ourselves over others, accompanied with a wish to make that superiority felt. When this feeling causes a great display of the supposed superiority to be

11. Why is it considered preferable in this brief treatise to resort to no specific classification? How, therefore, are the affections treated? What are included under that significant term?

12. How are the susceptibilities appropriately ranked?

13. Define anger? How does it differ from hatred? In what feeling does hatred result?

14. How is admiration excited?

15. In what feeling does pride originate? When is it termed vanity? When arrogance?

made, it is called *Vanity*—when it is inordinate in its demands, it is *Arrogance*—and arrogance coupled with ill-nature, is *Insolence*.

16. *Benevolence* is an affection prompting us to do good to others.

17. *Esteem* is the affection we bear to a person whom we regard as having a character possessed of excellence, without taking into the account his ability to bestow benefits upon us, or receive good from us. Uncommon qualities of excellence will heighten esteem into Reverence and Veneration.

18. *Contempt* stands in opposition to esteem, and arises from our considering an object worthless and destitute of merit. Disdain and Scorn are different degrees of contempt.

19. *Hope* is a modification of desire. It differs from *Desire* and *Wish* in this, namely, it implies some expectation of obtaining the good desired, or the possibility of possessing it. Hope, therefore, always gives pleasure or joy, whereas wish and desire may be accompanied with, or produce pain and anxiety.

20. *Despair* is the absence of hope.

21. *Envy* is an uneasiness or discomposure of mind produced by the superiority or success of another.

22. *Fear* painfully affects the mind in view of some apprehended injury or danger.

23. *Love* is an affection of the mind, excited by

16. What is benevolence?

17. What is esteem? How is it heightened into reverence and veneration?

18. What is said of contempt? Of disdain and scorn?

19. What is hope? How does it differ from desire and wish?

20. What is despair?

21. What is envy?

22. How is fear produced?

beauty or worth of any kind, or by the qualities of an object which communicates pleasure, sensual or intellectual. *Gratitude* seems to be but one of the forms of the general affection of love, and is excited toward a benefactor whom we esteem, in view of kindnesses or benefits received.

24. *Jealousy* is a painful affection of the mind, superinduced by a suspicion that one whom we love either has done, or meditates doing us an injury. There are various degrees of jealousy, from watchful distrust to the highest paroxysm. The peculiar characteristic of this affection or passion is, that all its bitterness is bestowed upon an object of love—and the more ardent the love, the more intense the passion.

25. No writer probably, in any language, has depicted the force and power of this peculiar affection, with such painful fidelity to nature, as Shakespeare, in his tragedy of *Othello*. It may be truly said, that Jealousy "makes the meat it feeds on," for

"Trifles, light as air,
Are, to the jealous, confirmations strong
As proofs of holy writ."

26. *Joy* is a pleasing emotion of the mind, excited by the enjoyment or prospect of good. *Sorrow* is the opposite of joy, and arises in the mind upon the thought of a good lost which might have been longer enjoyed, or by disappointment in the expectation of good. The degrees of Joy may be expressed by the words, *glad-*

23. What is love? What is gratitude? How is it excited?

24. What is jealousy? What is said of its degrees? What is its peculiar characteristic?

25. How does Shakspeare describe it?

26. What is joy? What is sorrow? When is it exercised? How are the degrees of joy expressed? The degrees of sorrow?

ness, mirth or laughter, exultation, rapture, ecstasy—the degrees of Sorrow, by grief, trouble, anguish, misery.

27. *Sympathy* is an affection of the mind which implies the exercise of the imagination, by which we transfer ourselves into the situation of others, and thus appreciate and partake of their joys and sorrows, and so regulate our conduct towards them.

28. *Shame* is a painful emotion, excited by the consciousness of guilt, or the loss of reputation, or by that which offends against modesty. The feeling that other intelligent minds look upon our character and conduct with displeasure and contempt, is what inflicts the keenest suffering, and there is scarcely anything that mankind will not sacrifice to avoid this painful emotion.

CONSCIENCE.

29. Our disquisition upon the affections would be incomplete, did we not notice that moral susceptibility or affection, denominated *Conscience*. We have considered the Desires, as having relation to ourselves; the Affections, as having relation to others. Conscience seems to be a principle of our nature, standing mid-way between the desires and affections, whose office it is to impress the mind with a conviction of what is morally right and wrong, in regard to the regulation of our Desires, and the exercise of our Affections.

27. What is sympathy?

28. What is shame? What inflicts the keenest suffering? What will men do to avoid this emotion?

29. What would render our disquisition upon the affections incomplete? How have the desires and affections been considered? What does conscience seem to be? What is its office? How does it do this? What does its due exercise tend to do? To what

This it does, by its own inherent sense of right, and refers, in its decisions, to no other standard of duty. Its due exercise tends to preserve between the moral susceptibilities, a just and healthful balance towards each other. Its place among the moral, would, therefore, seem to be analagous to reason among the intellectual powers. Viewed in this relation, there seems to be a beautiful harmony pervading the whole economy of the mind.

30. There has been much dispute about the nature of conscience, or even whether such a principle exists as a distinct element of our mental constitution. With such disputes we shall not meddle. We confine ourselves to the simple fact, that there is a mental exercise or susceptibility, by which we feel certain actions to be right, and others wrong—and experience from its exercise pleasure or pain, according as the decision of judgment is one of approval or disapproval. The evidence of this fact is entirely within. It is the evidence of consciousness. Every man knows within himself, that he feels a power, pointing him, in given cases, to a particular line of conduct, and which administers severe and stinging reproof, when he departs from the way so designated. Our Creator has thus formed us with a susceptibility of emotions of approbation and disapprobation, to guide us in the discharge of our duties to Him, to our fellow-beings, and to ourselves.

31. "Without this susceptibility, which we call CONSCIENCE, men would feel no regret or compunc-

is its place among the moral powers analagous? Viewed in this manner what does there seem to be?

30. What disputes have there been? Declining to meddle with the disputes to what shall we confine ourselves? Where is the evidence of this fact? What evidence is it? What does every man know? With what susceptibility has our Creator formed us?

tion, even in disobeying the express commands of God himself. Without this susceptibility it would be all the same, whether they regarded or disregarded the most affecting calls of charity, and of the public good. Without this, benevolent intercourse would cease, religious homage would be at an end, the bonds of society would be loosened and dissolved. The true source, then, of moral obligation, is in the natural impulses of the human breast—in a man's own conscience. It is in this, that we find the origin of the multitude of moral motives, that are continually stirring up men to worthy and exalted enterprises. This is the law which governs them, and as it is inseparable from that nature, of which the Supreme Being is the author, it is the law of God."

32. This mental movement, which we denominate conscience, is a complex operation of the mind, in part intellective, and in part emotive. It does not belong exclusively to the intellect or to the susceptibility—nor can it be regarded as distinct from either.

33. By intellection an act of judgment is produced. The Judgment decides whether an action is right or wrong. By its decision emotive action is elicited—the moral susceptibility, or conscience, is awakened into activity, and pleasure or pain is produced, according as the decision of the judgment is one of approval or

31. Without it how would men feel? Would they be charitable and public spirited? Without it would benevolent intercourse continue? How would it affect religious homage? And the bonds of society? Where is the true source of moral obligation? What stirs up men to worthy and exalted enterprises? What is said of this law within us?

32. How is it described? To what does it belong?

33. What is produced by intellection? What does the judgment decide? What is said of its decision? When does con-

disapproval. When judgment sanctions or condemns the conduct of another, conscience simply approves or disapproves—but when the decisions of judgment sanction or condemn our own conduct, then the action of conscience gives us pleasure or pain.

34. Where the judgment conveys to the mind impressions in regard to the qualities and tendencies of actions, conscience approves or disapproves of those actions or tendencies, in reference purely to their moral aspect, without any regard to their consequences.

35. When the judgment is unperverted, this monitor is an unerring guide. But where the judgment is unenlightened, or under the influence of wrong early associations, or swayed by sudden and violent passions, then this monitory moral susceptibility of the soul may be blunted or perverted in its exercise. Hence the expression that we sometimes hear used, respecting the conduct of an individual—that he acted from a mistaken or an unenlightened conscience.

36. In the case of sudden, violent passion, it is only blunted or suspended, and when the paroxysm passes off, returns to the exercise of its appropriate office, with an increase of vigor which gives poignancy to its keen and just rebuke.

37. Though blunted or perverted in the savage breast, or more degraded heathen, yet in them, with compar-

science approve or disapprove? When does it give pleasure or pain?

34. In reference to what does conscience approve or disapprove of actions or tendencies? Without any regard to what?

35. When is conscience an unerring guide? What is the occasion of its being perverted in its exercise? Hence what expression is frequently made?

36. What effect has sudden passion upon it? What does it do when passion subsides?

atively few, if we admit of any exceptions, it may be found, though in a weakened state. For it is an implanted susceptibility in our nature, depending upon no acquired knowledge for its exercise, nor upon inculcated precepts for its guidance, or the character of its action, but exists in native, primitive vigor in the human breast, to warn, admonish and sanction, and he is without excuse, who refrains from yielding to its monitions.

38. Though deeds of atrocity, owing to peculiar influences of education, are sometimes committed—aged parents put to death, infants sacrificed, &c., &c., without compunction; yet this fact is an exception to the general rule, and as such militates not against it—for it still holds true, that the great mass of mankind, amid all the differences of climate, government and local institutions and observances, pronounce with the most evident uniformity, on the excellence of some actions and the iniquity of others.

39. The sacred writings themselves confirm the fact, that the ignorant and the rude, the barbarian and the Scythian, without any acquired knowledge, feel within, the action of this condemnatory or excusatory principle, and therefore “are a law unto themselves.” The great Apostle of the Gentiles in writing to the Romans said, “For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which

37. Is conscience to be found in savage and heathen breasts? In what state is it? Why is it found in every heart? Upon what does it not depend? Who is without excuse?

38. What is an exception to the general rule? Does it militate against it? What still holds true?

39. What do the Scriptures confirm? What does the Great Apostle to the Gentiles say?

show the work of the law *written in their hearts*, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.

40. Increase of knowledge, increases the efficiency of the exercise of conscience. This is what we call an enlightened conscience. Where knowledge exists of the character, will, and attributes of God, and of our relations to him, (and these, his works, and the scriptures unfold) conscience will never be found in opposition to the Almighty, but will infallibly approve what he requires, and disapprove of those things which he forbids and denounces.

41. Men are responsible for having a perverted conscience, in proportion to the means of knowledge which they possess. All men are bound to live up to the light which they have. This of course is equally as true of heathen as of civilized communities. When men, in neglect of the light within their reach, have perverted, blunted or weakened consciences, and thus even, as it may be said, *conscientiously* do wrong and criminal acts, they are not guiltless. The degree of their guilt, of course it is not ours to pronounce.

42. The savage may kill his aged parents, not only without compunction, but with an internal feeling of approval—so indurated and perverted may his moral susceptibility become, by reason of the influences, prejudices and associations in the midst of which he has lived. But his internal approbation cannot make murder

40. How is the efficiency of conscience increased? What is this called? When will conscience never be found in opposition to God? What will it then do?

41. For what are men responsible? How are all men bound to live? Of whom is this true? When are men not guiltless? What is it not ours to pronounce?

42. Why can the savage kill his aged parents without compunc-

praiseworthy; cannot make wrong right. Guilt attaches to the crime, for a law of our nature is violated, which even the conscience of a savage might, and is, therefore, bound to recognize and respect.

43. It is the possession of a conscience which renders us accountable beings. Without it, we should not differ essentially from the brutes. It is this affection of the soul, this susceptibility of our moral constitution, that brings us into relationship with God, and with all moral intelligences.

44. It is an ever present monitor and guide. It abides with us in secret and in public, in solitude and in society, admonishing, warning, approving, acquitting, condemning. Its approvals bring pleasure, satisfaction, happiness—its disapprobation, unhappiness, dissatisfaction, misery, remorse. “It truly doubles all our feelings, when they have been such as virtue inspired, and it multiplies them in a much more fearful proportion, when they have been of an opposite kind, arresting, as it were, every moment of guilt, which, of itself, would have passed away, as fugitive as our other moments, and suspending them for ever before our eyes in fixed and terrifying reality.”

45. Being thus the source of happiness or misery, it will be our companion for weal or for woe FOREVER!

tion? Can he feel that he has done right? Why is guilt attached to the crime? What is a savage bound to recognise?

43. What renders us accountable beings? From what should we not essentially differ without it? Where does this susceptibility bring us?

44. What is said of this monitor? Where does it go with us? For what purpose? What is said of its approval and disapprobation? When does it double our feelings? When multiply them in a much more fearful proportion?

45. Why does it become us to listen to its warnings?

Well then, does it become man to listen to its warnings, and reverence its solemn monitors.

46. From the foregoing consideration of the Susceptibilities of our nature, the importance of a due regulation of them must impress itself upon every mind. And this regulation of them should begin in early life, and be pursued with a perseverance that will secure success. On their due regulation, depend peace of mind, prosperity, respectability—in fine, all that can lend a charm to life, or give dignity to man.

PART IV.

OF THE WILL.

1. VIEWING the mind as departmental, and as being naturally resolved into a three-fold division, and having considered two of those departments in their order, namely, the Intellect and the Susceptibility, we come now, in conclusion, to a discussion of the last department in the regular order of sequence, namely, the Will. Though these departments, as has been already remarked, are necessarily more or less involved with each other, yet, if the expression may be allowed, each has distinct, departmental functions of its own to per-

46. What must be impressed upon every mind? When should this regulation of our susceptibilities begin? How should they be pursued? What depend upon a due regulation of them?

PART IV.—1. Viewing the mind as departmental, what two departments have been considered? What in the regular order of sequence remains to be considered? How are the three departments related? Has each distinct functions?

form, and in the performance of them they stand, in a manner, distinct from, and independent of each other.

2. For example, Intellect purely, in its peculiar and characteristic operations, is governed by laws specifically adapted to the regulation of those operations, and which clearly distinguish its action from the field of operations allotted to the Susceptibilities, and these, in their turn are marked by peculiarities in their action, which specifically distinguish them from other forms of mental movement. The Will, in like manner, stands in its designated field of activity, having its distinct nature, attributes, and appropriate laws, for the regulation of its action, and exercises over the other departments of mind, a supervisory and authoritative office. Our notice of it must necessarily be brief, neither our plan nor our limits requiring or permitting a particular reference to the many voluminous and warm discussions to which a consideration of it has given rise, among Philosophers of learning, acuteness, and eminence.

3. Among the writers on this subject, the name of the elder Jonathan Edwards stands forth pre-eminent, and perhaps unrivalled, and no subsequent writer, of any note, has written upon the subject, without making Edwards' celebrated Essay on the Freedom of the Will, to a greater or less extent, the text for his own disquisitions, and for approving or opposing criticism. The great defect in Edwards' mode of treating the subject, is believed to lie in this, namely, that he too much

2. What is said of the intellect purely? What of the susceptibilities? What of the will? To what has a consideration of the will given rise? Among whom?

3. Whose name stands pre-eminent among the writers on this subject? What is said of him and his treatise? What is believed to be his great defect in the mode of treating the subject?

strips man of responsibility, making him the victim of a stern necessity, the passive instrument of an unbending cause ; universal causation residing in the Divine will.

4. Says a writer, "It might have been well if the devout Edwards could have foreseen the consequences that have actually resulted from the mode in which he conducted the argument, for in that case he assuredly would not have allowed to sceptics the opportunity of triumphing by his means over faith as well as reason. He would, then, instead of abandoning the ground of abstract reasoning as soon as he had achieved the overthrow of the metaphysical error of his opponents, have carried it (and he was able to do so) to its utmost extent, and have so established the responsibility of man, as should have compelled infidels either not to avail themselves at all of his doctrine of universal causation, or to yield to his proof of the reality of religion. Notwithstanding this unhappy and accidental result of his argument, his 'Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will' must long support its reputation, as the product of a great and vigorous intellect, habituated to calm discussion, and to profound abstract reasoning, and will continue to be used, as a classic *material* in the business of intellectual education."

5. Discussions respecting the will have been much confounded with theological opinions, and in this manner have often led to theological controversies. It will be our purpose, in this little treatise, as a matter of

4. What says a writer ? If Edwards had foreseen the consequences of his mode of treating the subject, what would he have done ? Notwithstanding this result, what will his "Inquiry, &c," long continue to support ? For what will it be used ?

5. With what have discussions respecting the will been confounded ? To what have they led ? What will it be our purpose to

course, to avoid every thing strictly partaking of school theology, and to view the Will as a part of the mental constitution. In this latter aspect, it demands, certainly, attention at our hands. In the farther prosecution of our design, we shall proceed to speak (1.) of the Ambiguity of terms used, to denote acts and states of the Will; (2.) of Volitions, Imperative, Immanent, Subordinate, and Predominant; (3.) the Freedom of the Will; and (4.) conclude with some reflections, directed to a consideration of the Value of the Soul, and man's Accountability.

CHAPTER I.

AMBIGUITY OF TERMS.

1. THE terms used to denote acts or states of Will are exceedingly various, and are such as Will, Volition, Choice, Preference, Affections, Love, Heart, Disposition, Desire, Inclination, Propensity, Purpose, &c.

2. Most of these terms are ambiguous, and are applied sometimes to the Will and sometimes to the susceptibility.

3. These terms denote voluntary states, and yet have other significations. A clear definition of them is important that it may be distinctly understood what is, and what is not meant by them.

avoid in this treatise? In what respect does the will demand attention at our hands? What is the order adopted for the further consideration of the subject?

CHAPTER I.—1. What is said of the terms used? Name them?

2. What is said of most of these terms?

3. What do these terms denote? What else have they? What is important?

4. (1.) *Will*. This is used generally to signify the power which the mind has of willing. This is its primary sense—though it may be used to denote an act or state of will, as when we are said to act according to the will of another. It may also be used to signify strong constitutional desire. For example, “my necessity, and not my will assents.” Assent is in every case voluntary, and, therefore, implies an act of will. To say we act by the will of another cannot be in strictness true—what we mean by it, simply is, that we have a strong, involuntary feeling arrayed against the voluntary. For example, the Savior said, “not my will, but thine be done.” In strictness the Savior had no will that the cup should pass away. As far as his will was voluntary, it harmonized with that of the Father—and his will was to endure all. He could not, therefore, in this sense be said to mean “not my will,” &c., &c. The word thus used, referred to a constitutional desire to avoid suffering. It was, consequently, an involuntary, raised against a voluntary state.

5. (2.) *Volition*. This is a scientific term used only by Philosophers, and by them differently applied. It always signifies an act or state of the will. Some apply it only to acts of will, followed by action—others apply it to all acts of preference. Edwards,

4. How is the term used in a primary sense? What may it be used to denote? What may it also be used to signify?—Give the example? What is said of assent? What does it imply? What cannot be in strictness true? What is meant by it? Give the example? What is said in strictness of the Savior's will? As far as it was voluntary what is said of it? What did the word, as used refer to? What was it consequently?

5. What is said of the term volition? What does it signify? How do some apply it? How do others? In what sense do Ed-

and other New England writers apply it in this last sense. Webster gives as a second definition of volition, "the power of willing," a sense in which it does not seem to be often, if ever used.

6. Voluntary denotes sometimes, only "acts of will," and again, "acts dictated by the will," as, for example, when we speak of the act of walking, as a *voluntary* act.

7. (3.) *Choice*. This ordinarily signifies an act of will. For example, "I did it of choice." But when I say "I did it contrary to choice," the reference is, to strong, involuntary desire.

8. (4.) *Preference*. This frequently denotes an act of will, but not always. Mr. Locke says, a man may prefer flying to walking, but who will say he ever wills it. So a man may prefer banishment, to being hung, and not choose either. Thus we may indulge a preference between two things, while neither of them is an object of choice.

9. (5.) *Affections*. Edwards says, "these are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercise of the inclinations and will of the soul." But we certainly apply this term to joy, sorrow, &c., in which the mind does not choose. The love of God is an affection, but it differs from the mere constitutional affection, namely, admiration, which such a character as His cannot fail to produce. As a holy state, we speak of it as supreme affection, and in this sense it is voluntary, and includes choice—acts of will.

wards and other New England writers apply it? What is Webster's definition? Is it often used in this sense?

6. What does voluntary denote?

7. What does choice signify? Give the example?

8. What does preference denote? What does Mr. Locke say?

9. In reference to the affections what does Edwards say? How do we apply the term? What is said of the love of God?

10. (6.) *Love*. We may love two objects and have no preference between them—or we may love one object, and not prefer it to another. Such is an involuntary love. It seems to be a species under the last (the affections) and the same distinction may be made. As a voluntary state it denotes the supreme affection, and involves preference and will.

11. (7.) *Heart*. This word is used in the Bible, sometimes to denote the character of a man; sometimes for the seat of the understanding; sometimes for the seat of the affections, both voluntary and involuntary. There is, consequently, much indefiniteness in its use. It is frequently used for the predominant volition, or governing purpose, as when we are commanded to make us a new heart.

12. (8.) *Disposition*. This signifies, primarily an involuntary state of the mind which disposes it to voluntary acts. For example, "I was disposed to do it, but did not choose to." A secondary signification is a state of the mind as the subject of a governing purpose or volition, which also disposes it to other and specific volitions. For example, "I did it, because I had a disposition to do it."

13. (9.) *Desire*. Mr. Locke affirms, that a man may will contrary to his *desires*. This position is regarded by philosophers as a sound one, though the *argument* used by Locke to sustain it, was so feeble,

10. What is said of Love? What distinction may be made? What does it denote and include?

11. How is the word heart used in the Bible? How is it frequently used?

12. What does Disposition signify primarily? Give the example? What is a secondary consideration? Give the example?

13. In reference to Desire, what does Mr. Locke affirm? How is this position regarded by philosophers? What is said of Mr. Locke's argument to sustain it? What did Edwards maintain?

as to be utterly demolished by Edwards, who maintained that Will and Desire never run counter. But it is well known that a man may desire what he does not choose to do. Here will and desire conflict. But in the sense of a voluntary state, Desire may mean Will, and in that case, of course the two cannot run counter. But if desire means the involuntary state, then in every act of choice, we go contrary to, at least, one desire, as truly as we go with the other. For example—the desire of safety is an involuntary state. I may choose to hazard my safety for the attainment of some object. Here the act of choice,—the *Will*, goes counter to the involuntary, constitutional desire of safety, as truly as it goes with the desire of attaining some object, for which safety is put in jeopardy.

14. (10.) *Inclination*. This term is very similar to Desire. We speak of acting, because we have an inclination to act—and also of acting contrary to our inclinations. In the latter case the state is an involuntary one—in the former it may be either voluntary or involuntary.

15. (11.) *Propensity*. This term denotes a voluntary and an involuntary state. When we speak of our animal propensities, we refer to a part of our nature—but when we speak of a man as having “the spirit of a fiend, linked with the propensities of a brute,” the language, though figurative, refers to a voluntary state of the mind, involving preference and

What is well known? In the sense of a voluntary state what may Desire mean? If Desire means an involuntary state what is said? Give the example?

14. What is said of the term Inclination?

15. What does the term Propensity denote? When we speak of our animal propensities to what do we refer? When we speak

choice of sensuality as the greatest good—for such propensities as are not properly and naturally the propensities of a man, cannot become his, except by a voluntary act, his own choice.

16. (12.) *Purpose*. This seems to be used only in a voluntary sense. It refers to future, rather than to present action. Or it may be an internal volition, giving birth to many specific volitions. For example, a man's purpose to become rich gives rise to specific and overt acts, calculated to accomplish that end.

17. The foregoing terms, with the exception of Volition and Purpose, are ambiguous, and are sometimes applied to the Susceptibility and sometimes to the Will. For this reason great care in their use is requisite in order to define clearly and specifically what is meant by them in order to develop accurately the meaning intended to be conveyed, and thus avoid confusion.

of a man as having the spirit of a fiend, &c., to what does the language refer? Involving what? What is said of such propensities as are not properly voluntary?

16. In what sense is the term Purpose used? To what does it refer? To what does it give rise as an internal volition? Give the example?

17. What is said of the foregoing terms? How are they sometimes applied? Why is great care in their use requisite?

CHAPTER II.

VOLITIONS.

1. VOLITION signifies an act or state of the will. In the prosecution of our subject we shall consider Volition under the following heads, namely, 1, Imperative, 2, Immanent, 3, Subordinate, and 4, Predominant Volitions.

2. I. IMPERATIVE VOLITIONS. The primary signification of *imperative*, is *commanding*. As applied here, it means a state of the will, in which we order some act, bodily or mental. For example, I fix upon wealth as an object desirable to be obtained. The preference of my mind then is for wealth—this preference, however, is not manifested by any visible acts, until, by the exercises of an imperative volition, some act is ordered, in accordance with this preference, and tending to secure the end preferred. A variety of specific acts are produced as the result of this mental state—a voyage is undertaken—a journey performed—this particular business is attended to, in order to secure wealth, the object of preference upon which the mind has fixed. The determination of the will to perform these specific acts, we call imperative volitions. Were it not for these imperative acts of will, our volitions, as far as outward manifestations

CHAPTER II.—1. What does volition signify? Under what heads, in the prosecution of our subject, shall we consider volition?

2. What is the primary signification of Imperative? As applied to volitions what does it mean? Give the example? What are produced as the result of this mental state? Were it not for these imperative acts of will, what would be the character of our volitions, and the state of our preferences?

are concerned, would remain unproductive. Our preferences would be merely immanent. This leads us to consider

3. II. IMMANENT VOLITIONS. A primary signification of *Immanent*, is *internal*—inherent. Immanent Volitions, are those internal acts of choice or preference, which inhere in the mind—begin and terminate there. It is simply putting the mind in a state of preference. There is no volition that exhibits itself in overt action. Yet this is a state of will, which, in *appropriate circumstances* may develop its existence in overt action. “Whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is nothing on earth that I desire beside thee.” This implies supreme preference for God—is an immanent volition—begins and ends in the mind—no act of body or mind is willed—the state is internal, inherent—involving no overt action.

4. But if some worldly good prompts me to disregard my immanent, supreme preference for God, then I am driven to an act of choice. To obtain the worldly good, I must sacrifice the “preference”—or, to retain the “preference,” I must sacrifice the worldly good. The appropriate circumstances are now produced, to develop the existence of the immanent volition. I decide, for example, to reject the *worldly good*, and retain the *preference*. Overt action is thus produced, and I “*do works*, meet for repentance.” The existence of the immanent volition is now made man-

3. What is a primary signification of Immanent? (Pronounced im-man-ent.) What are immanent volitions? Can the existence of this state of will be developed? What passage of Scripture is cited? What does it imply? What kind of a volition is it?

4. State particularly, and in full, the appropriate circumstances, which may serve to develop the existence of an immanent volition by reference to some worldly good?

ifest, and by the act of choice, is no longer an immanent, but becomes an *Imperative* volition.

5. III. SUBORDINATE VOLITIONS. In a primary sense, these are inferior in power, to the leading, controlling volitions of the mind, and are made up of certain specific acts, all subordinated or obedient to, the leading purpose of the soul, or predominant Volition of the mind. This leads us to speak in the next place of

6. IV. PREDOMINANT VOLITIONS. Predominant signifies *ascendant, ruling, controlling*. A Predominant Volition is the choice or preference of an object as our chief good. The same idea is conveyed by this term, as by the terms, Disposition, Heart, Governing Principle, Supreme Affection, Ruling passion, &c.

7. (1.) Predominant Volition tends to control subordinate volitions as intimated above; and so to control all acts as to secure its end. This is its true and steady tendency. If avarice is my ruling passion—my governing purpose, then the predominant volition will control all acts calculated to increase my wealth. I shall seize upon every opportunity to “get gain,” by making bargains, and putting forth other efforts—shall untiringly study to keep what I have acquired, and acquire what I can. If at any time I am found acting, apparently, not in accordance with this predominant purpose, neglecting my business &c., &c., it will be found, doubtless, upon careful enquiry, that

5. What are subordinate volitions, in a primary sense?

6. What does Predominant signify? What is a Predominant volition? What idea is conveyed by this term?

7. What is the tendency of a Predominant volition? If avarice is a ruling passion, what will be the influence of the Predominant volition? If I am at any time found acting not in accordance with

the seeming inconsistency does not arise from any relaxation in the control of the predominant volition, but, simply, in a deficiency of opportunity, just for the time being, to gratify the ruling passion, and hence, for the moment, I turn aside to enjoy some collateral good—but am ever ready to seize the first occasion, to yield obedience to the ruling passion of my mind. Thus my inconsistency in regard to the main design is only apparent not real, and I am truly a supremely avaricious man—the true, steady and unwavering tendency of my predominant volition, being to urge and prompt me, unceasingly to the acquisition of wealth.

8. (2.) The Predominant Volition influences the intellectual operations and the susceptibility. So controlling is its power, that it subjects every faculty of the mind to its sway, and bends them to its purpose. The movements of the intellect are made to subserve the main purpose—the action of the susceptibility produces feeling, more or less intense, and more or less pleasing or painful according as there is greater or less success, in gratifying the predominant passion of the soul. It also disposes the mind to other, and numerous specific volitions, all subservient to the main design, and subordinated to it. Thus it takes, and leads captive, the whole being—influences the thoughts and feelings of the soul—makes or unmakes the man.

9. (3.) The predominant Volition of a man determines his character. This needs hardly to be asserted

my Predominant purpose, what will probably be found, upon careful enquiry? Is my inconsistency in this respect, apparent or real?

8. What does the Predominant volition influence? How controlling is its power? What is said of the movements of the Intellect and the action of the susceptibility? How does it dispose the mind? What is said of the whole being?

9. What influence has the Predominant volition upon character?

after what has already been advanced. It follows of course. As a man thinketh, or purposeth in his heart, so is he. This is the only standard of any worth by which a man can judge of himself or others. If a man is conscious of a predominant, ruling purpose in his heart to do right, to act upon the law of benevolence and love, and to do unto others, as he would that others should do unto him, it will be impossible to persuade him that he is a bad man. So also the man who is conscious that the predominant purpose of his mind is of a vicious nature, cannot be persuaded that he is possessed of true excellence of character—in fine, that he is a good man. In judging also of others, and forming our estimate of them, we are obliged to take external conduct as an index of the predominant, reigning purpose of the soul. This it is true, is a fallible standard, and may often lead us astray, in our judgment of others. But it is the best we have. Could we, as can Omniscience, look within the minds of others, and discover their predominant principle of action, we should never take exterior conduct into the account, in forming our judgment of their character—for we should have a far more infallible guide.

10. (4.) A change in a man's predominant volition is a change of his character. If it be true, that the predominant volition determines or constitutes character, then there is no difficulty in arriving at the con-

What is the only standard of any worth by which a man can judge of himself or others? What can you not persuade a man who is conscious of a predominant purpose to do right? What can you not persuade a man who is conscious that the predominant purpose of his mind is of a vicious nature? In judging of others what must we take as an index of the ruling purpose? What is said of this standard? If, with an omniscient eye we could look into the mind should we judge by exterior conduct at all?

10. What effect does a change in a man's predominant volition

clusion, that a change of the predominant volition is a change of character. If self has been the cynosure of all a man's acts, and every thing has been subordinated to the predominant purpose of ministering to selfish gratification, regardless of the claims or wants of others, a change, to a sentiment of universal benevolence, as the predominant volition, the governing purpose of the mind, will work an entire and radical change of character. The supremely avaricious man, the inveterate miser, by a change in his predominant purpose, (if such a thing could be,) would lose his avaricious and miserly character, yield to the tender meltings of charity, and become animated, under a different reigning impulse, with sentiments of liberality, public spirit and general benevolence. So, also, the reckless spendthrift, whose predominant passion is pleasure, may, by a change in his ruling purpose, become an unmitigated miser. This is strikingly illustrated in the case of the young man spoken of in Foster's Essay on Decision of Character. Possessed of immense estates, pleasure was the god of his idolatry, the ruling purpose of his soul. Nothing was spared that could minister to its demands, till in dissipation and luxury he squandered the whole.

11. In view of his folly and his losses, cast down and dejected, even meditating self-destruction, while one day sitting upon an eminence, which overlooked his lost estates, he suddenly became possessed of the purpose of regaining them, and springing up with a bound, immediately started off, to put his new purpose

produce? What is said of a change of the predominant volition from selfishness to benevolence? What is said of the supremely avaricious man? What is said of the reckless spendthrift? By reference to what case is this illustrated?

11. Repeat the illustration?

into execution. His character, from that instant was radically changed, the transformation consisting in the change of the predominant passion of his soul. A new purpose reigned within, as the guiding star of his life. He was deaf to the calls and invitations of pleasure—he forsook his old haunts and his old associates—engaged in any and every menial office that presented itself, which afforded the prospect of some gain, however small. The predominant, governing, ruling purpose of his soul, was henceforth the re-acquisition of lost wealth. To this great and sole end, every specific act and volition was made to tend. He succeeded. He more than regained his lost wealth and estates, and died an inveterate miser, worth over a quarter of a million of dollars.

12. If the predominant purpose of a man of the world is changed to a like purpose to serve his Creator, his character is changed—changed even from sin to holiness.

13. Thus is shown the tendency and the power of the predominant volition, to give rise to, and control specific, subordinate volitions—to influence intellection and susceptibility—to constitute, and to change the character of man.

12. What is said of a change of a predominant purpose of a man of the world?

13. From the whole what is shown?

CHAPTER III.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

1. OPPOSITE opinions in regard to the operations of the will, have been held by different individuals, of perhaps equal eminence, learning and acuteness, and such contrariety of opinion has led to warm discussion and lengthened controversy. By some, the Liberty of the Will is asserted, and by them it is contended that it acts freely, while with equal earnestness of argumentation it is held on the other hand that it acts from Necessity. Much of this controversy has, doubtless, originated in the ambiguity of language and terms employed in discussion, and controversialists have, probably, not unfrequently, differed more about words, than real, essential principles of belief, and yet have gone on contradicting each other, and even each contradicting himself, involving the controversy in confusion, rather than eliciting any clear light or practical truth. On a subject where the brightest intellects have come into collision, it becomes others to express individual opinions with modesty and carefulness; and yet we may assert with confidence against names, however eminent, truths to which our own consciousness bears testimony, when habituated accurately to scan and take

CHAPTER III.—1. What is said of opposite opinions in regard to the operations of the will? What is contended by those who assert the Liberty of the will? What is held with equal earnestness on the other hand? In what has much of this controversy originated? Where the brightest intellects have come in collision, what is becoming in us? What may we assert with confidence against names however eminent? What is said of the testimony, which consciousness bears to the will's freedom?

cognizance of the subjects of our consciousness. The testimony which consciousness bears to the Will's freedom, can neither be overlooked nor disregarded, nor outweighed by metaphysical disquisitions, however eminent the reasoner.

2. The terms Liberty and Necessity in reference to this subject, it is thought, have been unfortunately chosen—and yet it may be doubted whether entire freedom from ambiguity could have been secured by the adoption of others. It would neither be profitable, judicious nor in consonance with the objects of this treatise, to encumber its pages with a notice of the various disquisitions, and abstruse and metaphysical distinctions in regard to terms.

3. Edwards' celebrated "Inquiry concerning the Freedom of the will"—the masterly production of a master mind, has been the instrument of much good, and much mischief also—and afforded a text book, for both theologians and infidels. While the purity of purpose and design of this distinguished author and divine cannot be questioned, it is nevertheless to be lamented that his writings are disfigured with such defects as to strengthen the prurient propensities of infidelity.

4. It is by some believed, that the system of Edwards leads to an absolute and unconditional necessity, particular and general. That it follows from this system that every volition or event is both necessary, and necessarily the best possible in its place and relations.

2. What is said of the terms Liberty and necessity? Could other terms have been better chosen? What would not be profitable, &c.,?

3. What is said of Edward's celebrated treatise on the freedom of the will? What is said of the purity of purpose of the author? What is to be lamented?

4. What is believed by some? What is believed follows from

That the whole system of things had its origin in infinite and necessary wisdom. All that has been, all that is, all that can be, are connected by an absolute necessity with the same great source. It would be the height of absurdity to suppose it possible for any thing to be different from what it is, or to suppose that any change could make any thing any better than that it is—for all that is, is by absolute necessity, and all that is, is just what and where infinite wisdom has made it, and disposed of it.

5. That if what we call evil, in reality be evil, then it must be both necessary evil, and evil having its origin in infinite wisdom. It is in vain to say that man is the agent, in the common acceptance of the word; that he is the author, because the particular volitions are his. These volitions are absolutely necessary, and are necessarily carried back to the one great source of all being and events. Hence, the creature, man, cannot be blameable. Every volition which appears in him, appears by an absolute necessity—and it cannot be supposed to be otherwise than it is.

6. On the other hand, Edwards' System is vindicated from such consequences. His vindicators say, that his work is entitled an Inquiry respecting that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to *moral agency*, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. It has sometimes been thought, by those who opposed him, that he has labored hard to maintain the

this system? That the whole system of things had its origin in what? That all that has been, all that is, &c., are connected with what? That it would be the height of absurdity to suppose what?

5. That if evil, be in reality evil, what must be the consequence? That it is in vain to say what?

6. On the other hand, from what is Edwards' system vindicated? What do his vindicators say? What has sometimes been

dependence of volitions, at the expense of accountability. The truth is, (say those who maintain the general correctness of his views) it is the great object of his work to show, that dependence is *consistent* with *accountability*. Many hold to accountability, and thence draw the inference, that our volitions are not dependent, for being as they are, upon any influence from without. Others believe in the dependence of our wills, and therefore deny our accountability. It is contended that it is Edwards' object to maintain *both*; to show that one is far from being incompatible with the other.

7. But we will not linger upon these themes. Our limits confine us to a brief statement of what is meant by Freedom of Will, and to a few considerations, adduced as proof of that Freedom. In a former chapter we had occasion to remark, that the mind, in the exercise of its own self-activity originates its own action, without dependence upon any outward influence. It is the mind itself, which thinks, and feels, and *WILLS*. The mind is the author of its own volitions. Nothing from without can put volitions into the mind.

8. Outward influences, it is true, may operate upon the mind, and produce action. But such influences are only the *occasion*, not the *efficient cause*, of the mind's action. The efficient cause of action resides

thought by those who approve him? What is said to be the truth by those who maintain the correctness of his views? To what do many hold? What inference do they draw from thence? What do others believe and deny? What is contended?

7. To what do our limits confine us? What was remarked in a former chapter? What is it that wills? Of what is the mind the author? Can anything from without put volitions into the mind?

8. Can outward influences operate upon the mind? What is said of such influences? Where does the efficient cause of action

in the mind itself. It has an impulsive power of its own. Unless this be so, there is no freedom of will, nor, indeed, any will at all. If volition is produced, not by the action of the mind itself, but only as it is acted *upon*, by something out of itself, we must yield up all to an absolute necessity.

9. In the fact that the mind is the originator of its own volitions, and in that alone, consists its *freedom*. On the other hand, the view which some take, that the mind is incapable of acting, except as it is *acted upon*, involves *fatalism* and all its consequences.

10. "The fatalist maintains that a man's destiny is decided *entirely* and *only* by his constitution and his circumstances, both of which God determines. The defender of free agency brings in God and man as co-workers in deciding man's destiny. God decides what shall be the constitutional susceptibilities and their relative proportions, and his agency regulates the circumstances of temptation.

11. But man can, also, to a great degree, control circumstances. He can by his volitions decide many of his future circumstances, while at the same time he can, to a certain extent, modify his susceptibilities. And at all times he can choose or refuse any kind of good that is put within his reach.

reside? What power has it? Without this power, what would be the consequence? To what does the doctrine lead that volition is not produced by the action of the mind itself, but only as it is acted upon?

9. In what fact consists the mind's freedom? What does the opposite view, taken by some involve?

10. What does the fatalist maintain? What is the doctrine of the defender of free agency? What does God decide? What does he regulate?

11. What can man also control? What by his volitions can he decide and modify? What can he at all times do?

12. God always has the power to *prevent* any given volition by a change of circumstances,—man is able to prevent any given volition by the power of free agency. Thus nothing that depends on man's volitions can take place contrary to God's will, and yet man always retains the power of taking or refusing any mode of enjoyment within his reach. Man never can say he could not have chosen otherwise."

13. A distinction is to be marked between freedom of will, and freedom of external action. The mind, in the exercise of its self-activity, originates and puts forth its volitions. In this action the will is free. When the volitions, thus made, are executed, their execution involves freedom of external action. When, therefore, the question is about the freedom of man, it is necessary to enquire, freedom in what respect. Whether freedom in *willing* or freedom in *acting*—freedom in putting forth, or in executing volitions.

14. I will to walk, and the act of walking follows. This illustrates both freedom in willing and freedom of external action. The putting forth of the volition is one thing,—the execution of the volition another. The external act, if we may so speak, is but the servant of the volition. When we will to walk, the act of walking follows the volition necessarily, unless prevented by external restraint or physical inability.

12. How can God prevent any given volition? How can man? Can any thing that depends on man's volition take place contrary to God's will? Yet what does man always retain? What cannot man say?

13. What distinction is to be observed? In what action is the will free? What does the execution of volitions involve? When the question is about the freedom of man what is it necessary to inquire?

14. Illustrate both kinds of freedom by the instance of walking? What is the external act called? When we will to walk,

When the act of walking takes place, it illustrates freedom of external action, in distinction from that freedom of will or volition, which, as a cause produces the action of walking as an effect.

What we mean by the Freedom of the Will, may now be briefly stated.

15. I. By freedom of the Will we mean, that inherent, original power which the mind has, independent of any extraneous influence, of deciding to do, or not to do a given act,—of choosing or refusing either of several objects of choice,—involving in every act of choice, *power to the contrary*,—power to have made a different, or a contrary election.

16. II. In proof of the correctness of our definition of the mind's freedom, we will appeal to consciousness, and the unperverted common-sense decisions of mankind.

17. (1.) We are conscious that our minds are free to choose or to refuse,—and that in any given act of choice we could have chosen otherwise—in fine, that in every act of choice, there is power to the contrary. An intelligent attention to one's own consciousness, will afford abundant conviction of the correctness of this position.

18. (2.) The unperverted, common-sense decision of mankind goes to establish it. Men cannot be made to believe that they are obliged to choose as they do, or that they have not power to choose otherwise. Their words and their actions prove this. They

what alone will prevent the action of walking from following ?
When the action of walking takes place what does it illustrate ?

15. Define now fully what we mean by the freedom of the will?

16. What appeal is made in proof of the correctness of this definition ?

17. Of what are we conscious ?

18. What further goes to establish the truth of our definition of

blame wrong conduct, and approve and commend right action.

19. They attach accountability to human conduct, and enact laws, and establish courts of Justice to punish the guilty. Would they thus act, if they believed that mankind did not originate their own volitions—if they believed they were the victims of a stern necessity, and obliged to do, and choose as they do, with no power to the contrary? Would they treat as they do, those who wrong and injure them, and attach blame to them, and censure and condemn their conduct?

20. If a man strike us, we blame him—if we are struck by a falling stick of timber, we do not blame *it*. Why is this? It is the unperverted decision of common sense, that the man who struck, had power to the contrary, and that the falling timber had no such power.

21. If it be true that human actions are not the offspring of the independent, self-originated volitions of the mind, but that the mind, so far from being self-active, is only an instrument, which acts, as it is acted upon, by outward, propelling impulses, then responsibility cannot attach to human conduct: and it would be as absurd to punish a man for any of his actions, as it would be to arraign, try, convict, sentence and punish for murder the inanimate, falling timber which had crushed a man to death.

freedom of the will? What cannot men be made to believe? What proves this?

19. What do they attach to human conduct? What do they establish? Why? What inference in regard to their belief is drawn from this fact?

20. If a man strike us or if we are struck by a stick of timber, why do we blame the man and not the stick?

21. If it be true that the mind is not self-active but acts only as it is acted upon, what follows? What absurdity would punishment involve?

22. The unperturbed decision of mankind sanctions this view of the subject—a decision, which, in a case of this kind, affords a safe criterion to abide by.

23. Is it to be supposed that their minds are perverted, when it is for the interest of wicked men to decide differently, if a different decision could be made, and thus escape the responsibility, guilt and condemnation which attach to freedom as opposed to necessity?

24. When men's minds are perverted, and then only can they, or do they decide differently, in which case their decisions are, of course, entitled to no reliance.

25. Human actions can be accounted for on no other supposition, than that of the mind's freedom, as we have attempted to define and illustrate it.

26. Upon this appeal, which we have now made to consciousness, and the unperturbed, common sense decision of mankind, we may safely leave the point as established, that man is a free, and, therefore, a responsible agent.

27. Let it always be borne in mind, that in every act of choice, there is *power to the contrary*,—and that this fact is established by the testimony of consciousness, and the intuitive, common-sense conviction of mankind, and much confusion of mind, and difficulty

22. Explain what the view of the subject is which the unperturbed decision of mankind sanctions? What does this decision afford?

23. What reason have we to suppose that their minds are not perverted in making such decision?

24. When only, can or do men decide differently?

25. On what supposition alone, can human conduct be accounted for?

26. What point does this appeal to consciousness and the unperturbed common sense of mankind establish?

in regard to the subject of the Freedom of the Will, may be avoided.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCLUSION.

1. THE subject which has now passed in review before us, if rightly considered, cannot fail to impress us with both *the value of the soul* and its *accountability*. As an appropriate conclusion, therefore, of our labors, we shall urge a few practical considerations, designed to enforce these two particulars, viz:

- I. THE VALUE OF THE SOUL.
- II. ITS ACCOUNTABILITY.

2. I. Its value is incalculable. Finite conception cannot comprehend it. The utmost stretch of the human faculties is incompetent to measure the soul's capacity, in its ever-enlarging dimensions, for the enjoyment of blessedness, or the endurance of woe.

3. Is there a world of despair to be shunned, a heaven of blessedness to be attained? If the soul's value cannot be computed by unending pangs—and it would seem that no small conception of its worth can

27. What should always be borne in mind? And what further should be observed? What may thus be avoided?

CHAPTER IV.—1. With what is the subject matter of this treatise calculated to impress us? What two particulars are next to be considered?

2. What is said of the value of the soul? What is incompetent to measure its capacity for happiness or misery?

3. What important inquiry is made? Can we obtain any conception of the value of the soul by contemplating its undying suf-

be derived from such a contemplation—its worth may yet be vividly inferred from other considerations. And

4. (1.) A glimpse of its value may be derived, by contemplating *the value of Heaven*—the residence of God. If Heaven is valuable, all that pertains to it is valuable. If Heaven only is peculiarly adapted to develop the glorious energies of the undying soul, then its value can only be estimated by the value of Heaven. What less than an infinite intelligence can make the full and proper estimate.

5. The vast conception, but pains and fatigues the finite mind, and leaves it still unsatisfied.

“ Go wing thy flight from star to star,
From world to luminous world, as far
As the universe spreads its flaming wall;
Take all the pleasures of all the spheres,
And multiply each through endless years,
One minute of heaven is worth them all.”

6. (2.) The soul is of priceless value, as it is immortal. Some idea of its value may be entertained, therefore, by contemplating its eternal existence. Both Nature and Revelation teach the fact, that the soul cannot die. An undying existence is one that admits of no comparison in the computation of value. Immortality! what is it? The finite mind staggers under

ferings? Are there other considerations from which we may infer its value?

4. What is the first? What is valuable? What is heaven peculiarly calculated to develop? Then how can the soul's value be estimated? Who only can make the proper estimate?

5. How does the vast conception affect the finite mind? How does the poet estimate heaven?

6. Why is the soul of priceless value? What idea may be obtained by reflecting upon its eternal existence? What do Nature and Revelation teach? Of what does an undying existence not admit? How does the thought of immortality affect the mind?

the immense thought. Nothing short of the faculties of an infinite intelligence, can, by this standard, estimate the soul's worth. Its existence runs "parallel with the existence of God." What mines of unfathomable, incalculable value are implied in this expression.

7. (3.) God makes nothing in vain. Every thing that comes from his hand has a useful design, and is possessed of both an intrinsic and relative value. Every work of God having its value, that must be intrinsically and relatively unrivalled in value, which stands, in the wonderful works of creation, the acknowledged head and superior of all.

8. (4.) That which stands related to God, not only co-equal in the duration, or immortality of its future existence, but fashioned in His image, differing nothing in kind in spiritual energy, can be second in importance and value, only to Infinity itself.

9. (5.) The mind is awakened to a consciousness of its own inherent value by its horror of annihilation, and its longings and thirstings after immortality. God himself, has set the signet of matchless worth upon it, by implanting within it, as a part of its original structure, the hope, expectation and desire of immortality. That principle was not implanted within us,

How long shall the soul exist? What is implied in this expression?

7. What is said of the works of God? Of what value is every thing possessed? Of what value then is he possessed who stands the acknowledged head and superior of all?

8. What is second only in importance and value to infinity? Why is man?

9. How can the mind be aroused to a consciousness of its value? How has God set the signet of matchless worth upon it? Why was this principle implanted in the mind? What is said of the mind's expectation? What will be determined in its realization?

to mock us, but to dignify, ennoble and exalt the soul as an intellectual, spiritual existence. This expectation, this elevating aspiration, is to be realized, and in its realization inheres the supreme value of the soul.

10. Such being the worth of the undying mind, how does it become man to reverence himself, to respect the dignity of his nature and his destiny, nor abuse the noble faculties with which he is endowed. Formed with susceptibilities for the enjoyment of happiness—for happiness in kind like that, which swells angelic breasts—nay more, formed with an aptitude for the same kind of happiness, which goes to make up the felicity of God, how does it behoove man to take care of his soul, to reach forth after those glories that lie in higher and more enduring scenes, nor grovel entirely, with limited, earth-bound views, amid the perishable and perishing objects of the present fleeting life.

11. II. Thus viewing the priceless value of that wonderful existence of which man is the conscious possessor, he should feel, and well consider, his accountability to the great and benevolent Author of that existence. A full conviction of accountability to God, seated in the breasts of all men, would at once change the aspect of the whole world.

12. If the mind—the soul—is such as we have described it, a self-active, spiritual existence, the originator of its own acts, the determiner of its own

10. Why should man reverence himself? For what happiness is man susceptible? Then what becomes him? Where should he not grovel?

11. In consideration of the priceless value of the soul what should he feel and consider? If all men realized their accountability what would be the result?

12. Why is man accountable for his actions? What is said of

choices, then is it involved in deep responsibility and accountable for its acts. For wrong action it is blameworthy, for right action, entitled to approval. By a law of its own constitution, it approves or censures its own right or wrong conduct. If our conscience condemn us, how much greater must be the condemnation of Him who cannot view sinful conduct with complacency or allowance. "If our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart and knoweth all things."

13. Man is a free moral agent, and as such the rightful subject of law. But law alone does not create his obligations. If the law had never been proclaimed on Sinai, still man would have been responsible and accountable for his conduct; for responsibility inheres in the very constitution of his nature—and the mind cannot act without an innate consciousness of desert, or ill-desert—without rewarding or punishing itself, according to the character of its own action.

14. Man is made in the image of God—his mind bears a resemblance to the Divine mind. Out of its relations to its great Author spring its obligations. God's commands do not *make* a thing right; but He commands it because it *is* right. The will of God, in whatever way made known to us, is an infallible criterion of absolute rectitude. The soul in the exercise of its freeness, in the energy of its own self-ac-

right, and wrong actions? What is said of a law of its own constitution? What is this law which condemns, and reproves, or approves? Who is greater than our heart?

13. Why is man a rightful subject of law? Does a knowledge of it create obligations? Why not? How is the mind affected by this internal consciousness of right and wrong?

14. In whose image is man made? From whence spring his obligations? What is said of God's commands? What is a criterion of absolute rectitude? Why is the soul bound to pursue a right course of conduct whether there is a specific command or not?

tivity, as the originator of its own course of action, is bound to pursue a right course of conduct, whether the particular thing itself has been the subject of a specific command, or not.

15. Accountability, it must be seen, attaches to man from the self-active, self-determining power of his own mind. Reason and Scripture, therefore, both attest to man's accountability. "So then every one of us shall give account of himself to God." Rom. xiv. 12.

16. It is then of most essential consequence, in order to be prepared to meet that account, that the intellect be rightly trained, cultivated and directed, that the susceptibilities be under appropriate control, and that the decisions of the will be unperverted.

17. That which greatly enhances the importance of the subject of our future being, is the aptitude or capacity of our mental constitution, for happiness or misery. And that which gives to its consideration an importance so great and momentous, is the fact, that happiness or misery in the life which is to come depends upon our action in this probationary world.

18. To secure happiness here, or hereafter, all the faculties of the mind must be kept in due subjection, and must be properly ordered and regulated. The claims of duty must not be disregarded. Duty must be discharged as duty. The feeling of obligation must be the motive. Self must be subdued, when it

15. Why does accountability attach to man? What attest the fact of man's accountability? Repeat the scripture quoted?

16. What is of essential consequence in order to be prepared to meet that account?

17. What greatly enhances the importance of the subject of our future being? What renders the consideration so momentous?

18. How shall happiness be secured? What must not be disregarded? What must be the motive? When must self be denied? What will be the reward?

comes in competition with duty. These things being thus done, happiness, the purest that mortals can know, will be the reward.

19. When we come to love that which is right with a pure love, fervently, for its own sake, we shall be nearer akin to heaven than earth. Our Thoughts, Feelings and Will, will all be conspiring together in a course of right action, and we may well hope to meet our final account with joy and not with grief, through Him who has loved us and given himself for us—and to drink in of the fullness and blessedness of God forever—to be transferred to that purely spiritual realm, where intellect, sanctified and holy, will go on brightening and enlarging, increasing in vigor, strength and power, while the immense, incomprehensible cycles of eternity shall run their ceaseless, endless rounds, without the possibility of finding a limit—forever learning, and yet never full.

19. What effect will be produced by loving right action? How shall we meet our final account? Whose merits will bring us this reward? What shall we drink in? In what condition will the mind be in that spiritual and holy place? How long shall it be learning yet never full?

APPENDIX.

GENERAL REMARKS—IRREGULAR AND DISORDERED MENTAL ACTION.

1. HAVING gone through with our general plan, and given a succinct, elementary outline of Mental Philosophy, we proceed to the statement of a few particulars of interest and importance, involving irregular and disordered mental action. We are indebted for a share of the material for this appendix to Dr. Abercrombie's excellent treatise, from which, as well as from several other sources, we have freely drawn such portions as seemed suited to our purpose.

2. Irregular mental action, exhibits itself in a variety of ways, and in forms not inconsistent with general soundness and healthiness of intellect; such irregularities constituting rather what we term eccentricity of individual character, than reaching that degree of disordered mental action denominated insanity. We have already given, in the chapter on Abstraction, in the former part of this work, several examples of eccentricity, or unusual, or irregular mental action, which seem to consist with the highest degree of intellectual strength and vigor. We will here proceed to give a few more illustrations of still greater irregularity of

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1. What particulars of importance will now claim our attention?
 2. May irregular mental action consist with soundness of intellect? What do such irregularities constitute? Where can illustrations be found of eccentricity, co-existing with vigor of intellect? Can still greater irregularity be found, and yet fall below the point termed Insanity?

mental action, and yet falling below what writers classify as cases of imbecility, or insanity.

3. The first example is from Bruyere's *Manners of the Age*, as quoted by Professor Upham, and is as follows: "Menalcas (the character is supposed to have been drawn from life, viz: the Count de Brancas) goes down stairs, opens the door to go out, shuts it. He perceives that his nightcap is still on; and, examining himself a little better, finds but one half of his face shaved, his sword on his right side, and his stockings hanging over his heels. If he walks into the street, he feels something strike on his face or stomach. He can't imagine what it is, till waking and opening his eyes, he sees himself by a cartwheel, or under a joiner's penthouse, with the coffins about his ears. One time you might have seen him run against a blind man, push him backward, and afterward fall over him. Sometimes he happens to come up, forehead to forehead, with a prince, and obstructs his passage. With much ado he recollects himself, and has but just time to squeeze himself close to a wall to make room for him. He seeks quarrels and brawls, puts himself into a heat, calls to his servants, and tells them, one after another, every thing is lost or out of the way, and demands his gloves, which he has on his hands; like the woman, who asked for her mask when she had it on her face. He enters an apartment, passes under a sconce, on which his periwig hitches, and is left hanging. The courtiers look on him and laugh. Menalcas laughs too, louder than any of them, and turns his eyes round the company to see the man who shows his ears and has lost his wig. He says *yes* commonly, instead of *no*; and when he says *no*, you must suppose he would say *yes*. When he answers you, perhaps his

eyes are fixed on yours, but it does not follow that he sees you, nor any one else nor anything in the world. All that you can draw from him, when he is most sociable, are some such words as these: *Yes, indeed, 'tis true, good, all the better, sincerely, I believe so, certainly, ah, oh, heaven*, and some other monosyllables, which are not spoken in the right place neither. He never is among those whom he appears to be with. He calls his footman very seriously *Sir*, and his friend *Robin*. He says your *Reverence* to a prince of the blood, and your *Highness* to a Jesuit. When he is at mass, if the priest sneezes, he cries out '*God bless you.*' He is in company with a judge, grave by his character, and venerable by his age and dignity, who asks him if such a thing is so. Menalcas replies, '*Yes, Madam.*' As he came up once from the country, his footmen attempted to rob him and succeeded. They jumped down from behind the coach, presented the end of a flambeau to his throat, demanded his purse, and he delivered it to them. Being come home, he told the adventure to his friends, who asked him the circumstances, and he referred them to his servants. 'Inquire of my men,' said he, 'they were there.' "

4. Another example is that of the Rev. George Harvest, one of the ministers of Thames Ditton, a man of singular ability and of extensive learning, and a deep metaphysician. He was a lover of good eating, almost to gluttony; and was further remarkable as a great fisherman; very negligent in his dress, and a believer in ghosts. In his youth he was contracted to a daughter of the Bishop of London; but on his wedding day, being gudgeon fishing, he overstaid the canonical hour; and the lady, justly offended at his neglect, broke off the match. He had at that time an estate of three

4. What is another example? Relate it.

hundred pounds per annum, but, from inattention and absence, suffered his servants to run him in debt so much, that it was soon spent. It is said, that his maid frequently gave balls to her friends and fellow-servants of the neighborhood, and persuaded her master that the noise he heard was the effect of wind. In the latter part of his life no one would lend or let him a horse, as he frequently lost his beast from under him, or at least out of his hands, it being his practice to dismount and lead his horse, putting the bridle under his arm, which the horse sometimes shook off, and sometimes it was taken off by the boys, and the parson was seen drawing his bridle after him. Sometimes he would purchase a penny's worth of shrimps, and put them into his waistcoat pocket, among tobacco, worms, gentles for fishing, and other trumpery; these he often carried about him till they were so offensive as to make his presence almost insufferable. I once saw a melange turned out of his pocket by the dowager lady Pembroke. Such was his absence and distraction, that he frequently used to forget the prayer days, and to walk into his church with his gun, to see what could have assembled the people there. In company he never put the bottle round, but always filled when it stood opposite to him; so that he very often took a half dozen glasses running. That he alone was drunk, and the rest of the company sober, is not, therefore, to be wondered at. One day Mr. Harvest, being in a punt on the river Thames with Mr. Ostow, began to read a beautiful passage in some Greek author, and, throwing himself backwards in an ecstasy, fell into the water, whence he was with difficulty fished out. Once being to preach before the clergy at the Visitation, he had three sermons in his pocket: some wags got possession of them, mixed the leaves, and sewed them all up as one. Mr. Harvest began his sermon, and soon lost the thread of his dis-

course and got confused ; but nevertheless continued, till he had preached out first all the church-wardens, and next the clergy, who thought he was taken mad.

5. It will be seen that there are various modifications of mental irregularity, not reaching to insanity, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, and yet such as greatly impair the usefulness, and happiness, influence and respectability of the individual. Such persons are called *odd, eccentric, visionary, &c.*, and are to be found, in cases more or less marked, in every community. It is highly proper to take notice of such phenomena, in investigating the principles and qualities of mental action.

6. The mental phenomena exhibited in dreams, partake of irregular, or disordered characteristics, and are, therefore, proper to be treated of in considering the disordered and irregular operations of the mind. Some philosophical writers regard dreaming as a healthy process, of a sound mind, and designed to give tone, variety and recreation to mental activity. Dr. Rush, however, advances the opinion that "a dream may be considered as a transient paroxysm of delirium, and delirium as a permanent dream. It differs from madness in not being attended with muscular action." But not to anticipate here, what is properly referable to other heads, we shall proceed to notice in their order, in successive sections, 1. Dreaming, 2. Somnambulism, 3. Insanity, 4. Spectral Illusions.

5. What will be seen ? Does it impair the usefulness, &c., of an individual ? What are such persons called ? Where found ?

6. Why are dreams proper to be treated of ? How do some philosophical writers regard dreaming ? What is Dr. Rush's opinion ? What topics are now to be noticed in their order ?

SECTION I.

DREAMING.

"While sleep oppresses the tired limbs, the MIND
Plays without weight, and wantons unconfined."

1. DREAMS are instances of that activity of the human mind, which is natural to it, and which it is not in the power of sleep to deaden or abate. When a man appears tired and worn out with the labors of the day, this active part in his composition is still often busied and unwearied. When the organs of sense want their due repose, and the body is no longer able to keep pace with the spiritual substance to which it is united, the mind exerts itself in its several faculties, and continues in action till its companion, the body, is again qualified for action.

2. In this case, dreams look like the relaxations and amusements of the soul, when she is disencumbered of her machine—her sports and recreations when she has laid her charge asleep.

3. Dreams, also, afford an evidence of the activity and perfection which are natural to the faculties of the mind when in a measure disengaged from the entanglements of the body. The mind is clogged and retarded in its operations, when it acts in conjunction with a companion which is so heavy and unwieldy in its motions. But in dreams it is wonderful to observe

SECTION I.—1. What are dreams instances of? When a man appears tired and worn out with labor, what is said? When the organs of sense want their due repose, what is said?

2. In this case what do dreams look like?

3. Of what do dreams afford an evidence? What is said of the mind when it acts in conjunction with the body? In dreams

with what sprightliness and alacrity the mind exerts itself. The slow of speech make unpremeditated harangues, or converse readily in languages with which they are but little acquainted. The grave abound in pleasantries, the dull in repartees and points of wit.

4. We may also observe, that the passions affect the mind with greater strength when we are asleep, than when we are awake. Joy and sorrow give us more vigorous sensations of pleasure and pain, at this time, than at any other. Devotion also, is in a very particular manner heightened and inflamed, when it rises in the soul at the time when the body is thus laid at rest. Every man's experience will afford him information in this matter, though it is very likely, this may happen differently in different constitutions.

5. An ingenious and agreeable writer has proposed two problems, suggested by the consideration that the passions affect the mind with greater force in our sleeping than in our waking moments. They are as follows: Supposing a man always happy in his dreams and miserable in his waking thoughts, and that his life were equally divided between them, whether would he be more happy or miserable? Again: Were a man a king in his dreams, and a beggar awake, and dreamed as consequentially, and in as unbroken schemes as he thinks when awake, whether he would be in reality, a king or a beggar, or rather, whether he would not be both. The solution is left for the reader.

6. Dreams are mental states or operations when we are asleep. They present various curious mental

what is wonderful to observe? How are different temperaments affected?

4. What may we also observe? What is said of Joy and Sorrow? What of devotion? What of every man's experience?

5. What has an ingenious writer proposed? By what suggested? State the two particulars in question.

phenomena, which it is difficult, and, indeed, impossible satisfactorily to explain. Dreams have always excited a great deal of interest, even in men of profound minds, and our Philosopher, Dr. Franklin, did not think it beneath him to write a treatise on "The Art of procuring pleasant Dreams." A great deal of superstition has always been connected with dreams. This is true now, among the ignorant and uninformed—but as we travel back into antiquity, we shall find it true to a still greater extent—supernatural and prophetic intimations having been very generally connected with dreaming—and this too, by men of eminence and distinction, of philosophic casts of mind, and of otherwise sound and enlightened views. Extravagant and superstitious notions in regard to dreams greatly prevailed among the Romans, and even the emperor Augustus was deeply affected by them, and carefully noted the season of the year when his dreams were most unfavorable.

7. So much interest has been excited in regard to our intellectual operations in our sleeping moments, in consequence of the wild and extravagant notions to which those operations have given rise, that an inquiry into the subject has not been thought unbecoming in those who have written upon mental science—and especially is such an inquiry not only justified, but seems to be actually called for, when we consider that a large and no inconsiderable portion of our in-

6. What are dreams? What do they present? What have dreams always excited? What is said of Dr. Franklin? What is said of superstition? Is this true now? What shall we find as we travel back into antiquity? What is said of the Romans? What of the Emperor Augustus?

7. Why has an enquiry into the subject of dreams not been thought unbecoming by those who have written on mental science? Why is such an enquiry especially justified?

tellectual operations and experiences must be referred to dreams—and all the actual knowledge which we are able to gain of dreams, is so much added to our stock of knowledge in regard to the principles and operations of the mind in general.

8. The universal prevalence of dreams is one reason probably why so great an interest is excited in reference to them. And yet, though there are not many natural appearances more familiar to us than dreaming, there are few which we less understand. It is a remark of Dr. Beattie, that dreaming is an operation of the mind, of which we can hardly say whether or not it be subservient, either to action or to knowledge.

9. But we may be assured, observes the same writer, that dreams are not without their uses, though we should never be able to discover them. The ancients entertained peculiar notions in regard to the immediate cause of dreaming. Epicurus, for example, fancied, than an infinite multitude of subtle images, some flowing from bodies, some formed in the air of their own accord, and others made up of different things variously combined, are always moving up and down around us; and that these images, being of extreme fineness, penetrate our bodies, and striking upon the mind, give rise to that mode of perception which we call imagination, and to which he refers the origin both of our dreams, and of our thoughts when we are awake.

10. Aristotle seems to think, that every object of sense, makes upon the human soul, or some other part

8. What is a reason why so great an interest is excited in dreams? Do we well understand these natural appearances? What is a remark of Dr. Beattie?

9. Of what may we be assured, according to the same writer? What is said of the ancients, and of Epicurus for example?

of our frame, a certain impression which remains for some time after the object that made it is gone, and which, being afterwards recognized by the mind in sleep, gives rise to those visionary images that then present themselves. These opinions seem to amount to nothing that can be distinctly understood. If, however, they convey any distinct idea at all, it would appear to be that of ascribing to human thought a sort of material or bodily nature, which is perfectly inconceivable. These things are recorded, as specimens of the crude, fanciful, and absurd notions, which have, at different times obtained in regard to dreams.

11. Dreaming, though common, does not seem to be universal among mankind. Locke tells us of a person of his acquaintance, who never dreamed till the twenty-sixth year of his age, when he happened to have a fever, and then dreamed for the first time in his life. Plutarch mentions one Cleon, his friend, who lived to be old, and never once dreamed in his life. Dr. Beattie knew a gentleman, who never dreamed except when his health was disordered. Aristotle observes that those who never dream till they have arrived at manhood, are generally liable, soon after the first incident of the kind, to some change in the bodily constitution, tending either to sickness or to death. Dreams, under such circumstances unquestionably are produced by excited action, caused by the incipient stages of a disease, which has fastened upon the system, and is slowly developing itself. It is generally

10. What does Aristotle think? Why are these things recorded?

11. Is dreaming universal? What does Locke tell us? What does Plutarch mention? What does Dr. Beattie relate? What does Aristotle observe? Under such circumstances by what are dreams produced? What is generally acknowledged?

acknowledged, that some people are not often conscious of dreaming, while on the other hand there are many others, who always dream when they sleep.

12. Those philosophers who maintain that the soul thinks always, will have it, that in sleep we dream always, and that, if we ever imagine otherwise, it is because we forget our dreams. Locke combats this idea, and asks, "How knows any one that the soul always thinks?—for if it be not a self evident proposition, it needs proof. If I think, when I know it not, no one else can know it." It would seem, that the position, that in sleep we always dream cannot be satisfactorily maintained. As already observed, it may therefore be alledged, that dreaming though common is not universal. This is alledged, however, simply as a fact, without any attempt to account for it, farther than that some conceive that dreaming is not probably equally necessary to all constitutions. Dr. Beattie observes, that dreams give to human thoughts a variety, which may be useful to some minds as an amusement, but not to all, or at least, not to all in an equal degree. As some bodies require less food and

12. What is said of those Philosophers who maintain that the soul thinks always? How does Locke combat this idea? What does Dr. Dwight say of Locke's reasoning on this subject? *Ans.* He says it is fallacious. A man may walk in his sleep without knowing it; and another man may see him walking, and doing other things which involve thought, and thus ascertain to a certainty that the sleeper thinks, while he himself is ignorant of it. Of this there are many proofs, and several illustrations are given in the Section on Somnambulism. Upon the whole, what does Dr. Dwight say? *Ans.* That he does not know that the soul always thinks—though for some reasons he thinks it probable, but, as remarked, he thinks Locke's arguments to prove that the mind does not always think are very fallacious. What, according to Locke's reasoning may be alledged? How is this alledged? What does Dr. Beattie observe?

less sleep than others, so some minds may have more, and others less need of dreams as a recreation.

13. After hinting that dreams may be of use in the way of physical admonition, the same writer suggests, that they may be serviceable, as a means of moral improvement. He properly refrains, however, from affirming as some have done, that by them, we may make a more accurate discovery of our temper and prevailing passions, than by observing what passes in our minds when awake. For in sleep we are very incompetent judges of ourselves, and of everything else; and one will dream of committing crimes with little remorse, which, if awake, he could not think of without horror. It is very possible, by carefully attending to what passes in our sleep, we may sometimes discover what passions are predominant, and so receive good hints for the regulation of them.

14. For example, a man dreams that he is in violent anger, and strikes a blow which kills a person. He awakes in horror at the thought of what he has done, and of the punishment he thinks he has reason to apprehend; and while, after a moment's recollection, he rejoices to find that it is but a dream, he will also be inclined to form some wholesome resolutions against the indulgence of violent anger, unless it should, in some unguarded moment hurry him on to the actual perpetration of an act of the like nature. If this advantage even, is ever derived from dreams we cannot pronounce them useless.

13. After hinting that dreams may be of use in the way of physical admonition what does Dr. Beattie further say? What does he properly refrain from affirming? What is possible by carefully attending to what passes in our sleep?

14. What example is given for illustration? What will he be inclined to form? Can dreams then be said to be useless?

15. Dr. Beattie dwells with much enthusiasm upon the recital of an alledged dream, in the *Tatler*, from the pen of Addison, as conveying, in his estimation the finest moral conceivable. The *Tatler*, says he, was once in the agonies of unutterable grief, and in so great a distraction of mind, that he thought himself even out of the possibility of receiving comfort. The occasion was as follows: He was, when in youth in a part of the army stationed at Dover, and upon a calm evening was amusing himself with a friend, on the top of a cliff, with a prospect of the sea which stretched out before them. In a frolicsome mood the friend suddenly ran towards the precipice, when instantly, though at some distance from the edge, the ground sunk beneath, and plunged the friend from such a prodigious hight, upon such a ledge of rocks, as would have dashed the body into ten thousand pieces, had it been made of adamant." "It is much easier," continues the narrative, "for the reader to imagine my state of mind, upon such an occasion, than for me to express it. I said to myself, it is not in the power of heaven to relieve me—when I awoke equally transported and astonished, to see myself drawn out of an affliction, which, the very moment before, appeared altogether inextricable."

16. "I might enlarge on the beauty of this narrative," says Dr. Beattie, "but I mean only to recommend, to the serious consideration of the reader, the important lesson implied in it. What fable of Esop, nay of Homer, or of Virgil, conveys so fine a moral! Yet most people have, I am sure I have, met with

15. What does Dr. Beattie dwell on with enthusiasm? In his estimation what does it convey? What does the *Tatler* say?

16. Repeat in substance Dr. Beattie's reflections on the foregoing.

such deliverances by means of a dream. And such deliverance will every good man meet at last, when he is taken away from the evils of life, and awakes in the regions of everlasting peace and light, looking back upon the world and its troubles, with a surprise and a satisfaction, similar in kind, though far higher in degree, to that which we now feel, when we escape from a terrifying dream, and open our eyes upon the sweet serenity of a summer morning. Let us not despise instruction, how mean soever the vehicle may be that brings it. Even if it be a dream, we may learn to profit by it. For whether asleep or awake we are equally the care of providence, and neither a dream nor a waking thought, can occur to us, without the permission of him, "in whom we live and move and have our being."

17. In dreams, we mistake our thoughts for real things. While the dream lasts, it appears a reality, at least it generally does; but the moment we awake, we are conscious that the whole was imaginary, and that our waking perceptions, and they only, are real, and such as may be depended upon.

18. Though some of our dreams are very extraordinary, others are more regular, and not unlike real life. When the mind is at ease, and the body in health, we often dream of our ordinary business. The passions, too, that occupy the mind when awake, and the objects and causes of these passions, are apt to recur in sleep, though for the most part under some disguise, accompanied with painful circumstances, when

17. In dreams what do we mistake? While the dream lasts how does it appear? The moment we awake how is it?

18. Though some dreams are extraordinary, how is it with others? When the mind is at ease, and the body in health, of what do we often dream? What is said of the passions?

we are in trouble, and with more pleasing ideas when we are happy.

19. Some of our dreams bear no resemblance to any thing that ever before occurred to our senses or our fancy. But this is not so common except in bad health. It holds true in general, that dreams are an imitation, though often a very extravagant one, of reality. Certain dreams, for the most part, accompany certain positions and states of the body. When our breathing is in any way interrupted, by the head falling awry, or by the bed clothes pressing on the mouth and nostrils, or by any internal disorder, we are apt to dream of going, with great uneasiness, through narrow passages, where we are in danger of suffocation. Aristotle observes, that in sleep, a weak impression made on an organ of sense, may make a dream of a strong impression ; and that a strong impression may make a dream of a weak one. A slight warmth in the feet, if in any degree greater than ordinary, will sometimes cause us to dream of walking on burning coals, and the striking of a clock heard in sleep, will seem fainter, than if we had heard it at the same distance when awake.

20. Here then we discover one source of the great variety of dreams, namely, that they are intimately connected with our bodily sensations, and are often caused by them. And it can hardly be doubted, if the thing were accurately attended to, that many particular dreams might be accounted for, from impressions made

19. To what do some dreams bear no resemblance ? Is this common ? What holds true in general ? What do certain dreams accompany ? When our breathing is interrupted how is it ? What does Aristotle observe ? What will a slight warmth in the feet, if greater than ordinary, produce ? How will the striking of a clock seem ?

in sleep upon our organs of sense, particularly those of touch and hearing. A slight hint suggested from without, or in any way suggested, is sufficient for fancy to work upon, in producing multitudes of visionary exhibitions, causing those mental states which we denominate dreaming.

21. Dr. Abercrombie relates an incident which is an evidence that dreams are produced by bodily sensations—namely, that Dr. Gregory, who, on the occasion of some indisposition, applied a bottle of hot water to his feet on going to bed. The result was he dreamed of walking upon the crater of Mt. Etna, and of feeling the ground warm under his feet. In early life Dr. Gregory had visited Mt. Vesuvius, and in walking up the side of its crater, had actually felt a sensation of warmth in his feet. It is a little singular, perhaps, that the dream was of Etna, not Vesuvius, as the former he had never visited. On another occasion, Dr. Gregory dreamed of spending a winter at Hudson's Bay, and of suffering intensely from the frost. On awaking, he found he had thrown off the bed clothes in his sleep. A few days before he had been reading an account of the colonies in that region, during the winter.

22. Another incident is related of a gentleman and his wife in Edinburgh, who had a dream nearly identical and in the same instant of time. It was at a time when there was an alarm prevailing in consequence of a threatened French invasion, and the city had been

20. What do we here discover? What can hardly be doubted? For what is a slight hint from without sufficient?

21. What incident does Dr. Abercrombie relate as an evidence that dreams are produced by bodily sensations?

22. What incident is related of a gentleman and his wife? What does Dr. Reid relate of himself?

put in a state of defense. The gentleman dreamed that the signal gun had been given, and that the city was filled with noise and bustle, the movements of soldiers, and all the confusion incident upon so sudden an alarm. His wife awoke in a fright in consequence of a similar dream. The cause of this dream, was ascertained in the morning to be, the noise produced by the falling of a pair of tongs in the room above. Dr. Reid relates of himself, that the dressing applied after a blister on his head, becoming ruffled, so as to produce uneasiness, he dreamed of falling into the hands of savages, and of being scalped by them.

23. There are several remarkable cases on record, of dreams produced in particular individuals, by whispering in their ears. In a manuscript of Dr. Gregory's which fell into the hands of Dr. Abercrombie, an instance of this kind is related, which seems to be perfectly authentic. Dr. Gregory received the particulars from a gentleman who witnessed them. The individual referred to, was an officer in the army. His companions were in the habit of amusing themselves at his expense, as they could produce in him any dream they pleased, by whispering in his ear, especially if this was done by a friend with whose voice he was familiar. At one time they carried him through all the stages of a quarrel, which resulted in a duel, and when the parties were supposed to have met, a pistol was put into his hand, the report of which awoke him. On another occasion, on board of a ship, they found him asleep on the top of a locker in the cabin, when they made him believe he had fallen overboard, and exhorted him to save himself by swimming. He immediately imitated all the motions of swimming. They then told him he

23. What remarkable cases are on record? Relate the anecdote of the officer in the army.

was pursued by a shark, and advised him to dive for his life. He did so with so much force, as to throw himself entirely off from the locker on to the cabin floor by which he was much bruised. On another occasion they found him asleep in his tent, evidently much annoyed by the cannonading which was taking place. They immediately made him believe they were engaged in battle, when he expressed great fear, and showed an evident disposition to run away. Against this they remonstrated, but increased his fears by imitating the groans of the wounded and the dying; and when he asked, as he frequently did, who was down, they named his particular friends. At last they told him the man in the line next to himself had fallen, when he instantly sprung from his bed, rushed out of the tent, and tumbling over the tent ropes, was at once aroused from his dream, and rescued from his danger. A remarkable fact is, that after these experiments, he had no distinct recollection of his dreams, but only a confused feeling of oppression or fatigue, and used to tell his friends he was sure they had been playing some trick upon him.

24. Another fact worthy of notice, is our singular estimate of time, in dreaming. Events and occurrences, whose performance would require days or weeks, are dreamt in a few moments of time—and, indeed, the same noise that awakes a person, frequently produces a dream, which seems to occupy considerable time. The following example of this, was related to Dr. Abercrombie. A gentleman dreamed that he had enlisted as a soldier, joined his regiment, deserted, was apprehended, carried back, tried, condemned to be shot,

24. What other fact is worthy of notice? What is said of occurrences whose performance would require days and weeks? What example is related by Dr. Abercrombie? What example does the writer of this treatise give?

and at last led out for execution. After all the usual preparations a gun was fired. He awoke with the report, and found that a noise in the adjoining room had both produced the dream and awakened him. The writer of this Treatise, being employed upon the work one evening, his little son, about six years old, happened to occupy the opposite side of the table. Presently sleep began to overpower him, but before he had subsided into sound slumber, for the purpose of experiment, the writer gave the table a sharp rap, and at the same instant pronounced the name of the child. He instantly awoke, in an affright. On being questioned as to the cause of his terror, he said, that he dreamed he had gone to bed, and after having been in bed awhile, a black bear emerged from the back side of his bed in a growling mood, and was seizing upon him, when he awoke. The dream was truly a childish one, but it illustrates the point, as the noise both awoke him and produced the dream, which seemed to him to have occupied considerable time. The merriment which succeeded the relation of the dream, and the explanation of the cause, amply compensated him for the fright that the little experiment of which he was the subject caused him.

25. A fact which arrests our attention in regard to dreams, is the intimate relation which they bear to our waking thoughts. Our waking thoughts are more or less marshalled into trains of association, and these trains of associated thoughts continue in our sleep with greater or less regularity. Questions which often much perplex individuals when awake, are frequently unfolded to them when asleep. Dr. Franklin alledges

25. What fact in regard to dreams, arrests our attention? What is said of our waking thoughts? What is said of questions which perplex individuals when awake? What does Dr. Franklin al-

this often times to have been the case with him. Mr. Coleridge relates, that as he was once reading in the Pilgrimage of Purchas, an account of the palace and garden of Khan Kubla, he fell asleep, and in a dream composed a poem of not less than two hundred lines. A portion of it he afterwards wrote down. One verse is as follows :

“ In Xanadu did Kubla Khan
A stately pleasure-dome decree;
Where Alph, the sacred river, ran
Through caverns measureless to man,
Down to a sunless sea.”

The remark already made, that dreams are imitations of reality, is verified by dreams of this description. The experience of nearly every one, probably, goes to confirm the fact, that our waking thoughts to a great extent furnish the materials of our dreams; our dreams in most cases, being but a continuation of our waking trains of association, imperfect it is true, and often exaggerated and extravagant.

26. There can be no doubt, that many dreams take place which are not remembered, as appears from the fact of a person talking in his sleep, so as to be distinctly understood, without remembering any thing of the impression which gave rise to it. It is probable, also, that the dreams which are the most distinctly remembered, are those which occur during imperfect sleep, or when the sleep begins to be broken by an approach towards waking.

27. There is another peculiarity about dreams,

ledge? What does Mr. Coleridge relate? What do dreams of this description verify? What does the experience of nearly every one go to confirm?

26. Of what can there be no doubt? What is also probable?

namely, the person dreaming is sometimes impressed with the belief, that he *is* dreaming. This takes place, probably, in quite imperfect sleep, or when the individual is in an immediate approach to waking, when his judgment, and reasoning powers seem to have some efficiency. A case of this kind is related by Dr. Beattie of himself. He says, "I dreamed once that I was walking upon the parapet of a high bridge. How I came there I did not know, but recollecting that I had never been given to pranks of that nature, I began to think it might be a dream, and finding my situation uneasy, and desirous of getting rid of so troublesome an idea, I threw myself headlong, in the belief, that the shock of the fall would restore my senses, which happened accordingly." In the same manner, Dr. Reid cured himself of a tendency to frightful dreams, with which he had been annoyed from his early years. He endeavored to fix strongly on his mind, the impression, that all such dangers in dreams are but imaginary, and determined, whenever, in a dream, he found himself on the brink of a precipice, to throw himself over, and so dissipate the vision. By persevering in this method, he so removed the propensity, that for forty years he was never sensible of dreaming.

28. The mind's power over its volitions is greatly, if not entirely suspended in our dreams, and this may in a great degree account for the wildness, irregularity, and extravagance of our dreams, though they should be, in fact, a continuation of our waking trains of associated thoughts.

27. What is another peculiarity about dreams? When does this take place? What does Dr. Beattie relate of himself? What is said of Dr. Reid?

28. What is said of the mind's power over its volitions in dreams? For what may this account?

29. In sleep, the powers of the mind are not only arrested in their ordinary operations, but the bodily senses partake of the general suspension. Medical writers state the fact, and the proofs to sustain it, that the senses sleep, and that they go to sleep individually in succession. The impressions upon the sight, are first withdrawn, owing to the protection afforded by the eyelids, and hence this sense is regarded as the first in falling to sleep. Taste follows next, and smell, hearing, and touch, in the order named. These writers suppose, also, that the senses sleep with different degrees of soundness—taste and smell awake last, the sight not as easily as hearing, and touch with less difficulty than any of the rest.

30. Some deny the utility of dreams, while others—as Dr. Beattie, already cited on this point—affirm it; contending that nature does nothing in vain. In our present state of knowledge upon the subject, (for our information is very limited) we ought not probably to be very positive in the assertion of their inutility. That particular individuals have derived benefit from them, in the solution of difficult questions, we have already stated. The rules by which some pretend to interpret dreams, are too ridiculous to be mentioned. They are indeed such, as may make almost any dream prophetic of any event. If a dream and a subsequent occurrence be the same or similar, then they believe that the dream foretold it; if totally different, and even

29. What is said of the powers of the mind and the bodily senses in sleep? What do Medical writers state? In what order of succession do the senses go to sleep? What do these writers also suppose?

30. What do some deny and others affirm? In the present state of our knowledge, of what ought we not to be very positive? What is said of the rules by which some pretend to interpret dreams? What is said of an occasional coincidence between a

contrary, they still believe the dream foretold it. That there may occasionally be a coincidence of a dream with a future event, is nothing more than may be reasonably expected from the revolution of chances. It would indeed be wonderful, considering the variety of our thoughts in sleep, and that they bear so much analogy to the affairs of life, if this did never happen. But there is nothing more extraordinary in it, than that an idiot should sometimes speak to the purpose, or an irregular clock once or twice in a year point to the right hour. The same coincidence of a reality with a previous imagination, is observable when we are awake; as when a friend whom we did not expect, happens to come in view the very moment we are thinking or speaking of him—a thing so common, that it is often expressed by a proverb. When we have an uncommon dream, we ought not to look forward with apprehension, as if it were the forerunner of calamity, but rather backward, to see if we can trace out its cause, and also see whether we may, or may not, from such discovery, learn something that may be profitable to us. Dr. Abercrombie remarks, in reference to dreaming, "that the subject is not only curious but important." It appears to be worthy of careful investigation, and there is much reason to believe, that an extensive collection of authentic facts, carefully analyzed, would unfold principles of very great interest in reference to the philosophy of the mental powers.

dream and a future event? What is said of the same coincidence of a reality with a previous imagination when awake? When we have an uncommon dream ought we to look forward with apprehension? Rather, what should we do? What does Dr. Abercrombie remark?

SECTION II.

SOMNAMBULISM.

1. SOMNAMBULISM appears to differ from dreaming chiefly in the degree in which the bodily functions are affected. The mind is fixed in the same manner as in dreaming upon its own impressions, as possessing a real and present existence in external things, but the bodily organs are more under the control of the will, so that the individual acts under the influence of his erroneous conceptions, and holds conversation in regard to them. He is also, to a certain degree susceptible of impressions from without through his organs of sense, not, however, so as to correct his erroneous impressions, but rather to be mixed up with them.

2. The first degree of Somnambulism, generally shows itself by a propensity to talk during sleep, the person giving a full and connected account of what passes before him in dreams, and often revealing his own secrets or those of his friends. Walking during sleep is the next degree, and that from which the affection derives its name. The phenomena connected with this form, are familiar to every one. The individual gets out of bed, dresses himself, if not prevented goes out of doors, walks frequently over dangerous places in safety, sometimes escapes by a window and gets to the roof of a house, after a considerable interval returns

SECTION II.—1. In what does Somnambulism chiefly differ from dreaming? How is the mind fixed? What is said of the bodily organs?

2. How does the first degree of Somnambulism generally show itself? What is the next degree? What does the individual do?

and goes to bed, and all that has passed conveys to his mind merely the impressions of a dream.

3. Dr. Hartley, in his "observations upon Man" remarks, that "Those who walk and talk in their sleep, have evidently the nerves of the muscles concerned, so free, as that vibrations, [or nervous influence,] can descend from the internal parts of the brain, the peculiar residence of ideas, into them. At the same time, the brain itself is so oppressed, that they have scarce any memory. Persons who read inattentively, that is, see and speak, almost without remembering; also those who labor under such a morbid loss of memory, as that though they see, hear, speak and act, *pro re nata*, from moment to moment, somewhat resemble the persons who walk and talk in their sleep."

4. Somnambulism may be accompanied with coherent, or incoherent conduct. Coherence of conduct discovers itself, in persons who are affected with it, undertaking, or resuming certain habitual exercises or employments. For example, we read of the scholar resuming his studies, the professional man, his pursuits, the poet his pen, the artisan his labors, and the husbandman his toils, while under its influence, with their usual industry, taste and correctness. A variety of remarkable phenomena arise out of these peculiarities, which we shall now endeavor to illustrate by a few examples of this singular affection.

5. Dr. Abercrombie relates an anecdote derived from a family of rank in Scotland, the descendants of a dis-

3. What does Dr. Hartley remark? What is the meaning of *pro re nata*? *Ans.* "For the existing occasion"—for a special business; or emergency.

4. With what may or may not Somnambulism be accompanied? How does coherence of conduct discover itself? Of what examples of this do we read?

tinguished lawyer of the last age. This eminent person had been consulted respecting a case of great importance and much difficulty, and he had been studying it with intense anxiety and attention. After several days had been occupied in this manner, he was observed by his wife to arise from his bed in the night, and go to a writing desk which stood in the bed-room. He then sat down, and wrote a long paper, which he put carefully by in the desk, and returned to the bed. The following morning he told his wife that he had a most interesting dream—that he had dreamed of giving a clear and luminous opinion concerning a case which had exceedingly perplexed him, and that he would give any thing to recover the train of thought which had passed before him in his dream. She then directed him to the writing-desk, where he found the opinion clearly and fully written out, and which was afterwards found to be perfectly correct.

6. An interesting anecdote is related of a farmer in Massachusetts who was engaged during the winter in thrashing his grain in his barn. One night he arose in his sleep, repaired to his barn, set open the large doors, ascended to the great beams where his grain was deposited, threw down a flooring, thrashed it, bound up the straw in a workman-like manner, and thus proceeded until he had thrashed five floorings. Ascending the sixth time, by a misstep he fell off from a part of the mow and awoke. With much ado he found out where he was, groped his way out, and found his house. On coming to the light he found, so profuse had been his perspiration that his clothes were literally wet through. While performing this task he had not the least consciousness of what he was doing.

5. What anecdote does Dr. Abercrombie relate ?

6. Relate the anecdote of the Massachusetts farmer.

7. It is related of Dr. Blacklock of Edinburgh, that he arose from his bed, to which he had retired at an early hour, went into the room where his family were assembled, conversed with them, and afterwards entertained them with a pleasant song, and without retaining, after he awoke, the least recollection of what he had done.

8. A gentleman of one of the English Universities had been very intent during the day in the composition of some verses which he had not been able to complete. During the following night he arose in his sleep and finished his composition, then expressed great exultation, and returned to bed.

9. The imagination or fancy, seems to be almost the only one of our mental powers which is never suspended in its operations by sleep. Of the others, some are more, others less affected, and some appear to be for a time wholly extinguished. There is no doubt that the Somnambulist is in that state of mind called dreaming. Those volitions which are a part of his dreams, retain their power over the muscles, consequently whatever he dreams, is not only real in the mind, as in the case of all other dreams, but his ability to exercise his muscles enables him to give it a reality in action.

10. Dr. Abercrombie records that a young nobleman, mentioned by Horstius, living in the citadel of Breslau, was observed by his brother, who occupied the same room, to rise in his sleep, wrap himself in

7. What is related of Dr. Blacklock ?

8. What is related of a gentleman of one of the English Universities ?

9. Which of our mental powers seem to be almost the only one never suspended by sleep ? What is said of the other mental powers ? Of what is there no doubt ? What is the consequence of the volitions retaining their power over the muscles ?

a cloak, and escape by a window to the roof of the building. He there tore in pieces a magpie's nest, wrapped the young birds in his cloak, returned to his apartment, and went to bed. In the morning he mentioned the circumstances as having occurred in a dream, and could not be persuaded that there had been anything more than a dream, till he was shown the magpies in his cloak.

11. Another still more extraordinary instance of Somnambulism is given as follows: "In the Carthusian Convent, of which I was prior," said father A—— to me, one evening, "there lived a monk of a melancholy humor and gloomy disposition, who was well known to be a somnambulist. Sometimes he would come out of his cell, when the fit was upon him, and go in again alone; and sometimes he would wander away, and require to be conducted home. Medical advice being obtained, some remedies were administered, and his relapses becoming of less frequent occurrence, people no longer thought of him. One evening as I sat up rather later than usual, I was busy at my desk examining some papers, when I heard the door of my chamber open, from which the key was seldom withdrawn, and in a moment this monk entered in a state of absolute somnambulism. His eyes were open, but fixed; he had nothing on but the tunic he slept in, and in his hand a long-bladed knife. Knowing where my bed stood, he went directly to it, and seemed to ascertain by feeling with his hand, whether I actually was there. Then, three several times, he struck with such force, that, after piercing the blankets, the blade penetrated very deeply into the mattress. When he passed before me, his features

10. Relate the anecdote of the young nobleman.

11. Give a relation of a still more extraordinary instance.

were contracted, and his brow knit, but when he had done the deed, he turned on his heel, and I noticed that his features were relaxed, and had an air of satisfaction diffused over them. The light of the two lamps which were standing on my desk made no impression on his eyes, and he went back again as he came, opening carefully and shutting the two doors which led to my cell; and in a little time I assured myself that he had gone directly and quietly to his own apartment. The state into which this terrible apparition threw me, may be conceived. I shuddered with horror at the idea of the danger I had escaped, and offered up my thanks to Heaven; but such was my state of excitement that I could not close my eyes during the night.

On the following morning I sent for the somnambulist, and in a tone of seeming indifference, inquired what had been the subject of his last night's dream. This question rather disconcerted him. 'Father,' said he, 'I dreamed so strange a dream, that I feel some reluctance to tell it to you; it is, perhaps, the work of the devil, and——.' 'I command you to tell it,' said I. 'Dreams are involuntary, and merely delusive. Speak out the truth.' 'Father,' then said he, 'scarcely had I laid myself down when I dreamed that you had killed my mother, and that her bloody ghost appeared to me, crying out for vengeance. This so transported me with fury, that I ran like a madman into your cell, and finding you in bed, stabbed you there. Shortly afterwards, I awoke, perspiring at every pore with a perfect horror of my wickedness, and blessing God that so great a crime had not been committed.' 'More has been committed than you think,' said I, in a quiet manner. I then related to him what had happened, and showed him the blows he had intended for me, at the sight of which he threw

himself at my feet, suffused with tears, bitterly lamenting the involuntary misfortune which had so nearly taken place, and imploring me to inflict such a penance as I might think suitable for such an occasion. 'No, no,' I exclaimed, 'I will not punish you for an involuntary deed; but hereafter your attendance at the night service will be dispensed with; and I warn you that your cell shall be locked on the outside after the evening meal, and shall only be opened to let you out to the family mass at the dawn of day.' "

12. The sleep of the senses is sometimes imperfect, and then they are susceptible of slight external impressions. In such cases the mind can be reached and affected through their medium, and a new direction given to a person's dreams. An illustration of this has been given already in the case of the individual who was made to go through the process of fighting a duel. In his case the sense of hearing was but imperfectly locked up in sleep. Somnambulists may also retain, to a slight degree, a susceptibility to visual impressions, indeed all the senses, it would seem, may be, and are, under given circumstances, slightly affected, by objects suited to awaken into action the several bodily senses. There are cases on record where a sensual organ has been excited in a somnambulist to a degree of intensity, which is both wonderful and unaccountable. A case occurred of this kind in this country several years since, illustrative of the statement just made, where the visual organ was excited to

12. When the sleep of the senses is imperfect of what are they susceptible? In such cases how can the mind be reached? What illustration of this has already been given? Which sense was imperfectly asleep in this case? Of what may Somnambulists retain a slight degree of susceptibility? What cases are on record? What case occurred in this country several years ago, illustrative of the statement just made?

a degree of power, not capable of easy or satisfactory explanation. It was the case of Jane Rider. When in a state of somnambulism, it seemed impossible to diminish the efficiency of the extraordinary power of the visual organ. Her eye-lids being closed, two large wads of cotton were placed upon them and bound on with a black silk handkerchief. The cotton filled the cavity under the eye-brows, and reached down to the middle of the cheek, and various experiments were tried to ascertain whether she could see. A watch enclosed in a case was handed to her, and she was requested to tell the time by it. After examining both sides of the watch, she opened the case, and told the time correctly. She also read, without hesitation, the name of a gentleman, written in characters so fine that no one else could distinguish it at the usual distance from the eye. In another paroxysm, or condition of somnambulism, the lights were removed from the room, and the windows so secured that no object was discernable, and two books were presented to her, when she immediately told the titles of both, though one of them was a book which she had never before seen. In other experiments, while the room was so darkened that it was impossible, with the ordinary powers of vision, to distinguish the colors of the carpet, and her eyes were also bandaged, she pointed out the different colors in the hearth rug, took up and read several cards which lay upon the table, threaded a needle, and performed several other things which could not have been done without the aid of vision.

13. This case of Jane Rider, it will be observed, is very similar in some of its characteristics, to a certain state of a person under the influence of Animal Magnetism. In a certain degree of the magnetic sleep,

13. To what is the case of Jane Rider very similar? In a co

the subject is regarded as a somnambulist. "In this state the patient awakens, not from his sleep, but within himself, and regains his consciousness. He knows himself again, yet in a changed relation to surrounding circumstances. The external senses are either closed entirely, or their character is changed, and the internal sense only remains the same. In this state the somnambulist, entirely awakened within himself, distinguishes with his eyes nothing but light and darkness, and not always even these, although, as is sometimes the case, the eyelids are open. The ball of the eye is either drawn up convulsively or stiff, the pupil widened and without sensation. Next, the sense of feeling is metamorphosed into that of seeing, so that the somnambulist can distinguish by it, not only the outlines of things, but also colors, with perfect precision. The region of the stomach becomes the central point of all sensation, and it is chiefly through this region that the sense of sight is supplied. The somnambulist, therefore, can ascertain the time perfectly well by a watch, closely held to the pit of the stomach. Of every thing which has occurred to the somnambulist during this period, what he has perceived, thought, said or done, he has when awaking, either no recollection, or a very faint one—but if he is brought again into this state, he recollects every thing very well." Of the wonders of Animal Magnetism, people may believe much or little. The attention which it has attracted in Europe and in this country will justify, at least, the slight allusion which we have made to it, as illustrative of the sub-

tain degree of the magnetic sleep how is the subject regarded? What is said of the Somnambulist patient, in this degree of the magnetic sleep? What seems to justify this slight allusion to animal magnetism? What does the footing it has gained, and the effects it has produced exemplify?

ject in hand. The footing which it has gained and the effects which it has produced, exemplify, strikingly, the power of imagination.

SECTION III.

INSANITY.

1. We have seen in the former part of this work, the power which the mind has, in the exercise of its own self-activity, over its own volitions. This power is, to a greater or less extent, lost in insanity, and the result is one of two conditions. Either the mind is entirely under the influence of a single impression, without the power of varying or dismissing it, and comparing it with other impressions; or it is left at the mercy of a chain of impressions, which have been set in motion, and which succeed one another according to some principle of connection over which the individual has no control. In both cases the mental impression is believed to have a real and present existence in the external world; and this false belief is not corrected by the actual state of things as they present themselves to the senses, or by any facts or considerations which can be communicated by other sentient beings. Of the cause of this remarkable deviation from the healthy state of the mental functions, we know nothing. We may trace its connection with accompanying circumstances in the bodily functions, and we may investigate

SECTION III.—1. What have we seen in the former part of this work! What is lost in insanity? What is the result? In both cases what is believed? What do we know of this remarkable deviation from the healthy state of the mental functions? What is said of tracing its connection, &c.?

certain effects which result from it; but the nature of the change and the manner in which it is produced, are among those points, in the arrangement of the Almighty Creator, which entirely elude our researches.

2. It appears, then, there is a remarkable analogy between the mental phenomena in insanity and in dreaming; and that the leading peculiarities in both these cases are referable to two heads; (1.) The impressions which arise in the mind are believed to be real and present existences, and this belief is not corrected by comparing the conception with the actual state of things in the external world. (2.) The chain of ideas or images, which arise, follow one another according to certain associations over which the individual has no control. He cannot, as in a healthy state, vary the series, or stop it at his will. In the numerous forms of insanity we shall see these characters exhibited in various degrees; but we shall be able to trace their influence in one degree or another through all the modifications; and, in the higher states, or what we call perfect mania, we see them exemplified in the same complete manner as in dreaming. The maniac fancies himself a king possessed of boundless power, and surrounded by every form of earthly splendor, and with all his bodily senses in their perfect exercise, this hallucination is in no degree corrected by the sight of his bed of straw and all the horrors of his cell.

3. A remarkable peculiarity in many cases of insanity is a great activity of mind, and rapidity of con-

2. Between what is there a remarkable analogy? To how many heads are both these cases referable? What is the first? What is the second? What cannot he do as in a healthy state? In the numerous forms of insanity what shall we see? What shall we be able to trace?

ception—a tendency to seize rapidly upon incidental or partial relations of things, and often a fertility of imagination which changes the character of the mind, sometimes without remarkably distorting it. The memory in such cases is entire, and even appears more ready than in health, and old associations are called up with a rapidity quite unknown to the individual in his sound state of mind.

4. A gentleman mentioned by Dr. Willis, who was liable to periodical attacks of insanity, said that he expected the paroxysms with impatience, because he enjoyed, during them, a high degree of pleasure. “Every thing appeared easy to me. No obstacles presented themselves, either in theory or practice. My memory acquired, all of a sudden, a singular degree of perfection. Long passages of Latin authors occurred to my mind. In general I have great difficulty in finding rhythmical terminations, but then I could write verses with as great facility as prose.” “I have often” says Pinel, “stopped at the chamber door of a literary gentleman who, during his paroxysms, appears to soar above the mediocrity of intellect that was familiar to him, solely to admire his newly acquired powers of eloquence. He declaimed upon the subject of the Revolution with all the force, the dignity, and the purity of language that this very interesting subject could admit of. At other times, he was a man of very ordinary abilities.

5. It is this activity of thought and readiness of association, that gives to maniacs of a particular class an appearance of great ingenuity and acuteness.—

3. What is a remarkable peculiarity in many cases of insanity ?
What is the state of the memory in such cases ?

4. Relate the case of a gentleman mentioned by Dr. Willis ?
What case is spoken of by Pinel ?

Hence they have been said to reason acutely upon false premises; and one author has even alledged that a maniac of a particular kind would make an excellent logician. But to say that a maniac reasons either soundly or acutely is an abuse of terms. He reasons plausibly and ingeniously; that is, he catches rapidly incidental and partial relations, and from the rapidity with which they are seized upon, it may be sometimes difficult at first to detect their fallacy. He might have been a skillful logician of the schools, whose ingenuity consisted in verbal disputes and frivolous distinctions; but he never can be considered as exercising that sound logic, the aim of which is to trace the relations of things, and the object of which is truth.

6. The peculiar character of insanity, in all its modifications, appears to be that a certain impression has fixed itself upon the mind in such a manner as to exclude all others; or to exclude them from that influence, which they ought to have on the mind in its estimate of the relations of things. This impression may be entirely visionary and unfounded, or it may be in itself true, but distorted in the applications, which the unsound mind makes of it, and the consequences which are deduced from it. Thus a man of wealth fancies himself a beggar, and in danger of dying of hunger. Another takes up the same impression, who has in fact sustained some considerable loss. In the one the impression is entirely visionary, like that which might occur in a dream; in the other, it is a real and

5. What gives to maniacs of a particular class the appearance of great ingenuity? What has one author alledged? Is it proper to say that maniacs reason soundly? How does he reason?

6. What does the peculiar character of insanity, in all its modifications appear to be? How may this impression be? State the illustrations, in the case of the man of wealth, &c.

true impression, carried to consequences which it does not warrant.

7. There is great variety in the degree to which the mind is influenced by the erroneous impression. In some cases it is such, as entirely excludes all others; even those immediately arising from the evidence of the senses, as in the state of perfect mania. In many others, though in a less degree than this, it is such as to change the whole character. The particular manner in which this more immediately appears will depend, of course, upon the nature of the erroneous impression. A person formerly most correct in his conduct and habits, may become obscene and blasphemous; accustomed occupations become odious to him; the nearest and most beloved friends become objects of his aversion and abhorrence. Much interesting matter of observation often arises out of these peculiarities; and it is no less interesting to observe, during convalescence the gradual return to former habits and attachments. A young lady, mentioned by Dr. Rush, who had been for some time confined in a lunatic asylum, had shown for several weeks, every mark of a sound mind except one—she hated her father. At length, she one day acknowledged with pleasure the return of her filial attachment, and was soon after discharged fully recovered. Even when the erroneous impression is confined to a single subject, it is remarkable how it absorbs the attention, to the exclusion of other feelings of a most intense and powerful kind. I

7. What is said of the degree of influence of the erroneous impression? In some cases what does it do? In many others what change does it affect? Upon what will the manner in which this appears depend? State some of the aspects in which it appears. What is interesting to observe? What case is mentioned by Dr. Rush? When the impression is confined to a single subject, what

knew a person of wealth, remarks Dr. Abercrombie, who had fallen into a state of melancholic hallucination, in connection with a transaction in business, which he regretted having made, but of which the real effect was of a trifling nature. While in this situation, the most severe distress occurred in his family, by the death of one of them under very painful circumstances, without his being affected by it in the slightest degree.

8. The uniformity of the impressions of maniacs is so remarkable that M. Pinel, in his Treatise on insanity, has proposed this uniformity as a test for distinguishing feigned from real insanity. He has seen melancholics confined in the Bicetre for twelve, fifteen, twenty, and even thirty years; and through the whole of that period, their hallucination has been confined to one subject. Others, after a course of years, have changed from one hallucination to another. A man mentioned by him, was for eight years constantly haunted by the idea of being poisoned; he then changed his hallucination, become sovereign of the world and extremely happy, and thus continued four years.

9. The sudden revival of old associations, after having been long and entirely suspended by mental hallucination, presents some of the most singular phenomena, connected with this subject. For example: A man had been employed splitting wood with a beetle and wedges. At night he put his implements

is the effect? What instance of this is mentioned by Dr. Abercrombie?

8. What is said of the uniformity of the impressions of maniacs? What cases of melancholics has Pinel seen? What instance of a change of hallucination is given?

9. What presents some of the most singular phenomena connected with this subject? What examples are given?

in a hollow tree. During the night he became insane, and thus continued for several years, when his reason suddenly returned. The first question he asked, was, whether his sons had brought home the beetle and wedges. Upon their replying that they could not find them, he arose from his bed, went to the field, and found the wedges and rings to the beetle, the wood having mouldered away. A lady who had been intensely engaged on a piece of needle-work, became suddenly insane, and thus continued seven years, when she suddenly recovered, and the first question she asked, was about the needle-work, though during the whole period of her insanity she had not been known to allude to it.

10. Among the most singular phenomena connected with insanity, we must reckon those cases in which the hallucination is confined to a single point, while on every other subject the patient speaks and acts like a rational man, and he often shows the most astonishing power of avoiding the subject of his disordered impression, when circumstances make it advisable for him to do so. A man mentioned by Pinel, who had been for some time confined in the Bicetre, was, on the visitation of a commissary, ordered to be discharged as perfectly sane, after a long conversation, in which he had conducted himself with the greatest propriety. The officer prepared the *proces verbal* for his discharge, and gave it to him to put his name to it, when he subscribed himself Jesus Christ, and then indulged in all the reveries connected with that delusion.

10. What must we reckon among the most remarkable phenomena connected with insanity? What instance is related by Pinel? What is the Bicetre? *Ans.* A Hospital for the insane in France. What is the meaning of *proces verbal*? *Ans.* "Verbal process"—A written statement in which a person testifies to what he has seen or heard.

11. Dr. Abercrombie refers mental hallucination to several heads.

(1.) Propensities of character, which had been kept under restraint by reason, or habit, developing themselves without control, and leading the mind into trains of fancies arising out of them. Thus a man of an aspiring, ambitious character, may imagine himself a king or great personage; while in a man of a timid, suspicious disposition, the mind may fix upon supposed injury, or loss, either of property or reputation.

12. (2.) Old associations recalled into the mind, and mixed up perhaps with more recent occurrences, in the same manner as we often see in dreaming. A lady is mentioned, who became insane in consequence of an alarm from fire. She imagined herself to be the Virgin Mary, and that she had a halo around her head.

13. (3.) Visions of the imagination formerly indulged in what we sometimes call waking dreams, or castle-building, occur to the mind, in its disordered condition, and are now believed to have a real existence. The source of the hallucination, referable to this head, has been traced. In one case, for example, it turned upon an office to which the individual imagined that he had been appointed, and it was impossible to persuade him to the contrary, or even that the office was not vacant. He afterwards acknowledged that his fancy had at various times been fixed upon that appointment, though there were no circumstances that warranted him in entertaining any expectation of it.

11. Dr. Abercrombie refers hallucination to several heads, what is the first? Give the illustration.

12. What is the second? Give the illustration.

13. What is the third? State the case in which the source of the hallucination has been traced.

14. (4.) Bodily feelings give rise to trains of associations, in the same extravagant manner as in dreaming. Dr. Rush mentions a man who imagined that he had a Caffre in his stomach. In this case it is probable there was some uneasy sensation in the stomach, connected in some way, with the impression of a Caffre.

15. (5.) There is reason to suppose, that the hallucinations of the insane, are often influenced by a certain sense of the new and singular state, in which their mental powers usually are, and a certain feeling, though confused and ill-defined, of the loss of that power over their mental exercises, which they possessed when in health. To a feeling of this kind may be referred, perhaps, the impression so common among the insane of being under the influence of some supernatural power. The impression being once established of a mysterious agency, or a mysterious change in the state and the feelings of the individual, various other incidental associations may be brought into connection with it, according as particular circumstances have made a deep impression upon the mind. A man mentioned by Pinel, who had become insane during the French Revolution, imagined that he had been guillotined; that the judges had changed their minds after the sentence was executed, and had ordered his head to be put on again; and that the persons intrusted with this duty had made a mistake and put a wrong head upon him.

14. What is said of bodily feelings as giving rise to trains of association? What is the case mentioned by Dr. Rush?

15. By what, is there reason to suppose the hallucinations of the insane are often influenced? What may be referred to a feeling of this kind? The belief of this mysterious agency being once established, what may occur? Give the case mentioned by Pinel?

16. Out of the same undefined feeling of mental exercises, very different from a healthy state, arises the common belief of intercourse with spiritual beings, of visions and revelations. The particular character of these, perhaps, arises out of some previous operations of the mind, or strong propensity of the character; and the notion of a supernatural revelation may arise from a certain feeling of the new and peculiar manner in which the impression was fixed upon the mind. A priest mentioned by Pinel, imagined that he had a commission from the Virgin Mary to murder a certain individual, who was accused of infidelity. It is probable that the patient in this case, had been naturally of a violent and irascible disposition; that he had come in contact with this person, and had been annoyed and irritated by his infidel sentiments; and that a strong feeling in regard to him had thus been excited in his mind, which, in his insane state, was formed into this vision.

17. When the mental impression is of a depressing character, that form of the disease is produced, which is called melancholia. It seems to differ from mania merely in the subject of hallucination, and accordingly we find the two modifications pass into each other, the same patient being at one time in a state of melancholic depression, and at another of maniacal excitement. The most striking peculiarity of melancholia is the prevailing propensity to suicide.

16. Out of the same feeling, what other common feeling arises? From what may the particular character of these arise? From what may the notion of a supernatural revelation proceed? Relate the case of the priest mentioned by Pinel?

17. When the mental impression is of a depressing character, what is the disease called? In what does it differ from mania? What is the most striking propensity of melancholia?

18. Attempts have been made, to refer insanity to disease of bodily organs, but hitherto without much success. In many instances it may be traced to a connection of this kind, but in a large proportion we can trace no bodily disease. Insanity is, in a great number of cases, to be traced to hereditary predisposition.

19. The higher degrees of insanity, are in general so distinctly defined in their character, as to leave no room for doubt, in deciding upon the nature of the affection. But it is otherwise in regard to many of the lower forms of insanity, and great discretion is often required, in judging, whether the conduct of the individual, in particular instances, is to be considered as indicative of insanity.

18. What are Dr. Abercrombie's remarks upon the attempt to connect insanity with disease of bodily organs?

19. What is said of the higher degrees of insanity? What is said of the lower modifications?

SECTION IV.

SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS.

1. THE theory of Spectral Illusions is closely allied to the affections already treated of in the preceding sections. It is perhaps worthy of notice, that through most ages, and in most nations, the belief in the appearance of spectres has extensively prevailed. A belief in the existence of witches, and of witchcraft, has also extensively prevailed—and many an innocent life has been sacrificed to this strange and ridiculous delusion. The witch stories of New England, which caused so much excitement, and gained the full credence of the most learned and best citizens of that day, have long since been rejected as supremely ridiculous, though then thought to be founded upon sufficient testimony.

2. It is not very surprising that men who believed in witchcraft should also believe in ghosts and goblins, and accordingly we find Dr. Cotton Mather, one of the great men of the olden time, in New England, whimsical enough to have written a book, in which he attempted to prove that a denial of the appearance of Spectres was an approval of the doctrine of the Sadducees. His reasoning upon the subject is said to be very weak, an assertion which we presume will surprise no one.

SECTION IV.—1. To what is the theory of spectral illusions closely allied? What is worthy of notice? A belief in what else has extensively prevailed? What has been sacrificed? What is said of the witch stories of New England?

2. What is not very surprising? What is said of Cotton Mather?

3. The common assertion is, that the testimony in favor of the appearance of spectres is not sufficient—that they have appeared only to men in humble life, the rude and the ignorant—that they appear to only one person, and in the night—that the motives often are trivial—that there never has been an instance in which the evidence of such appearance was satisfactory—that many supposed cases of their appearance have been proved to be mistakes—that where they have been doubted, tales of them have ceased, and, on the contrary, where they have been believed in, they have multiplied. These statements in the general are well founded, and yet there are so far exceptions to them, that spectres, by some are *believed* to have been seen in the day time—by several persons—and by men of some learning and eminence. Every such appearance, however, must be susceptible of a satisfactory explanation, according to the ordinary laws of nature, and in cases which seem inexplicable, the inability to explain is doubtless owing to a lack of knowledge sufficient to trace out the particular cause.

4. We shall proceed to introduce a few facts and illustrations on this subject, under the following heads:

(1.) False perceptions, or impressions made upon the senses only, in which the mind does not participate. An example of this is given in the case of a gentleman who died at the age of eighty, and who, for several years before his death, never sat down to the table at his meals, without the impression of sitting down with a large party dressed in the fashion of fifty years back.

3. What is the common assertion? Notwithstanding, what is believed by some? Of what must every such appearance be susceptible? When cases seem inexplicable to what is it owing?

4. Facts and illustrations on this subject are given under several heads—what is the first? What is the example given?

He was blind of one eye, and the sight of the other was very imperfect. On this account, he wore over it a green shade, and he had before him the image of his own countenance, as if it were reflected from the inner surface of the shade.

5. (2.) Real dreams, though the person was not at the time sensible of having slept, nor consequently of having dreamed. A person under the influence of some strong mental impression, drops asleep for a few seconds, perhaps without being sensible of it, some scene or person connected with the impression appears in a dream, and he starts up under the conviction that it was a spectral appearance. The following example well illustrates the analogy between dreaming and spectral illusions. A gentleman having sat up late one evening under considerable anxiety about one of his children that was ill, fell asleep in his chair, and had a frightful dream, in which the prominent figure was an immense baboon. He awoke with the fright, got up instantly, and walked to a table which was in the middle of the room. He was then quite awake and quite conscious of the articles around him, but close by the wall, in the end of the apartment, he distinctly saw the baboon making the same horrible grimaces, which he had seen in his dream, and the spectre continued visible for about half a minute.

6. Dr. Dwight, former President of Yale College, in relating an instance of spectral illusion which occurred in England, seems to us, from the manner in which he does it, to yield it his credence. Dr. Dwight distinctly avows, "I would admit a story of a spectre, if as well attested as any in a court of justice. Make out such a

5. What is referred to the second head? What example is given to illustrate the analogy between dreaming and spectral illusions?

6. What is said of Dr. Dwight? What does he distinctly avow?

case and I will believe it. It is within the power of God to make spectres: there is no contradiction involved in it. Still, arguing from facts, it seems to me most probable that they do not appear, though I cannot prove that they do not." It may be that the following case was, in the opinion of Dr. Dwight, sufficiently substantiated to entitle it to belief. The story was told by Dr. Smith. We shall give it, in the language reported to have been used by Dr. Dwight in relating it, as follows:

"He (Dr. Smith) states, that he was once engaged in the settlement of a large estate in England, and found that a highly important document was missing, which was absolutely necessary to prove the title. As a very interesting family were dependent on the decision of the case for their livelihood, his feelings were greatly excited on the subject. The time rapidly approached when the cause was to be tried; and as he was sitting alone in his study one day, a stranger presented himself, in a neat black dress, without any thing very extraordinary in his appearance, whose approach was attended by no noise, and of whose appearance he was not aware until he raised his eyes by accident. Although he was surprised to find a person thus unceremoniously introduced into his private study, he had at first no suspicion of his being a supernatural visitor. The stranger, after a courteous salutation, informed him that he knew he was anxiously wishing to obtain an important document, and that it was to be found in the possession of a nobleman whom he mentioned, and to whom he recommended to him to make application. After communicating this information the mysterious visitor disappeared, it was difficult to imagine how; for he was

What instance does he relate which probably obtained his credence?

not yet suspected of being a spectre, and, on inquiry being made, none of the family had seen such a person, either entering or retiring. The Doctor appears to have been a man of strong mind, neither weak nor superstitious. He deliberated much and coolly upon this singular occurrence, but felt a great unwillingness to apply to the nobleman in question, on what appeared such unsatisfactory ground, and such an errand, and at last made up his mind to take no notice of the matter. He, however, was again visited by the same person, under very similar circumstances, being again surprised in his study by his unexpected appearance, and being once more urged, with more persuasion, to apply to the nobleman and request him to search for the paper. He at length became convinced that the experiment was worth trying, he visited the nobleman, and obtained what he desired. The document proved of the utmost importance, and saved the estate to the rightful heirs. The Doctor afterwards collected all the facts relating to the stranger's appearance, and makes out a very strong claim of evidence in favor of his being a spectre. The story does not sound like a common one; the narrator was a man of good character and wit. He possessed an ardent mind, and strong prejudices, but had strength of intellect, and was one of the first English preachers. The circumstances of this case were peculiar, and several of the natural objections to common ghost stories will not lie against it. The spectre is represented to have come into the Doctor's room in the day time; there was nothing that would seem likely to favor imposture or mistake; the veracity of the narrator cannot be questioned; the proof of the whole seems to have been furnished by the finding of the document sought for. Perhaps this story is in all respects as unexceptionable as any that has ever been furnished to prove the appearance of spectres."

7. If it is as unexceptionable as any, we must, with due deference, be permitted to say, that it is far from being conclusive, or satisfactory as a testimony in favor of the appearance of spectres. But on the supposition that spectres do not appear, we believe it is susceptible of a rational explanation. Dr. Smith, unquestionably had a dream or reverie, without being conscious of it. He had, probably, at some former period of time, when the subject was a matter of indifference to him, and, therefore, not calculated to make an abiding impression, heard of some papers being in the hands of this particular nobleman of consequence to this family—or something which in some way connected the nobleman with the transaction. It being at the time of no special interest to him, (Dr. Smith) he had entirely forgotten the statement. It is a well authenticated fact, that old impressions, long since forgotten, are frequently revived in dreams. Take then, these two considerations into view, namely, that a person may dream and not be conscious of it, and that long forgotten impressions are revived in dreams, this case is capable of explanation, consistently with the non-appearance of a spectre. Dr. Smith sat in his study, exercised with deep anxiety, and studying intensely into the case in hand. In the silence and solitude of his study, in this intensely anxious and laboring state of mind, he fell asleep, and dreamed that a person appeared before him, and communicated the information spoken of.

8. In dreams, we have already seen that we mistake

7. What is said of this case, though believed by Dr. Dwight to be as unexceptionable as any in favor of spectres? On the supposition that spectres do not appear of what is it believed to be susceptible? State with particularity the explanation of it here given?

our thoughts for real things, and while the dream lasts, it appears a reality. We have also seen the singular estimate which is put upon time in dreams. Transactions which require a considerable space of time, occupy in a dream but a few moments, or even seconds of time. Dr. Smith, then, not being sensible of dreaming, the dream would appear to him a reality, and the transaction to have occupied much more time than was actually allotted to the dream.

9. Having determined not to call upon the nobleman, and being again in his study intensely exercised with his reflections upon the case, and probably thinking, with some feeling of wonder, about his late mysterious visitor, it is not wonderful, that the same scene should be again presented in another transient, unconscious dream. And it is perfectly natural that the dream should not again recur, after he had visited the nobleman, obtained the paper, and had the anxiety of his mind relieved. Thus this, at first, seemingly unexplainable spectral phenomenon, appears to be susceptible of satisfactory explication, on rational principles.

10. (3.) Intense mental conceptions so strongly impressed upon the mind as for the moment to be believed to have a real existence. This takes place when, along with the mental emotion, the individual is placed in circumstances in which external impressions are very slight—as solitude, faint light, and quiescence of body. It is a state closely bordering on dreaming, though the vision occurs while the person is in the waking state. The following is an example, namely :

8. In dreams what have we already seen ? Dr. Smith not being sensible of dreaming, how would the dream appear to him ?

9. What is said in explanation of the second appearance of the supposed spectre ?

10. What is the third head ? When does this take place ? Upon what does this state closely border ?

11. A gentlemen was told of the sudden death of an old and intimate friend, and was deeply affected by it. The impression, though partially banished by the business of the day, was renewed from time to time, by conversing on the subject with his family and other friends. After supper, he went by himself to walk in a small enclosure in the rear of his house, which was bounded by extensive gardens. The sky was clear and the night serene, and no light was falling upon the enclosure from any of the windows. As he walked down stairs, he was not thinking of anything connected with his deceased friend; but when he had proceeded at a slow pace about half-way across the enclosure, the figure of his friend started up before him, in a most distinct manner, at the opposite angle of the enclosure. He noted his dress, and the several articles particularly, as those formerly worn by the deceased. He says, an indescribable feeling shot through his frame, but recovering himself, he walked briskly up to the spot, keeping his eyes intently fixed upon the spectre. As he approached it, it vanished, not by sinking into the earth, but by seeming to melt insensibly into air.

12. An interesting case referable to this head is described by Sir Walter Scott, in his work on Demonology and Witchcraft, as follows: "Not long after the death of a late illustrious poet, [probably Lord Byron] who had filled, while living, a great station in the eye of the public, a literary friend, to whom the deceased had been well known, was engaged during the darkening twilight of an autumn evening in perusing one of the publications which professed to detail the habits and opinions of the distinguished individual who was now

11. Relate the example here given.

12. Relate the interesting case, referable to the third head, described by Walter Scott.

no more. As the reader had enjoyed the intimacy of the deceased to a considerable degree, he was deeply interested in the publication, which contained some particulars relating to himself and other friends. A visitor was sitting in the apartment, who was also engaged in reading. Their sitting-room opened into an entrance-hall, rather fantastically fitted up with articles of armor, skins of wild animals, and the like. It was when laying down his book, and passing into this hall, through which the moon was beginning to shine, that the individual of whom I speak saw right before him, and in a standing posture, the exact representation of his departed friend, whose recollection had been so strongly brought to his imagination. He stopped for a single moment, so as to notice the wonderful accuracy with which fancy had impressed upon the bodily eye, the peculiarities of dress and posture of the illustrious poet. Sensible, however, of the delusion, he felt no sentiment save that of wonder at the extraordinary accuracy of the resemblance, and stepped onwards towards the figure, which resolved itself, as he approached, into the various materials of which it was composed. These were merely a screen, occupied by great coats, shawls, plaids, and such other articles as usually are found in a country entrance-hall."

13. (4.) Erroneous impressions connected with bodily disease, generally disease in the brain, produce these illusions. The illusions in these cases, arise in a manner strictly analagous to dreaming, and consist of some former circumstances recalled to the mind, and believed for the time to have a real and present existence. The diseases in connection with which they

13. What is the fourth head? To what are the illusions in these cases strictly analagous? Of what do they consist? With what disease are they generally connected?

arise are generally of an apoplectic or inflammatory character, sometimes epileptic; and they are very frequent in the affection called *delirium tremens*, which is produced by a continued use of intoxicating liquors.

14. An example of this form of illusion is given in the case of a man who kept a dram shop. He saw a soldier endeavoring to force himself into his house in a menacing manner, and in rushing forward to prevent him, was astonished to find it a phantom. He afterwards had a succession of visions of persons long since dead, and others who were living. He was finally cured by bleeding and other remedies, and the source of his first vision was traced to a quarrel which he had sometime before with a drunken soldier. Similar phantasms occur, in various forms, in febrile diseases. "A lady whom I attended," remarks Dr. Abercrombie, "some years ago, on account of an inflammatory affection of the chest, awoke her husband one night, at the commencement of her disorder, and begged him to get up instantly. She said she had distinctly seen a man enter the apartment, pass the foot of her bed, and go into a closet which entered from the opposite side of the room. She was quite awake, and fully convinced of the reality of the appearance; and, even after the closet was examined, it was found almost impossible to convince her that it was a delusion." There are numerous examples of this kind on record. A writer mentions a lady who, during a severe illness, repeatedly saw her father, who resided at the distance of many hundred miles, come to her bedside, and, withdrawing the curtains, address her in his usual voice and manner. A farmer, mentioned by the same writer, in returning from a market, was deeply affected by a most

14. Relate the example given of this form of illusion. Give the example of the lady attended by Dr. Abercrombie.

extraordinary, brilliant light, which he thought he saw upon the road, and by an appearance in the light, which he supposed to be our Savior. He was greatly alarmed, and spurring his horse, galloped home; remained agitated during the evening; was seized with typhus fever, then prevailing in the neighborhood, and died in about ten days. It was afterward ascertained, that on the morning of the day of the supposed vision, before he left home, he had complained of headache and languor; and there can be no doubt that the spectral appearance was connected with the commencement of the fever. Entirely analogous to this, but still more striking in its circumstances, is the case of a lady about fifty, who, on returning one evening from a party, went into a dark room to lay aside some part of her dress, when she saw distinctly before her the figure of death, as a skeleton, with his arm uplifted, and a dart in his hand. He instantly aimed a blow at her with the dart, which seemed to strike her on the left side. The same night she was seized with fever, accompanied with symptoms of inflammation in the left side, but recovered after a severe illness. So strongly was the vision impressed upon her mind, that, even for some time after her recovery, she could not pass the door of the room in which it occurred, without discovering agitation, declaring that it was there that she met with her illness.

15. (5.) To these sources of spectral illusions, we are to add those which originate in pure misconception; the *Imagination* working up into a spectral illusion a natural circumstance, which may be in itself, some really trifling thing. Of this class is an anecdote, related of a whole ship's company being thrown into the utmost state of consternation, by the apparition of a

15. What is the fifth head? What anecdote of this class is related?

cook, who had died a few days before. He was distinctly seen walking ahead of the ship, with a peculiar gait, by which he was distinguished when alive, from having one of his legs shorter than the other. On steering the ship towards the object, it was found to be a piece of floating wreck.

16. To the same principle is referable the celebrated "Spectre Ship," which appeared in the harbor of New Haven, Connecticut, many years ago. The story is briefly as follows: The people of New Haven, in the early settlement of the colony, not enjoying desirable facilities for foreign trade, united in the building of a ship, for the purpose of availing themselves, to some extent, of such advantages. A ship of one hundred or one hundred and fifty tons burden, was completed, and in January, 1646, a passage having been cut through the ice for about three miles, the ship set sail with about seventy souls on board, designing first to touch at the West India Islands, and then sail direct for England. Many of the most beloved, respected, influential, and enterprising citizens of New Haven, heads of families, male and female, were on board. The ship never was heard from. The long absence of the ship, and the finally forced and settled conviction, that she was lost, with all on board, produced consternation, distress, and mourning, in the infant colony. Two years and five months after the sailing of the ship, in the month of June, after a thunderstorm, there appeared, about sunset, over the harbor of New Haven, the form of the keel of a ship, with three masts, to which were suddenly added, all the tackling and sails, and presently after, upon the highest part of the deck, a man appeared, standing with one hand leaning against his left side,

16. To what is the case of the New Haven "Spectre Ship" referable? Relate the story.

and in his right hand was a sword pointing towards the sea. The phantom continued about a quarter of an hour, and was seen by a crowd of wondering witnesses, till at last, there arose a great smoke, which covered all the ship, and in the smoke she vanished away. It was many years afterwards reported by those who witnessed the illusion of the Spectre Ship, that the Rev. Mr. Davenport, the minister of New Haven at the time, publicly declared, "that God had condescended to give, for the quieting of their afflicted spirits, this extraordinary account of his disposal of those, for whom so many prayers had been offered."

17. In this atmospheric phenomenon, if it may so be called, the workings of excited imagination in a number of persons, tending to the same results, (for they were all animated by a similar feeling in regard to the lost ship) is distinctly traceable, first laying the keel of the ship and erecting the masts, and then, as the imagination became more heated, by mutual suggestions, the whole ship was completed to its topmost rigging, and the man with the drawn sword appeared. And when the rising breeze began to agitate the natural vapor of the ocean, the excited imagination of the wondering spectators easily wreathed the fancied ship in dense clouds of smoke.

18. A story referable to the same head is related of a gentleman traveling in the Highlands of Scotland, who was conducted to a bedroom, which was reported to be haunted by the spirit of a man who had there committed suicide. In the night he awoke under the influence of a frightful dream, and found himself sitting up in bed, with a pistol grasped in his right hand. On

17. State the explanation here ventured to be given?

18. Relate the story, referable to the same head, of the gentleman traveling in the Highlands of Scotland.

looking round the room he now discovered, by the moonlight, a corpse dressed in a shroud reared against the wall, close by the window ; the features of the body, and every part of the funeral apparel, being perceived distinctly. On recovering from the first impulse of terror, so far as to investigate the source of the phantom, it was found to be produced by the moonbeams forming a long bright image through the broken window.

19. Two esteemed friends of mine, says Dr. Abercrombie, while traveling in the highlands, had occasion to sleep in separate beds in one apartment. One of them, having awoke in the night, saw by the moonlight a skeleton hanging from the head of his friend's bed ; every part of it being perceived in the most distinct manner. He instantly got up, and upon examination found the illusion to be produced by the moonbeams falling upon the drapery of the bed. He returned to bed and soon fell asleep. Again awaking, the skeleton was still distinctly before him, and being determined to be disturbed no longer by the phantom, he arose and adjusted the drapery of the bed, and the skeleton appeared no more.

20. From the foregoing considerations, it will, we think, be apparent, that spectral illusions, commonly denominated ghosts and goblins, are in all cases referable to natural causes ; and a contrary belief is but the offspring of ignorance and superstition.

21. We may here appropriately introduce an extract from Sir Walter Scott's work on Witchcraft and Demonology, and for its good sense commend it to care-

19. Relate the anecdote, recorded by Dr. Abercrombie, of two esteemed friends of his ?

20. From the foregoing considerations what will be apparent ?

21. For what is the extract from Sir Walter Scott's work com-

ful consideration:—"There are many ghost-stories which we do not feel at liberty to challenge as impostures, because we are confident, that those who relate them on their own authority actually believe what they assert, and may have good reason for doing so, though there is no real phantom after all. We are far, therefore, from averring that such tales are necessarily false. It is easy to suppose the visionary has been imposed upon by a lively dream, a waking revery, the excitation of a powerful imagination, or the misrepresentation of a diseased organ of sight; and, in one or other of these causes, (to say nothing of a system of deception, which may, in many instances, be probable), we apprehend a solution will be found for all cases of what are called real ghost-stories. In truth, the evidence with respect to such apparitions is very seldom accurately or distinctly questioned. A supernatural tale is, in most cases, received as an agreeable mode of amusing society, and he would be rather accounted a sturdy moralist than an entertaining companion, who should employ himself in assailing its credibility. It would, indeed, be a solecism in manners, something like that of impeaching the genuine value of the antiquities exhibited by a good-natured collector for the gratification of his guests. This difficulty will appear greater, should a company have the rare good fortune to meet with the person who himself witnessed the wonders

mended? What do we not feel at liberty to challenge as impostures? Why? After all what may there not be? What is it easy to suppose? What may be probable? What do we apprehend may be found for all cases of ghost stories? What is very seldom accurately or distinctly questioned? How is a supernatural tale in most cases received? How is he accounted who should presume to assail its credibility? Indeed what would it be considered? What would it be like? When will this difficulty appear

which he tells; a well-bred or prudent man will, under such circumstances, abstain from using the rules of cross-examination practised in a court of justice; and if in any case he presumes to do so, he is in danger of receiving answers, even from the most candid and honorable persons, which are rather fitted to support the credit of the story which they stand committed to maintain, than to the pure service of unadorned truth.

22. The narrator is asked, for example, some unimportant question with respect to the apparition; he answers it on the hasty suggestion of his own imagination, tinged as it is with belief of the general fact, and, by doing so, often gives a feature of minute evidence which was before wanting, and this with perfect unconsciousness on his own part. It is a rare occurrence, indeed, to find an opportunity of dealing with an actual ghost-seer; such instances, however, I have certainly myself met with, and that in the case of able, wise, candid and resolute persons, of whose veracity I had every reason to be confident. But, in such instances, shades of mental aberration have afterward occurred, which sufficiently accounted for the supposed apparitions, and will incline me always to feel alarmed in behalf of the continued health of a friend who should conceive himself to have witnessed such a visitation.

23. The nearest approximation which can be generally made to exact evidence in the case, is the word of some individual who has had the story, it may be, from the person to whom it has happened, but most likely

greater? From what will a well-bred person abstain? If he should presume to do so, of what would he be in danger?

22. If the narrator is asked an important question how does he answer it? With what has the writer himself met? In such instances what have afterwards occurred?

from his family or some friend of the family. Far more commonly, the narrator possesses no better means of knowledge than that of dwelling in the country where the thing happened, or being well acquainted with the outside of the mansion in the inside of which the ghost appeared.

24. In every point, the evidence of such a second-hand retailer of the mystic story must fall under the adjudged case in an English court. The Judge stopped a witness who was about to give an account of the murder, upon trial, as it was narrated to him by the ghost of the murdered person. 'Hold, sir,' said his lordship; 'the ghost is an excellent witness, and his evidence the best possible; but he cannot be heard by proxy in this court. Summon him hither, and I'll hear him in person; but your communication is mere hearsay, which my office compels me to reject.' Yet it is upon the credit of one man, who pledges it upon that of three or four persons, who have told it successively to each other, that we are often expected to believe an incident inconsistent with the laws of nature, however agreeable to our love of the wonderful and the horrible."

23. What is the nearest approximation which can generally be made in this case?

24. Under what, must such second hand evidence fall? Relate the anecdote of the English Judge. Upon what are we often expected to believe an incident inconsistent with the laws of nature?

THE END.

No.		Date		Description		Amount	
1		Jan 1		Balance		100.00	
2		Jan 15		Received from A. B.		50.00	
3		Jan 30		Received from C. D.		25.00	
4		Feb 10		Received from E. F.		75.00	
5		Feb 20		Received from G. H.		30.00	
6		Feb 25		Received from I. J.		40.00	
7		Mar 5		Received from K. L.		60.00	
8		Mar 15		Received from M. N.		20.00	
9		Mar 25		Received from O. P.		80.00	
10		Apr 5		Received from Q. R.		15.00	
11		Apr 15		Received from S. T.		90.00	
12		Apr 25		Received from U. V.		35.00	
13		May 5		Received from W. X.		55.00	
14		May 15		Received from Y. Z.		45.00	
15		May 25		Received from A. B.		65.00	
16		Jun 5		Received from C. D.		25.00	
17		Jun 15		Received from E. F.		75.00	
18		Jun 25		Received from G. H.		30.00	
19		Jul 5		Received from I. J.		40.00	
20		Jul 15		Received from K. L.		60.00	
21		Jul 25		Received from M. N.		20.00	
22		Aug 5		Received from O. P.		80.00	
23		Aug 15		Received from Q. R.		15.00	
24		Aug 25		Received from S. T.		90.00	
25		Sep 5		Received from U. V.		35.00	
26		Sep 15		Received from W. X.		55.00	
27		Sep 25		Received from Y. Z.		45.00	
28		Oct 5		Received from A. B.		65.00	
29		Oct 15		Received from C. D.		25.00	
30		Oct 25		Received from E. F.		75.00	
31		Nov 5		Received from G. H.		30.00	
32		Nov 15		Received from I. J.		40.00	
33		Nov 25		Received from K. L.		60.00	
34		Dec 5		Received from M. N.		20.00	
35		Dec 15		Received from O. P.		80.00	
36		Dec 25		Received from Q. R.		15.00	
37		Jan 5		Received from S. T.		90.00	
38		Jan 15		Received from U. V.		35.00	
39		Jan 25		Received from W. X.		55.00	
40		Feb 5		Received from Y. Z.		45.00	
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44		Mar 15		Received from G. H.		30.00	
45		Mar 25		Received from I. J.		40.00	
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47		Apr 15		Received from M. N.		20.00	
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99		Sep 25		Received from M. N.		20.00	
100		Oct 5		Received from O. P.		80.00	



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process.
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide
Treatment Date: Oct. 2004

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